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Man's Biological Future in 
Hungarian Utopian Literature* 
George Bisztray 
A fairly recent, unofficial report of the National Academy of 
Sciences concludes the survey of the present state of biology with this 
judgment: 
"When one day man accepts responsibility for his acknowledged 
power to control his own genetic destiny, the choice between plans 
must be based on value judgments. When he begins to use the power 
to control his own evolution, man must clearly understand the values 
towards whose realization he is to strive."1 
In other words: For what purpose life, present or future? For 
what purpose a new breed of man? 
Right now, these still are uncomfortable questions. None of the 
existing social models should dare claim that it could serve as ideal for 
the future generations. The Nazis tried to shape genetics so that it 
corresponded to their ideology. Western scientists preferred to stay on 
grounds which they could long defend as purely speculative and non-
political. A certain "scientist" named H.J. Muller, for instance, recom-
mended freezing the sperms of famous males to be used by lucky 
females in the future.2 In less future-oriented psycho-medical practice, 
like the changing of human behavior and world outlook by methods 
ranging from lobotomy to brain washing, our scientific age has 
produced more outstanding results than in planning for the future. 
Though man's natural existence is inseparable from the social 
formations and technological conditions in which he lives, his physi-
cal constitution seems to have attracted the attention of Utopian 
writers all through the ages. The unchangeability of nature has been a 
traditional commonplace in Western culture, yet experience, and later 
Darwinism, pointed out how man-created culture significantly influ-
enced man's very natural essence too. 
"This paper is developed from a lecture given in July 1974 at the annual conference 
of the Science Fiction Research Association in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 
The critical debate on Darwinism, especially, had scores of 
Utopian implications, and the self-assigned prophets like Sumner and 
Ward, Engels and Thomas Huxley, all had some biological program 
for the future. Opponents of scientific philosophies also adhered 
occasionally to Utopian ideas, as in the case of Nietzsche. Biological 
Utopias (sometimes also called "anthropological Utopias") entered late 
into Western European literatures, the finest and bitterest being 
Aldous Huxley's Brave New World and Ape and Essence. 
It is remarkable how much importance Eastern European writers 
have assigned to the bio-future of man. Technological Utopias of the 
scope of Jules Verne are scarce, perhaps because of the relatively late 
industrialization of the East-Central European countries. It was rather 
the changeability of the organism that most concerned the 19th and 
20th century writers from these countries. This interest was primarily 
not scientific, however: the integrity of the human constitution, the 
mental freedom of thought and action, were of equal concern for these 
writers. 
In this paper, four fantastic-utopian works, or parts of works, 
f rom Hungary will be analyzed as models of East-Central European 
writers' reactions to the development of biology, and particularly 
anthropology, neurology, and behavioral science. The works cover 
the period f rom 1860 to the eve of World War II. 
"Model" is a term well known from general communication 
theory, still relatively little used in literary scholarship. Yet it seems to 
serve our purpose effectively. If we investigate the causes and func-
tions underlying the Hungarian Utopian imagination, we find more 
than isolated, individual "examples" in the four books analyzed. 
Changing as the historical conditions were, the four works neverthe-
less represent a consistent and continuous preoccupation with man's 
future in the perspective of his own knowledge and his created 
"second nature." In the summary, we shall see how the considered 
Hungarian Utopian works correspond to a generalized definition of 
the model. 
—2— 
Ten years after Austria and Russia defeated the Hungarian revo-
lution of 1848-49, a patriot and playwright-nobleman, Imre Mada'ch, 
sat down to summarize a dark decade in an allegorical work. The out-
come was The Tragedy of Man (Az ember tragediaja), an extremely 
problematic cosmic drama which has since then been frequently and 
unjustly identified as a paraphrase of Goethe's Faust. Though much 
less known abroad than is deserved or desirable, Madach's "Tragedy" 
still exists in over half a dozen different English translations.3 
In the drama, Lucifer guides Adam through different periods of 
human history up to Madach's age and beyond. There are fifteen 
scenes in the tragedy, of which the twelfth is a Utopian one. The age 
which the writer imagines will follow the 19th century knows no 
nations, the world is united under the rule of science and reason. 
Those species of organic nature which did not serve human needs have 
been extinguished, the rest tamed and exploited. Society is molded in 
phalanxes in which, similar to an ant-heap, individuals have no 
aspirations of their own, only socially assigned roles. Those who, like 
a new Luther, Plato, or Michelangelo, revolt against their slavery, 
must suffer humiliating punishment. 
Madach's dramatic scene is clearly an early protest against the 
Utopian socialist equalitarianism of Charles Fourier. Also, it has been 
customary to concentrate the attention on Madach's attitude toward 
the socio-political aspects of Utopian or naive socialism. As early as 
1862 the author of the "Tragedy" had to defend himself against the 
respected progressive critic Janos Erdelyi who reproached him for 
representing the socialist ideals unfairly. Since then, the political 
aspect of the phalanx-scene has been the focus of interest, and literary 
historians (including Georg Lukacs in his Madach-essay of 1955)4 
speculate endlessly whether Madach was "reactionary" or "progres-
sive" in his view of the future. 
We suggest another approach to the Utopian scene: an approach 
based on Madach's apparent view of the advance of biological 
sciences in the future. This critique of the advance and application of 
sciences appears mostly in a final and concentrated episode in which 
we witness the social interference with the spontaneous perpetuation 
of the human race and with the potential will of the individuals. Eve 
appears as young mother with her newborn baby. Scientists inspect 
this baby and another one, and decide that, judging from the shape of 
their skulls, one shall be raised to become a doctor, the other a 
shepherd. The babies are instantly separated from their mothers. Eve 
protests violently: however, she is pronounced ready for a new mate. 
Adam claims her, but the doctor of the phalanx is against the match: 
two unstable individuals like Adam and Eve would beget psychotic, 
hysterical descendants, who could not adjust themselves to a society 
of reason. When Adam hears that love is no longer a relevant factor, 
he becomes so outraged that only Lucifer's magic intervention can 
save him from bedlam. 
What concerns us in Madach's Utopian vision is not so much his 
view of socialization and mass-man (in which he shows some similar-
ity to J.S. Mill's ideas), but rather, his critique of scientific marriage 
planning and professional counseling. He sees the real danger not in 
romantic love or natural child raising, but in a Lamarckian deter-
minism which decides human fates by using comparative anthropolo-
gical and genetic charts. Madach believes that man is to have the free-
dom to live in a certain way he chooses for himself because of, or even 
in spite of, his innate biological setup. Consequently, he cannot accept 
science as an antidote for the risks this freedom implies. 
—3— 
Madach's time was transitory, however, and later decades of the 
19th century witnessed a more positive view of science and technology 
among writers. The Hungarian Mor Jokai was a product of the period 
after 1864, when the constitutionalist-liberal middle class and nobility 
made peace with each other and with Austria. It was no longer a post-
revolutionary pessimism, but rather a conformistic wish for coopera-
tion with Big Brother Austria, that motivated his writings. 
Jokai has always been extremely popular in his country. Also, he 
has been widely translated, especially in his lifetime and in the earlier 
decades of our century, even into quite esoteric and improbable 
languages (such as Armenian, Chinese, Estonian and Ruthenian). The 
enormous success of this skillful storyteller has made something of an 
idol of him. Jokai had a vivid imagination which often created 
fantastic or Utopian figures, situations, or whole works. Notable of 
these is A Novel About The Next Century (A jovo sza'zad reg^nye, 
1872-74). In this work, Jokai described the "Home State" of the future 
which, possessing the secret of aviation, forces the world into disarm-
ament. When the secret is broken and the arch-enemy (NB: Russia!) 
also builds airplanes, a challenge of air war shows the absurdity of the 
armed race, and the "Home State" develops into a "Union of States", 
based on eternal peace and global cooperation. 
A Novel About The Next Century is about a political and tech-
nical Utopia, yet it discusses little of the anthropological aspects of 
rapid historical changes. Another later novel of Jokai, however, 
opened future vistas for changing and controlling the individual, using 
a contemporary motif for the kernel of its plot. 
In 1889, Jokai published the notably inferior novel, The Soul 
Shaper (A l£lekidomar). Though unsuccessful by any aesthetic stan-
dard, this work concerns us because of the description of its central 
hero, a certain Landory. This mysterious person was supposedly 
modelled after one of the police officers who played a key part in 
rolling up the widespread net or robbers and fences covering the 
Hungarian Flatlands a hundred years ago. 
The exact identity of Landory is impossible to verify. It has been 
customary to find analogies between him and a count Gedeon Raday, 
the royal commissionary who led the campaign against the outlaws. 
Because of Raday's status and social position, however, it might be 
suspected that rather one of his officers, for instance an obscure 
investigator called Laucsik, might have served as a more concrete 
example for Jokai than did the count. 
In Jokai's characterization, this Landory had an almost super-
natural influence on the captured outlaws. Instead of the traditional 
physical pressure, he used his psychological capacities to make the 
suspect speak. 
Jokai dwells on Landory's interrogating methods only in one 
chapter of the book, but with full admiration. His hero plays on the 
hidden emotions and aspirations of the criminals. In some cases, 
Landory succeeds in making the suspect list his crimes in order to 
prove that he has deserved his dreadful reputation. At other times, he 
confronts the murderer with his victim in some macabre form, so that 
the criminal's fear and conscience are awakened. His green eyes put 
the suspects in a semi-hypnotic state, from which they awake sweat-
ing, trembling, and crying. He frequently interrogates at night, and 
the faces of those arrested for examination are covered with masks, so 
that they don't recognize each other. 
Aside from the obvious influence of the pseudo-psychologism of 
Victor Hugo and Sue, relevant parts of Jokai's novel are historically 
true and convincing records of early occurrences of policy techniques 
which we now call collectively "brainwashing." It is not so much 
Jokai's dangerously naive approach to such techniques as it is the fact 
that the writer reflected these phenomena at such an early stage of 
their development, that makes The Soul Shaper important to discuss 
as a preface to the world of The Gulag Archipelago and A Clockwork 
Orange. 
—4— 
In the decadent-symbolistic atmosphere around the turn of the 
century, scientific fantasies and Utopias were infrequent, both in Eas-
tern and in Western European literatures. After the cataclysm of 
World War I, however, they re-appeared in ample numbers. Among 
the Hungarian writers, it is Frigyes Karinthy's activity that is relevant 
to our topic. 
Karinthy belongs to those not-yet-discovered geniuses of world 
literature whose fantasy products, unlike those of Verne and Jokai, 
were often too philosophical to be easily consumed. In two fantastic 
books, he continued Gulliver's travels in modern setting. In Voyage to 
Faremido (Utazas Faremidoba, 1916), Gulliver gets to the planet of 
intelligent and perfect self-programmed robots; in Capillaria (1921), 
he sinks to the bottom of the sea to find there a world of amazons who 
enslave, exploit and, indeed, devour the degenerate, dwarf-size males^ 
This latter novel, particularly, can be regarded as a congenial early 
literary contribution to Alister Hardy's hypothesis about the aquatic-
feminine origin of mankind.6 
Karinthy wrote a drama, Tomorrow Morning (Holnap reggel, 
1916), and a documentary novel, A Journey Around My Skull (Utazas 
a koponyam koriil, 1937) about the dimensions and perspectives of 
neurology. His drama is plainly bad by any standard; his novel, 
however, is a masterpiece, available also in English translation. 
The drama, Tomorrow Morning, centers around the private 
conflicts of a dangerous genius, an engineer who invented a winged 
remote-control rocket which can easily be used for military purposes. 
In order to prove to his estranged, eccentric, thrill-hunting wife that 
he has no fear, he must take the challenge of flying the rocket on its 
test-flight as a kind of kamikaze-pilot. His surviving the test-flight 
would mean, however, his failure as an engineer. Karinthy's attempt 
to make this nonsensical paradox believable is pathetically unconvinc-
ing. The point is, however, that the hero is afraid. For better or worse, 
he happens to run into a mysterious Finnish neurologist, a certain Irjo 
( = Yrjo?) Olson who has found the way to extinguish the fear of death 
in man through a simple operation. The engineer chooses to undergo 
this operation, flies the plane the next day only to discover that the 
explosive mechanism is faulty, and thus surviving the flight, he starts 
a new life free from his earlier obsessions with his wife and with fame. 
Almost twenty years after the play was written, a much less 
mystical, indeed prosaic, still genuinely skillful Scandinavian medical 
wizard, Herbert Olivecrona carried out a long and complicated opera-
tion on Karinthy himself. He removed an egg-sized tumor from the 
writer's brain. The circumstances of this operation form the content of 
A Journey Around My Skull. 
Karinthy as a writer deals with three possible levels of mental 
existence. One is the so-called "normal" state of the human mind. The 
other is the short-circuited mind, implying the wide variety of mental 
illnesses. In-between the two is the physical deformation: brain 
tumor. Still comprehensible, visible, and operable, the tumor can 
nevertheless drive the individual to the verge of insanity. Karinthy 
does not go so far as to even mention the possibility of a grand guignol 
like a certain Danish playwright does, who describes how a man 
Q 
tortured by brain tumor kills and decapitates his wife. Yet Karinthy 
too has pathological complaints, such as schizophrenic visual and 
hallucinative disorders, maddening headaches, giddiness and identity 
crises. 
Both in the drama and in the documentary account, the medical 
scientist appears as a powerful manipulator of the physical organism 
of another individual. Doctor Olson compares the human body to a 
machine without instructions, and the history of medicine to thou-
sands of years spent in trying to figure out how the machine works. In 
the novel, the author repeatedly looks at Olivecrona as one kind of a 
Wizard of Oz, in the process of detecting and fixing up a short-circuit 
in an endless system of wires (that is, neurons). In the dizziness of the 
operation, there is either an interaction between doctor and patient in 
the infrasensory sphere, or, alternately, a complete transposition of 
the consciousness of the writer to the doctor and vice versa. Karinthy 
has no doubts about Olivecrona; the doctor appears as healer. Yet the 
ethical responsibility of the manipulator is implicit: opening up the 
skull, connecting and disconnecting of nerves—for what purpose? 
—5— 
Three writers from a small East-Central European country have 
stated their opinion on the possibilities of shaping or influencing man. 
What is common and what is different in these writers? 
At the first sight, dissimilarities seem to dominate. Considering 
the value judgment our writers pass on the future, we find that 
Madach is more pessimistic than either Jokai or Karinthy. Also, it is 
only Madach's single dramatic scene which is undisputably put in the 
future; the other works take place in the (fantastic) present, but indi-
cate that the unique events they describe will be more universal and 
accepted in the future. This tendency to tear down the barriers 
between present and future is itself characteristic of Thomas More's 
Utopia. Naturally, current scientific influences give a distinct feature 
to each of the works discussed. Madach might have known Malthus' 
idea of family planning, with its naive genetic implications. Hypnosis 
always fascinated Jdkai, and the 18th century Mesmer was one of his 
awful idols. Karinthy lived on the eve of the 20th century revolution in 
surgery when taboo organs (like the brain or the heart) became opera-
tional objects, and when transplanting gradually became a reality. 
At least as important as the differences are the similarities among 
the works, however. All three writers regard the dividing lines 
between organic non-conscious and organic conscious nature as 
extremely shaky. They remind us to take good care of man's greatest 
property: his ethic feeling. The responsibility of professionals is 
consistently spelled out. 
The general understanding of the predominantly biological (or 
anthropological) character of the Hungarian Utopias would be diffi-
cult, however, with the application of conventional analytical tech-
niques only. In the introduction it has been suggested that the four 
works might be used as models in one way or another. Let us take a 
look at the essential characteristics of any model as we know these 
from information theory. 
Quantitatively on the structural level, the model is a copy of a 
system in corresponding proportions. Qualitatively (functionally) 
defined, the model is a constructed system which reacts to certain 
inputs in the same way as does the original system. Furthermore, the 
model has an experimental character. It serves one research hypothe-
sis or another. Consequently, there are no unique models; the indivi-
dual interests and perception of their builders define their character. 
Looking at the four Hungarian Utopian works as possible models, 
we find a strongly authoritarian feature of leadership. The biological 
character of the Utopias discussed results in leadership that is not 
assigned, but acquired, through specialized (as in Madich) or excep-
tional (as in Jokai or Karinthy) skills or knowledge. It is intellect, and 
not physical strength, that distinguishes the biological leadership of 
the future. 
The consequence of biological planning and intellectual refine-
ment appears as a new authoritarian trend, however. Knowledge is 
never represented as socially shared, but as a respected controlling 
force. Consequently, it becomes the privilege of a new aristocratic cast 
which is similar to the one we find in Hesse's Magister Ludi (Das Glas-
perlenspiel.) The methods and decisions of the new mandarins are 
surprisingly undisputed, by the other heroes or the masses (as in 
Madach), or by the author (as in Jokai). It is only Karinthy who hints 
significantly in Tomorrow Morning that the unstable geniuses of skill 
can be "used" by a cold-headed political super-elite. 
The role and responsibility of the Utopian scientist in the interpre-
tation of the three Hungarian writers is, understandably, analogous 
with the historical conditions, too. The authoritarian, oppressive 
character of a functionalized, materialistic social structure is spelled 
out most prominently by Madach, who was writing in an age of 
absolutism. In Jokai, only criminals (who "deserve it") are forced to 
undergo a socially beneficial brainwashing process. Finally, in Ka-
rinthy, the paranoid genius accepts a similarly "corrective" and 
socially desirable process by free choice, yielding to the humane and 
logical arguments of Doctor Olson. (Also, Karinthy himself "chose" 
the risky operation by his own free will—though his freedom was con-
siderably limited by the fact that his only alternative was a slow, pain-
ful death.) At any rate, the comparison of the three individual 
"models" shows a development from conditions in which individual 
freedom and responsibility appeared as hopelessly lost, to circum-
stances in which these became realistic to consider. 
The "experiments" the three Hungarian writers were involved in 
depend precisely on these changes in the social structure. Madach 
seems to probe especially into science and its relevance for Hungary. 
The general relationship of this country to Austria was analogous 
with a well-known colonial pattern insofar as a larger nation, claiming 
a higher civilization, imposed its standards on a smaller one. Exper-
ience shows that the result of such relationship is often a nationalistic 
rejection of whatever progressive feature the colonizing nation may 
have. (This aspect of the Utopian tradition, its connection with 
nationalism, has been regrettably neglected by researchers. Gandhi's 
plans for a future India, Swift's veiled reference to the Anglo-Irish 
relationship and Ibsen's parody, "Gynthiana," are just a few of the 
writings relevant to mention here.) 
Madach focuses on science as a possible foundation for a better 
age, and condemns it. In order to understand his attitude, we must 
keep in mind that by condemning a Western ideal of some scientific-
equalitarian "paradise," he also passes judgment on Austria and there-
by performs a patriotic action. 
Thirty years later, Jokai is no longer bothered by Austrification. 
Instead, he speculates on an ambitious cosmopolitan level. Hungary 
had been a downtrodden, semi-colonized country for centuries. Could 
she regain her ancient, respected status in Europe by coping with her 
own internal problems (The Soul Shaper)? If so, this country might 
fulfill a glorious world mission in the more distant future (A Novel 
About The Next Century). This truly ambitious speculation carries 
J6kai to extremes, yet his Utopian novels show a clearly sequential 
pattern in their hypotheses of Hungary's present and future. How a 
sudden awakening to a nation's potentials produces a missionary zeal 
which is reflected in Utopian literature is a phenomenon clearly recog-
nizable in the wave of American and Soviet Russian science fiction 
Utopias of our century. 
Again, 30-50 years pass, and Karinthy witnesses the emergence of 
international belligerence. Technology is slipping out of the control of 
unstable geniuses, and becomes a threat in the hands of power-hungry 
politicians. But science can help mankind, states Karinthy. Lobotomy 
can save man from his self-destructive frustration (Tomorrow Morn-
ing.) The same human knowledge which produces the means of uni-
versal destruction is capable of producing the remedy at the same 
time. Karinthy's A Journey Around My Skull is actually a corrobora-
tion of this thesis in the form of a personal documentation, seemingly 
without any Utopian reference. As in Jokai, we find a consistent 
development pattern in Karinthy's Utopian works. It is beyond our 
aspiration, however, to make Karinthy's numerous other Utopias 
(about Faremido, Capillaria, etc.) correspond to this pattern. As in 
Jokai, in Karinthy too the contribution of small nations to the techno-
logical-scientific scene is spelled out—the engineering genius is Hun-
garian, his healer a Finn, Olivecrona a Swede. 
The involvement of the discussion of concrete historical and geo-
graphical determinants in the observation of particular Utopian works 
does not exclude the possibility of looking at these works as being uni-
versally interesting and relevant. Nor does such method dim the main 
preoccupation, the biological perspective. Rather, the building of 
models should further explain on a genetic level both the changing 
value of science in a set of literary works and the potential supra-
national appeal of these works. 
The history of its Utopian literature is an unwritten chapter of the 
culture of Hungary. (Nor have the Utopian traditions of other East-
Central European countries been ever studied—certainly not com-
paratively.) Consequently, the fairly well established classifications 
and terms generally used by Western critics of Utopian literature are 
also missing in Hungary. To some, it might even seem ludicrous to 
think of this small, technologically long underdeveloped country in 
terms of the Utopian tradition of world literature. 
Yet, Hungarian literary history does not lack significant achieve-
ments in the Utopias. Gyorgy Bessenyei's satirical political Utopia, 
Tarimenes' Travel (Tarimenes utazasa, 1804) is an introduction to the 
later 19th century production of Madach and Jokai. As for Karinthy, 
he was not alone in the 20th century with his Utopian inclinations. 
Mihaly Babits, one of the greatest modern Hungarian writers, himself 
wrote a Utopian novel, Pilot Elza, or The Perfect Society (Elza pilota 
vagy a tokeletes tarsadalom, 1933). The first volume of Sandor Szath-
mari's "Kazohiniatrilogy" came out in 1941, the last one in 1957. In 
the sixties, Tibor Dery's Mr. G.A. in X. (G.A. ur X-ben, 1964) raised 
eyebrows with its "controversial" contribution to the Utopian tradi-
tion. (Incidentally, the astonishment at De'ry's Kafkaesque-fantastic 
vision was understandable: Dery wrote the novel while serving a 
prison term for his activity in favor of the Nagy government during 
and after 1956.) Last but not least, the find of the seventies is the 
young Peter Lengyel whose novel Ogg's Second Planet (Ogg masodik 
bolygoja, 1969) has become an international success. 
Directing the attention of literary scholarship to yet undiscovered 
aspects of Hungarian literature seems to be a long needed effort. The 
Hungarian Utopian tradition is just one of the hidden treasures in 
world literature. Besides establishing analogies between Western 
European and Hungarian literature, however, the specific situation of 
this latter, embedded in the motley East-Central European cultural 
context, should not be forgotten. 
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Praise the Lord! 
Albert Szenczi Molnar, 1574-1633 
Andrew Harsanyi 
Molnar means miller in English and, in fact, Albert Szenczi 
Molnir 's father was a well-to-do miller in the market town of Szenc 
(Szencz according to contemporary spelling) in north-western 
Hungary; hence his full Hungarian name: Szenczi Molnar Albert. He 
was born in Szenc in 1574 and died in 1633 in Kolozsvar, Transyl-
vania; his gravestone still stands in the cemetery of Hazsongard. 
Molnar spent more than 30 of his 59 years abroad as student, 
writer and scholar, beloved and respected; yet, after his return to his 
homeland in 1625, he was ignored and died forsaken in poverty. Still, 
no one in the history of the Reformed Church of Hungary had such a 
lasting impact upon its theology, piety and congregational life as 
Albert Molnar. Moreover, Albert Molnar had a decisive influence 
upon the development of Hungarian poetical forms and the 
Hungarian language in general. 
Molnar lived in the period of Hungarian history when the 
country was divided among three powers. Its middle part was 
occupied by the Turkish empire, the East and Southeast, Transyl-
vania, was an independent principality, while the northern and 
western sector was under the rule of the Habsburg king. In his youth, 
Albert Molnar witnessed first the consolidation of the Reformation, 
then the rising Counter-Reformation and the struggle for religious 
freedom championed by the princes of Transylvania: Stephen Bocs-
kay and Gabriel Bethlen; in his later years the Thirty Years War raged 
all over Europe. 
Albert Molnar began his studies at the age of 10. We know the 
story of his life quite accurately, for he kept a diary together with a 
kind of scrap-book with greetings of teachers and friends—among 
them such personalities as Theodore Beza (Calvin's successor in 
Geneva), the astronomer Johannes Kepler and Prince Gabriel Bethlen. 
These, together with hundreds of his letters, have been preserved and 
published. Other valuable biographical data can be distilled from the 
dedicatory prefaces to his printed books. These are written mostly in 
Latin. Latin was the international language of scientists, scholars and 
diplomats, even of merchants who engaged in international trade. The 
ten-year-old child had to learn to read, write and speak Latin at the 
same time he began to learn his Hungarian alphabet. 
Incredible as it sounds, at the age of 12, Albert Molnar, together 
with some other youngsters and an adventurous tutor, wandered 
across the country in search for a new place to study. He landed at a 
place called Gone. The fame of this place comes from its Reformed 
pastor, Gaspar Karolyi, the first translator of the full Bible into Hun-
garian (1590). At the time Molnar was in Gone the work of 
translation, carried out by Karolyi and several co-workers, was in full 
swing. At a most sensitive age, Molnar lived in the atmosphere of 
scholarly excitement, in the world of books and dictionaries, and in 
the midst of great hopes that the Word of God would be made avail-
able to the people in their own language. Molnar later made a note in 
his diary that in Gone he had listened to many heated discussions 
about theology and linguistics among Karolyi and his associates. 
Having finished his primary education, Molnar entered the 
College of Debrecen to pursue courses in grammatics, poetics and 
rhetoric. The discipline of the school was very strict. Morning prayers 
were at 6 and there were classes until evening. Missing service in the 
chapel, skipping classes, galavanting in the city, excessive drinking, 
wearing too modern garments—all drew punishment: the stick or 
even incarceration. Spiritual food was aplenty, food for the body 
much less. The school was poor and the students even poorer: they 
ate when good-hearted citizens invited them to their table or gave pots 
of food and bread to the mendicants, the students going house to 
house begging for food. 
Albert Molnar spent a year and a half in Debrecen and one record 
has it that he read every Hungarian book he was able to lay his hands 
on. The books had to be taken away from him to prevent him from 
neglecting his Latin. From Debrecen he returned to Gone where he 
became the messenger who carried the manuscripts and the proofs of 
the first Hungarian edition of the Bible between Gone and the print-
shop in Vizsoly. What an experience it was to see the printing press 
which, in a short time, produced 480 thousand sheets (the Bible was 
printed in 800 bulky copies)!' 
Soon the sixteen-year-old Molnar proceeded to the town of Kassa 
to become tutor to a burgher's son. Here he saw a Latin-German dic-
tionary. Teaching his Hungarian pupil Latin, how he wished he had a 
Latin-Hungarian dictionary! But Molnar wanted to study not to 
teach. So he decided to go to Wittenberg, Germany, to the cradle of 
the Reformation. Just like that. Students, in those times, travelled by 
the "apostles' horses", that is: on foot. There were no hotels, either. 
But that was no problem. When evening came he would knock at the 
door of the village pastor or teacher, who would gladly welcome him: 
the itinerant student was a source of news, a kind of "living news-
paper." For the student such visits meant not only supper and bed but 
also the opportunity to make precious contacts, to secure sponsors to 
help him in his studies. 
Albert Molnar was 16 when he left his native country. It took him 
five weeks to make it to Wittenberg. In his loneliness he was miracul-
ously comforted: the first man who spoke to him in the foreign city 
greeted him in Hungarian; he was another student from the home 
country. But Wittenberg was Luther's city, while Albert Molndr 
wanted to hear the Reformed interpretations of God's Word. This set 
him out westward, to the center of Reformed theology, Heidelberg. 
He must have been an expert wanderer; just look at the map: he made 
it in 13 days from Wittenberg to Heidelberg. His next place of study 
was Strassburg where, at the age of 21, he received his bachelor's 
degree. (The wreath of laurel is still in his scrap-book.) In the time 
span of eleven years he attended eight different schools. Today we 
would call it school-hopping; then, it was the sure sign of financial 
hardship. Also, the desire to hear the best teachers. 
Now Albert Molnar could have returned to Hungary to assume a 
pastorate. But he wanted to acquire still more knowledge and a 
master's degree. Not in Strassburg, however. First, he had no money. 
Even for his wreath of laurel he had to give a promissory note for two 
silver pieces. But the greater trouble was theology. In the continuous 
struggle between Lutherans and Reformed, the Lutherans gained 
power in Strassburg. To take holy communion in the Reformed way, 
Molnar used to go to a small neighboring community, Buschweiler. 
When he was found missing in chapel in Strassburg at Pentecost com-
munion in 1596, he was asked where he had been. He promptly 
admitted the reason of his absence. Equally promptly he was forced to 
leave. It was done in a roundabout way: he had to ask permission to 
be dismissed. Molnar wrote that since he would rather follow the 
peace of his conscience than the faith of the city, he wanted to leave. 
The pious answer was that he would not be held back against his con-
science. Before leaving the city he went to church where the pastor 
was just attacking the Reformed teaching. To Molnar's great satisfac-
tion—as he noted in his diary—lightning struck the church. 
The direction now was southward and the goal Geneva, the city 
of Calvin. Well armed with letters of introduction, Molnar called on 
Theodore Beza, the saintly old successor of John Calvin. Molnar was 
graciously received and as the old man offered him white bread and 
wine he pointed to the picture of Calvin on the wall: "This is my 
father in Christ." Albert Molnar, the 22 year old wanderer from 
Hungary, was quite certain that Calvin was also his father in Christ. 
The next project was Italy: all the great reformers had seen 
Rome, Albert Molnar could not miss it either. With all the suspicions 
of a Calvinist but with all the curiosity of a humanist he visited 
"papist" shrines; he zig-zagged through Italy like a modern American 
tourist (only he saw more of it). In Rome he was accorded brotherly 
hospitality by students of the Collegium Hungaricum, in an (as we 
would call it today) ecumenical spirit. 
Back in Heidelberg (mostly on foot) he did not have a copper 
penny to his name. So he went around hunting for benefactors, col-
lecting a gold coin here, a silver there. In Heidelberg the plague was 
raging which was a great help to Molnar: many of the professors and 
students fled the city so there was room for him in the college. But 
when they returned he was put out. On Easter Sunday of 1597 he 
spent the day in church; when the doors were locked he went to the 
local pastor for help and advice. He got 5 pennies to buy supper . . . 
All through these years it was a precarious existence: when he went to 
bed at night he did not know if he would have dinner the next day and 
as he ate his dinner he would not know if he would have a bed to sleep 
in that night. He rose at 4 in the morning and chanted hymns in 
Hungarian, German, Latin and Greek; and he prayed, in tears, 
because he would not give up. Amidst starvation and uncertainty he 
would pursue his studies and this in such a brilliant way that all his 
teachers would praise him and would give him emphatic letters of 
recommendation. 
In 1599 Molnar decided to go home—but just for a visit to find 
new patrons and to see his dying father. For he had great plans and he 
followed them through to the last letter. After having secured two 
wealthy sponsors, burghers from Nagyszombat and Kassa, he 
returned to Germany. 
His first dream to come true was a Latin-Hungarian dictionary. 
(We may recall how Molnar, as a young tutor in Kassa, wished there 
had been one.) In six months the work was ready for printing. Easy to 
say it now, but we must think what enormous difficulties he had to 
cope with. Molna'r's dictionary was the very first one of its kind. He 
could take a dictionary in Latin to pick the words but he had to find 
the Hungarian equivalents himself. It was not only the problem of 
finding them, many he had to create, describe, explain. The work, 
ready in 1604, had become the precursor of all Hungarian dictionaries 
written since. It was the private enterprise of a thirty-year-old 
wanderer-scholar whose only motivation was to raise the cultural 
level of his country and to link it to Western culture. 
In those times there were no publishers, only printers. The 
authors had to pay for the printing of their works. How could one get 
money for this purpose? By dedicating the book to a wealthy sponsor, 
a king or a prince, a city or a college. The money thus obtained would 
cover the cost of printing and the livelihood of the author as well. 
There were no royalties, the author would receive about 25 copies he 
could sell. The rest of the copies would be sold by the printer as part of 
the cost of printing. 
With his dictionary Molnar had a great idea: dedicate it to 
Emperor Rudolph! The dedicatory letter had to be printed in advance 
and bound in the book. Then the author would present it, taking the 
chance if the sponsor would accept it or not. There were many dis-
appointed authors indeed! 
Albert Molnar had to go to Prague to see the Emperor. So he 
made his way to Prague on foot, logging along copies of the diction-
ary. He was well armed with letters of introduction to both scholars 
and officials in the imperial court. The greatest of them came from 
Johannes Kepler, the famous scholar and the Emperor's astronomer. 
Through Kepler's mediation it was easy to get into the Emperor's 
presence: the dictionary was graciously accepted and Molnar was 
given 50 florins—quite a sum considering the state of the imperial 
treasury. 
Kepler and other new friends in Prague made sure that the news 
of Molndr's acceptance by the Emperor travelled all over Europe's 
academic community, so that this sponsor of high standing should 
prompt others to follow suit. Still, the greatest gain for Molnar was 
Kepler's friendship. Kepler closed one of his letters with these words: 
"God provides for his people in such turbulent times; love me . . . 
your faithful friend, Johannes Kepler."1 It is not hard to imagine what 
it meant to Molnar: there was the imperial mathematician, the 
Emperor's personal astronomer, the world-famous scholar, and here 
was a young Hungarian scholar-to-be, without position or status— 
and the great man called him his friend! 
His success with the dictionary prompted Molnar to pursue his 
second dream. The Reformation favored congregational singing and 
Hungarians loved to sing. Yet, the hymns available somehow could 
not gain popularity—neither the music, nor the words. Molnar's idea 
was to translate the biblical Psalms as they had been set into poetical 
form by the men from Geneva: Beza and Marot with the music of 
Bourgeois; in other words; the Geneva Psalter. Molnar did not know 
French but he had heard these Psalms sung in Geneva and he sung 
them himself in the German version. He wrote: "I want my 
Hungarian people to weep with these Psalms just as they weep in 
Basel." It took him 99 days to complete the job. He followed the 
German version but a French pastor helped him compare them with 
the French original. Molnar created a masterpiece. Since the first 
edition of 1607 there have been more than a hundred printings of these 
150 Psalms in Hungarian and in the course of 360 years hardly any 
linguistic or poetic changes were made: they are being sung today 
exactly as then. Thus the best critic of his work has been the Hungar-
ian Reformed congregation, and it is not hard to predict that as long as 
there will be Hungarian Reformed Psalm singing in the churches the 
people will "raise their hearts to God," "praise the Great Shepherd" 
and "proclaim His mercy" as interpreted by Albert Molnar. 
At this time Molnar just left the city of Altorf, where he had 
studied for a while and had been tutoring at private homes. His favor-
ite professor, Konrad Rittershausen, wrote these words in his letter of 
recommendation: "Albertus Molnar was an exile because of his love 
for knowledge, not to forget his homeland but to gather knowledge 
and experience in order to be capable to serve there later."2 
In fact, Molndr had still other plans to serve his Hungarian nation 
from Germany. To realize them he found a new, mighty sponsor in 
the person of Maurice, the Elector of Hessen, himself a scholar, a 
patron of literature and higher learning. Molnar must have had a 
winsome personality and also the ability to present his projects very 
convincingly. When he was presented to the prince he was invited to 
join the prince's family on a boat trip at the end of which he was 
dismissed with a letter to the rector of the University of Marburg with 
the order to give Molnar free tuition, room and board as the prince's 
gift. 
The new project was the Bible. The first full translation of the 
Hungarian Bible published in 1590 was bulky, very expensive and 
unavailable on the book-market. Molnar wanted a Bible small in size, 
easily to be handled, cheap enough to be accessible to the public; he 
also wanted to correct the many typographical errors made by the 
non-Hungarian printer. And Molnar did it again: a greatly revised 
version, nicely printed. The first two editions yielded 3,000 copies. 
There was one more obstacle to overcome: it was the age of the 
Counter-Reformation and the Bibles had to be smuggled into Hun-
gary. The Bibles were packed in barrels and marked as "other mer-
chandise." The shipments got through because Molndr soon received 
letters telling him of the joy that the Word of God could now be read 
by the common people. 
The Elector Maurice spoke many languages, even some Hungar-
ian. The reason for this was that on the maternal line he was a descen-
dant of the Xrpads, the royal house of Hungary, through—as we call 
her today—St. Elizabeth of Hungary (her grave is still visible in 
Marburg). Maurice wanted to learn the language well and so he com-
missioned Molnar to write a book of Hungarian grammar.3 Again he 
produced a work usable up to this day; and again a first of its kind. It 
contained sections on phonetics, spelling, grammar, syntax, etc. It is 
acknowledged that these works, the dictionary, the psalms, the Bible, 
the book on grammar, had a codifying effect on the Hungarian liter-
ary language. 
Now Molnar really could have returned to Hungary to take a 
regular teaching position there. As a matter of fact, he had an invi-
tation to be a teacher at S^rospatak. His friends and benefactors in 
Hungary pleaded with him in many letters to come home and utilize 
his knowledge to the benefit of his "own poor people." But Molnar 
first wanted to get married. He was 35, after all. He did not have much 
experience with women ever since years earlier he fell in love with the 
daughter of a glass merchant's widow in Heidelberg—at first sight— 
but was rejected. Reason: how could an itinerant student support a 
family? Result: Molnar had a nervous breakdown complicated by 
some strange illness which left him unconscious for days; delirious, he 
thought his friends to be angels and devils fighting over him. It may 
have been a mild form of the plague. 
Now, at last, he married the daughter of a professor in Marburg, 
Kunigunda Wildpetter, a young divorcee whose former husband, also 
a teacher, had run away and turned to Judaism. She was granted a 
divorce on the grounds of desertion. There was a big wedding in 
Oppenheim. 
They returned to Hungary in 1612 where Molnar became the 
chaplain at the court of one of the country's richest aristocrats, the 
Count Ferenc Batthyanyi. But he did not stay long. Maybe his family 
couldn't adjust to village life, maybe Molnar had no experience for the 
pastorate, or maybe it was his new dream: to establish a Hungarian 
print-shop where he could publish books for his people. After some 
delay, he made his way to the court of the great Prince of Transyl-
vania, Gabriel Bethlen. He was presented to the Prince in Fogaras on 
February 14, 1615. Bethlen promptly offered him a professorship at 
the college in Gyulafej^rvar. But this was not what Molnar wanted 
and he humbly rejected the offer by saying that his family was afraid 
of the possibility of Turkish attacks. Bethlen understood and dis-
missed him by writing these words in his scrap-book: "Stimulus dedit 
aemula virtus." 
They returned to Germany, to Oppenheim. Here, he first became 
choirmaster, then headmaster of the city school. It wasn't a high 
position but it meant a secure livelihood. He knew the city, he had 
many friends, several of his books had been printed here. At the age of 
43 he looked forward to a quiet life. Everything changed, however, 
when he received Prince Bethlen's great commission: translate into 
Hungarian the chief theological work of John Calvin, The Institutes of 
the Christian Religion. 
Molnar welcomed this beautiful opportunity. Hungarian 
Reformed theology was based on Calvin's interpretation but only 
through mediation, not through direct study. The knowledge of the 
Institutes was needed for both the theological consolidation of the 
Reformed church and the defense against the attacks of the Counter-
Reformation. This is why a Hungarian translation was so necessary. 
In the course of his work, completed in 1624, Albert Molnar also laid 
the foundation and created the Hungarian theological language. Sim-
ultaneously with the work on the Institutes, Molnar translated and 
published a book of sermons by the famous German preacher Sculte-
tus and a small prayer book for the use of pious women. 
It was history's irony that while working on this translation, in 
Heidelberg, the city was besieged and finally taken by the mercenaries 
of Tilly (1622) and Molnar was not only robbed of all of his belong-
ings (except his books) but also tortured for money. He did not want 
to stay in Transylvania for fear of the Turks and now, in the West, he 
suffered all the miseries of war. 
Now he felt that he had completed all his plans: to Hungarian 
theologians he gave Calvin's Institutes, to those who wished to visit 
Hungary a Hungarian grammar, to Hungarians who wanted to study 
Latin a dictionary, to the faithful people a handy Bible, sermons and a 
prayer-book, and to the congregation a book of Psalms fit to be sung 
at worship. At this time it was he who wanted to go home. Together 
with his family he arrived at the court of Prince Bethlen, now in 
Kassa, in 1625. With the exception of brief intervals, he had spent 34 
years abroad—it was time to repatriate. 
We know very little of his last years. His diary stopped and no 
letters are extant from this period. For a short while he was supported 
by Prince Bethlen; he was probably schoolmaster in Kassa. In 1629 he 
appears in Kolozsvar. This was after the death of the Prince and we 
can safely assume that Molnar was hoping to receive a gift from the 
Prince's legacy—not so much money but a position. There was noth-
ing in the Prince's will for Molnar. From several contemporary 
remarks we know that from this time on he lived in poverty; aban-
doned and forsaken, he died in 1633. He was the victim of the plague. 
Why was he forsaken? We can only guess. The best conjecture is 
that Molnar, the modern scholar, Western-oriented, who followed 
what today we would call a "liberal" interpretation of Calvin's theo-
logy, just did not find his place in his own church and country ruled 
and dominated by Istvan Geleji Katona, the Reformed bishop, rigidly 
orthodox in theology, cruelly authoritarian in church government. 
Knowing Molnar, he would not compromise—so there was no job, no 
support, and there were no sponsors. A single sponsor happened to 
send him money in 1630, a rich nobleman, Ferenc Darholcz, for whom 
he translated a book about "The Supreme Good". 
At the time of his death contemporary scholars wrote such 
epitaphs: "Germany gave him assistance, his homeland only exile;" 
"the only thing Transylvania gave him was his grave."4 
We could well call the life of Albert Szenczi Molnar a tragic one. 
He himself, however, never complained, only prayed to God to help 
him in his endeavors. He chose this kind of life. Instead of returning 
home after the customary few years of study and getting settled, he 
continued his life as an itinerant scholar tiring his body and eyes, as he 
wrote it in his diary. Why? He gave the answer himself, a hundred 
times always the same: "Spending time at the famous academies 
among great teachers I am not after knowledge to bring worldly 
riches; I desire knowledge so I can help the most people in our suffer-
ing homeland."5 
The life of Albert Szenczi Molnar did not end in 1633. He was 
consumed by the fire of the Spirit only to shine through the centuries 
like a comet. He loved his Lord with heart and talent. No better words 
can be found to characterize his life than his own as he translated the 
150th Psalm: 
Az urnák nevét dicsérvén, 
Es minden lelkes állat 
Dicsérje az nagy Urat, 
Dicsőség Istennek, Ámen. 
(Praising the name of the Lord, 
Every being with a soul 
Praise the great Lord. 
Glory be to God, Amen.) 
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manuscripts have been preserved: Lelki iscola [Spiritual school] (1600) a transla-
tion of the work of Daniel Tossanus; Conspiratio Kendiana Transylvanica (1610); 
and a small book dealing with comfort in bitterness and the teaching of true love, 
author unknown, 1629. 
The titles listed above are spelled as they appear in the originals. The titles are 
long according to contemporary custom. 
Collected Works. 
Szenczi Molnar's diary, correspondence and other writings have been pub-
lished by Lajos Dezsi, Szenczi Molnar Albert naploja, levelezese es iromdnyai [The 
diary, correspondence and writings of Albert Szenczi Molnar], Budapest: Hungar-
ian Academy of Science, 1898, pp. 520 with notes. Dezsi's publication contains 
a list of all the known works of Szenczi Molnar (pp. XIII-XVII), and a list of 
secondary sources on Szenczi Molnar and his works, beginning as early as 1595. 
Dezsi later published some additional letters Szenczi Molnar Albert levelei Camer-
ariushoz is Leodidushoz [ Albert Szenczi Molnar's letters to Camerarius and 
Leodidus]. Budapest: Athenaum, 1908. A list of Szenczi Molnar's works and 
secondary sources on him, based apparently on Dezsi, was included in the bio-
graphical article in Jozsef Szinnyei, Magyar irok elete h munkai [Life and works of 
Hungarian writers], Vol. IX., pp. 161-166. Budapest: Hornyansky, 1903. 
Some of Szenczi Molnar's works are not extant any more. We know only 
from his other works that they had existed. On the other hand, many of his works 
as well as some of the books and articles listed below can be found in North 
American libraries with a good collection of Hungarian material. 
Selected Works. 
There are three recent text editions. 1. Albertus Molnar Szenciensis, Nova 
Grammatica Ungarica. With an introduction by Gyula Decsy. Indiana University 
Publications, Uralic and Altaic Series, No. 98, no date (1969); 2. Szenci Molnar 
Albert koltoi muvei [Poetical works of Albert Szenczi Molnar] Bela Stoll ed. This 
is volume VI of Regi magyar koltok tdra, XVII. szazad [Collection of old Hungar-
ian poets, 17th century] Budapest: Akademiai kiado, 1971. (This is a critical 
edition of the Psalterium Ungaricum and other poetical works dispersed in Szenczi 
Molnar's writings). 3. Szenci Molnar Albert: Discursus de Summo Bono, Judit 
V£s^rhelyi ed. This is volume IV of Regi magyar prozai emldkek [Old Hungarian 
prose relics], Budapest: Akademiai kiado, 1975. 
II. Secondary Sources 
The only comprehensive treatment of Szenczi Molnar's life and works is still 
the one written by Lajos Dézsi, Szenczi Molnár Albert (1574-1633), Budapest: 
Hungarian Historical Society, 1897. This work was the main source of this study. 
Scores of articles and even a few minor books, have been written on Szenczi 
Molnár dealing with various periods in his life or analyzing one or more of his 
works. Also, every major work on Hungarian history, church history, or cultural 
history fits him into the life of the Reformed Church in Hungary and stresses his 
significance in the evolution of Hungarian language and literature. In the prepara-
tion of this study the following of these were used: 
Aprily, Lajos and Béla Árokháty. Szenczi Molnár Albert, Aprily Lajos és 
Árokháty Béla tanulmányával [Albert Szenczi Molnár, with studies by Lajos 
Aprily and Béla Árokháty]. Budapest, 1939. 
Fitz, József. A magyarországi nyomdászat, könyvkiadás es könyvkereskedelem 
története [The history of Hungarian printing, book-publishing and book-mar-
keting]. Vol. II. Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó, 1967. 
Gáldi, László'. Szenczi Molnár Albert zsoltárverse [The verse of Psalm of Albert 
Szenczi Molnár], Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó, 1958. 
Horváth, János. A reformácio jegyében [In the sign of the Reformation]. Buda-
pest: Gondolat kiadó, 1957 (2nd edition). 
Kerékgyártó", Elemér. Szenczi Molnár Albert zsoltárai magyar verstörténeti szem-
pontból [The psalms of Albert Szenczi Molnár from the point of view of the 
history of Hungarian poetry]. Budapest, Beke, 1941. 
Varga, Bálint. Szenczi Molnár Albert, a magyar zsoltárénekszerző, élete és iro'i 
működése [Albert Szenczi Molnár, the Hungarian author of songs of psalms, 
his life and his work as a writer], Budapest: Sylvester, 1932. 
Zsigmond, Ferenc. A Debreceni Református Kollégium története 1538 (7)-1938 
[The history of the Reformed College of Debrecen], Debrecen, 1937. 
Articles and other studies. 
Czegle, Imre. "Ramus életmüvéről, jelentőségéről es magyar hatásáról" [Ramus, 
his life's work, his significance and his Hungarian influence], Theológiai Szemle, 
1972 nos. 11 and 12, pp. 329-338. 
, Rámista volt-e Szenczi Molnár Albert? [Was Albert Szenczi 
Molnár a Ramist?] Manuscript of a paper presented at the session of the Institute 
of Literary History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, at Sárospatak, May 
1964. Used by courtesy of the author. 
Hargita, Pál. "Magister harmonisticus." Református Egyház. November, 1971, pp. 
245-247. 
, "The Friendship of Kepler and A. Szenczi Molnár." Acta 
Agronomica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, Vol. 20 (1971). 
Révész, Imre. "Az Institutio története" [The history of the Institutes}. In Kálvin 
János Institutioja [The Institutes of John Calvin]. Reformed Parochial Library, 
Vol. XIX. Budapest, 1936. 
Révész, Emeric. "Albert Molnár de Szencz. A l'occasion du troisiéme centenaire de 
sa mort ." Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie, 1934, pp. 50-59. 
Tolnai, Gábor. "Szenczi Molnár Albert értékelésének néhány kérdéssé" [A few 
questions concerning the evaluation of Albert Szenczi Molnár], Irodalomtör-
ténet, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1954), pp. 152-162. 
, "Zur Geschichte der Faust-Sage in Ungarn. Gesang des Albert 
Molnár" [Concerning the history of the Faust-Saga in Hungary. The song of 
Albert Molnár], Acta Litteraria Academicae Scientiarum Hungaricae Vol. 4, 
Nos. 1-2 (1963), pp. 3-16. 
Turóczi-Trostler, József. "Szenczi Molnár Albert Heidelbergben" [Albert Szenczi 
Molnár in Heidelberg], Filológiai Közlöny Vol. I, Nos. 1-2 (1955), pp. 9-18 and 
139-162. 
The 400th anniversary of Szenczi Molnár's birth was marked by the appear-
ance of commemorative articles on him in Hungarian periodicals all over the 
world. Significant of them, and used in the preparation of this study, were the 
following: 
Pávich, Zsuzsánna. "Szenczi Molnár Albert, 1574-1634," Református Egyház, 
Vol. XXVI, No. 7 (July 1974), pp. 145-148. 
Csomasz Tóth, Kálmán. "Négyszáz év halhatatlanság" [Four hundred years of 
immortality]. Theológiai Szemle, 1974, nos. 9-10, pp. 272-276. 
The Hungarian literary monthly, Kortárs, dedicated its August, 1974 issue to 
the anniversary of Szenczi Molnár's birth. It contained essays and poems by Géza 
Feja, Sándor Weöres, András Sütó, György Somlyó, Jenő Kiss, Magda Szabó, 
László Király, András Fodor, Aladár Lászlóffy, Domonkos Szilágyi, Ferenc 
Szemler, Lajos Létay, Sándor Kányafdi and Géza Páskándi. There is also an edi-
torial in this issue concerning the anniversary. 
The weekly of the Hungarian Reformed Church, Reformátusok Lapja, also 
dedicated an issue to the memory of Szenczi Molnár (XVIII/37, September 8, 
1974). The issue contained articles by Kálmán Újszászy, Endre Zsindely, Béla 
Takács, György SzŐnyi, Imre Telegdi and a poem by János Bódás. Telegdi's article 
"Szenctől Kolozsvárig" [From Szene to Kolozsvár], was continued in nos. 38 and 
41 of the weekly (September 15 and October 6). 
NOTES 
1. A passage from Kepler's letter, quoted by Hargita, "Magister harmonisticus," 
p. 246. 
2. Rittershausen's letter of recommendation, dated November 1, 1606, in Dezsi 
(ed.) Szenczi Molnar's Diary, Correspondence . . . p. 441. 
3. Concerning the Hungarian ancestry of the Elector Maurice, see Szenczi 
Molnar's dedicatory preface to his bible translation, in the appendix to the 
text-edition by B&a Stoll op. cit., p. 470; concerning the Hungarian language 
study of Maurice, see Szenczi Molnar's dedicatory preface to his New Hungar-
ian Grammar, ibid., pp. 472-478. 
4. The two epitaths, the first by John Henry Bisterfeld, the second by John Henry 
Alsted, both professors of German origin at the college of Gyulafejervar, 
Transylvania, quoted by Gabor Tolnay, op. cit., p. 13. 
5. In Szenczi Molnar's dedicatory preface to the Psalterium Hungaricum, in 
Stoll's text edition, p. 14. 
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The Lyrical Poetry of Sandor Petdfi* 
Joseph A. Batori 
The lyrics of Petofi prove the rule of all great lyrical poetry: they 
encompass three worlds. The poet's personal inner life; the concrete 
exterior scene in which he lives; and the realm of ideas, the spirit of 
the age are the elements blended in all lyrical poetry. But, although the 
blending of these three elements forms the unity of a lyric, one or the 
other will receive greater emphasis. No matter which poet we consider 
in the vast spectrum of the Hungarian lyric of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, these three factors strike us. Petdfi's great fore-
runner, Mihaly Vorosmarty, as also his great follower, Endre Ady, 
wrote their poems under the impact of their inner world and the spirit 
of the age. Thus, their poetry became the powerful expression of the 
age in which they wrote but, at the same time, was a telling demon-
stration of the individual humanity, sensitivity and receptivity to the 
external truths of the great poetic figures. The lyric of Vorosmarty is 
philosophical; the lyric of Petofi presents everyday episodes often 
crystalized into an experience that is deeply moving through its artistic 
quality and presentation of universal human truth; in Ady, the emo-
tional impact of the external world, seen through the prism of a 
possibly overly-sensitive soul, becomes a wondrous, lasting exper-
ience. 
In what does Petofi's originality lie? Precisely in what numerous 
insignificant critics of his day objected to: that he sings of the simpli-
city of his parents' home, of every day cares, of his own honest and 
exemplary life. They objected to his practice of using scenes of family 
life, of the life of the village and the puszta—seemingly insignificant 
events—and especially, that his poetry was always based on specific 
images imprinted on his memory. But Petofi's individuality, his varied 
images and metaphors, his love of humanity, his patriotism and love 
*An address delivered at Trinity College, Washington, D.C., on the opening of the 
Petdfi Memorial Year (1973), by the late Rev. Jozsef Batori. Translation © Enik<5 
Molnar Basa. 
of his native country made these poems lyrics. And they are personal 
lyrics, though his style must be called lyrical realism, for he presents 
himself as he is, truthfully, with his strengths and weaknesses, ideals 
and hates. His art lies in his ability to transform, through the magic of 
poetry, the harmony he creates between his personality and the realis-
tic scenes of his environment. 
Petofi's entire life can be reconstructed from his poetry. We see 
him as a child, a student, wanderer, soldier, actor and lover. We see 
him later, a champion of the dominant ideas of the country, as he 
aligns his own life with the totality of Hungarian existence, proposes, 
suggests, judges, urges, creates new genres in poetry, writes prose, 
translates, criticizes, and conducts an extensive correspondence. 
It is impossible not to like the personality that emerges from his 
lyrics, the reflection of a warm and loving person who firmly believes 
that God created man for happiness. Petdfi wrote, "Until a man has 
been happy, he cannot die." Who would not wax enthusiastic and be 
moved by Petofi's nobility of soul when he cries to God in "Fate, Give 
me Space": "my every heartbeat is a prayer for the happiness of the 
world".! The more hypocritical the world in which one lives, the 
more one is struck by Petofi's sincerity and steadfastness: "If you are a 
man, be a man; make your ideals your faith; / Profess this, even 
though your life is the price. /Rather deny your life a hundred times 
than deny yourself; /Let life itself be lost, if only honour remains."2 
The poet lived and died accordingly, as we now know, and we see also 
that "Freedom and Love" was not merely a poetic motto for him, but 
his creed: "Love and Liberty—These I need: /For Love I'd sacrifice 
my life, / but for Liberty I sacrifice my L o v e . " 3 It is not accidental that 
Pet6fi's translators, both the English and the Germans, saw this brief 
poem as the expression of his beliefs even before his death. And when 
he died, exactly as he had foretold it and as he had wished it, he stood 
before the world as a poet who had knowingly followed his destiny. 
Another characteristic of Petofi's poetry is dedication to the 
people. "The true poet", he wrote—and Petofi strove to be a true poet 
—"is he who drops his heavenly manna on the lips of the folk."4 
Every line he wrote, he wrote so all could understand it, so even the 
simplest person could identify himself with the poet's fate. Therefore 
he idealized the family as every man's mode of life and goal, and to 
this end presented not only his own life, but also Hungarian domestic 
scenes in many of his poems. And when, after his marriage he could 
celebrate his own wife, his own child, his poetry soared. 
But we find more than just the poetry of folk life and of the 
hearth, or his own personal reflections in Petofi's lyrics. We see a rich 
and varied sensibility. He was not a good actor, but his instinct was 
right: he can assume roles masterfully in his poetry. Everyone is sur-
prised when they learn from Petofi's biographers that he could not 
tolerate wine and never drank it, since numerous drinking songs seem 
to suggest the exact opposite. Likewise, his personality was not suited 
to the flirtatious interchanges of society, although his witty, jesting, 
occasionally sharp poems suggest something else. 
A method of expression that he brought to near perfection is the 
genre picture. The minor episodes of Hungarian life of the mid-nine-
teenth century, and its human types, gained lasting representatives on 
an eternally human plane: the village women, the men, the provincial 
noblemen, the outlaw, the young lovers, smaller and larger children 
are all framed in one memorable picture, as for example, the evoca-
tion of the peasant room in "Winter Evenings". 
Literary histories list in detail the themes of his poems, pointing 
out their rich variety. But only seldom do they mention that this rich-
ness comes from his lyrical realism: the harmony and relationships of 
Pet6fi's human and poetic personality created the poetry we know 
today as the characteristic Petofi-lyric. 
A prominent place among his works must be given to Petofi's 
patriotic lyrics. Petofi's insight into the Hungarian soul and the picture 
of Hungarians which emerges from his poetry, as well as the role he 
marked out for the nation, is unique and still valid. To fully under-
stand this aspect of the poet we must know that Peto'fi's family had 
been granted a patent of nobility by Leopold I in 1667, a full century 
and a half before his birth. Furthermore, Petofi was aware of this, and 
when the Diet abolished quit-rents, and so in effect freed the peasantry, 
he criticized the earlier behaviour of the nobles, but that day wrote in 
his diary, "I did not say this by way of reproach to the nobility to which 
I myself belong."5 Those who wish to transform Peto'fi into a rootless 
individual do so because it seems to be perhaps more democratic or 
more romantic. But the facts prove otherwise. His youth was spent in 
a wholly Hungarian atmosphere. Where else could he have acquired 
the impressive and charming Hungarian idiom, that unsurpassedly 
melodic, rhythmic Hungarian language, if not in the domain of Hun-
garian speech, folk poetry and folk song. 
This tremendous Hungarian-experience gained a newer, wider 
sphere when the poet moved to Pest. Let us not forget that his is the 
Era of Reform; the Turkish wars had been forgotten, but the Hun-
garian soul, too, was almost extinguished under centuries of foreign 
rule. In a cultured society still affected by the baroque interest in uni-
versality, the young man became acquainted with the great represen-
tatives of western literature, the genius of Shakespeare, the revolu-
tionary histories of Lamartine, Michelet and Mignet. Following in the 
footsteps of Istvan Szechenyi, Petofi becomes a leader among the 
young intellectuals of the Pilvax Coffee House. Thus, he affirms the 
duty of the poet to the liberation and leadership of the people in "The 
Poet of the XlX-th Century" as early as January 1847. Petofi had been 
born into a society in which the ideals of the Reform—"the happiness 
of the majority"—had become both a political and a human goal. 
Vorosmarty, free of any fear, aided and encouraged the younger poet, 
and he himself maintained that "a nation's fate appeals to" the poet, 
and "when we had rescued that from the depths and have raised it as 
high as possible through the pure gleams shed by ideological battles, 
then we can say as we meet our ancestors: 'Life, we are grateful for 
your blessings: this was worthwhile work, this was man's w o r k ' . " 6 
Naturally Peto'fi, the strongest representative of the younger poetic 
generation, is no longer content to prepare for "ideological battles", 
for compromises as the decades slip by; he wants comprehensive 
changes—reforms which indeed the nation was able to achieve 
through the first responsible ministry of 1848. 
We should not be surprised that Pet<5fi's patriotic, or rather poli-
tical poetry becomes ever more radical. The Reform-generation only 
wished for improvements and at first even the young generation of 
Petofi only sought that long-overdue reforms be implemented within 
the old forms, in conjunction with Austria. After all, even beyond the 
borders, in Austria, too, a new generation was urging progress. 
When, however, the poetic message was not enough, when the alarms 
sounded in the "National Ode" on March 15, 1848 were dismissed by 
the ruling forces of the imperial court, and when, within a few 
months, the court revoked the reforms that had been sanctioned by 
the king, the "young Hungary" of Petofi learned the final lesson: 
progress and liberty can not be achieved in cooperation with Imperial 
Austria. Petofi was a revolutionary from the beginning, yet it was 
only in the final months of the Hungarian mortal struggle, during the 
months of the war if independence, that he became, both as a poet and 
as a politician, uncompromising in demanding radical reforms. 
Hungary was not yet ready for comprehensive reform. Thus 
Petc5fi, who in March of 1848 was perhaps the most popular man in 
the country, had lost so much ground by June that he was defeated in 
his bid for a seat in Parliament. The poet of the people was denied by 
the people. In this bitter mood he wrote the political-philosophical 
poem, The Apostle: the tragedy of the political reformer who comes 
before his time. New, grand ideas emerge in it, for it contains Petofi's 
poetical testament and the program and beliefs of March 1848. Later, 
when the poet saw that the imperial government continued the policy 
of "divide et impera" and incited the nationalities against the Hungar-
ians, he wrote "Life or Death", the poem in which he demonstrated 
convincingly to the nation that it is impossible to turn back on free-
dom, to undo reforms: one must always go forward because not only 
the liberty of Hungarians was at stake, but the liberty of all oppressed 
peoples. 
The rest is history. Under Lajos Kossuth a Hungarian army, the 
national guard, was created. Hungarian officers and soldiers in the 
Austrian army, as well as the masses of Hungarian citizens, joined this 
new unit in such force that, augmented by the youth of other lands 
(Poles, Italians, Austrians), victory was well within its reach. Only 
with the intervention of the Russian tsar, according to the terms of the 
Holy Alliance, was the force defeated. 
Then did Petofi become the true tempest of the Revolution. He 
saw he must become a soldier, and that at his own request he joined 
the army of Transylvania, serving as adjutant to the Polish colonel 
Joseph Bern, first as a captain, later as a major. His poems immortal-
ized Bern and inspired the Hungarian troops in the face of the over-
whelming Russian army. It was here that death overtook him on July 
31st, 1849 during the Battle of Segesvar; here that he was buried—as 
he himself had wished to be—unknown, in "a mass grave with those 
who died for thee, sacred Liberty".7 
Is it possible to compare Pet<5fi to any other poet? Hardly. Cer-
tainly not to any foreign poet, but not even to other Hungarian poets, 
for his poetry is a mirror of his life and his life was an individual, 
unique human life. Petofi is a poet for all Hungarians. And, further, in 
Hungarian terms, Petofi is the poet of youth, the symbol of the regen-
erating Hungarian nation. For the non-Hungarian who appreciates 
literature however, he is the Hungarian poet. Some of his simplest 
poems have been translated into forty to fifty languages. If we recall 
that the poetic output of Petdfi, who died in his twenty-sixth year, is 
850 poems, and that this is the product of five or six years, then we 
can see the power of his creative energy. As the literary historian 
Frigyes Riedl (who published the first English history of Hungarian 
literature early in this century) remarked, if Shakespeare or Jinos 
Arany had died at twenty-six, we would not even know they had 
lived. Petofi's career was like a comet's: what he produced in his brief-
life is truly a marvel. If we should list the great men of Western Litera-
ture chronologically, we must start with Homer; Dante, then Shakes-
peare and Goethe follow. After that, Petofi must come. Yet, even if 
one would include two or three other names, Petofi must be listed 
among the ten greatest poets. 
There are those who learn Greek in order to read Homer, or 
English, to enjoy Shakespeare in the original. On the traces of Petofi's 
German and English translators, several men have set out to gain 
Petofi's poems in the original. My wish, as a Hungarian educator, is 
that the second and third generation Hungarians should turn to Petofi 
not only to learn the language in which he wrote but also that they 
might become participants in the impressive ethical and human values 
which give Petofi's poetry its immortality and its universal value. 
NOTES 
1. Sandor Petofi, "Sors, nyiss nekem tert", in Petofi Sandor osszes koltemenyei 
(Budapest, Magyar Helikon, 1967), p. 449. 
2. Petdfi, "Ha fe'rfi vagy, le'gy ferfi", op. cit. p. 518. 
3. Petofi, "Szabadsag, szerelem", op. cit. p. 517. 
4. Petofi, "Arany Janoshoz", op. cit. p. 351. 
5. Sdndor Petofi, "Lapok Petofi Sandor Napldjabol, Pest, marcius 24, 1848", in 
Petofi Sandor osszes prozai muvei es levelezese (budapest, Magyar Helikon, 
1967), p. 406. 
6. Mihaly Vorosmarty, "Bondolatok a konyvtarban", in Vordsmarty Mihaly 
osszes versei (Budapest, Szepirodalmi Konyvkiadcf, 1957) I, 482. 
7. Petofi, "Egy gondolat bant engemet", Osszes koltemenyei, p. 514. 
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REVIEW ARTICLES 
Hungarians in Transylvania 
Andrew Ludanyi 
Erdely valtozdsa: Mitosz es valosag. By Elemer Illyes. Munich: 
Aurora Konyvek, 1975. Pp. 359. $12.50. 
Elemer Illye's Erdely valtozdsa: Mitosz es valosag (Transylvania's 
Transformation: Myth and Reality) is a study that is "recommended 
reading" for anyone who is interested in contemporary Rumanian 
nationalism and ethnic minority policies in Eastern Europe. The study 
deals with post-World War II Transylvania and the fate of its Hungar-
ian inhabitants, thereby filling a major gap in East European studies. 
However, for the present, it fills this gap only in the Hungarian 
language. 
Perhaps the healthiest feature of Erdely valtozdsa is that it is a 
very dispassionate yet simultaneously a very compassionate treatment 
of a neglected subject which has generated too much passion and too 
little compassion in years gone by. It provides a balanced and humane 
perspective in an area where these qualities are generally lacking. 
Illyes is somehow able to transcend the bitterness and nationality 
hatreds of the past, to provide a balanced look at this potentially vola-
tile subject. This is an extraordinary achievement in view of the tradi-
tion of conflict, the deteriorating nationality relations of recent years 
and the author's personal links with the scene of action. As a conse-
quence of this clear-headedness and fair-mindedness, both the 
Hungarians and the Rumanians can obtain a more complete under-
standing of their respective destinies in Transylvania. Indeed, his 
study will be difficult to surpass as "the work," "the sourcebook," on 
Hungarian life in Transylvania f rom 1944 to 1974. 
It should be interjected, at this point, that the Illyes analysis 
extends to areas beyond the territory of historic Transylvania. While 
his main focus is on the area detached from Hungary by the Treaty of 
Trianon in 1920, he also considers the fate of Hungarians in other 
parts of present-day Rumania. True, most of his observations relate to 
the Hungarians in the Banat, Cri^ana, Maramure^ and historic Tran-
sylvania (since these are the areas where most of them are concen-
trated), but he also considers the fate of their fellow nationals in 
Bucharest, Bacau and the coastal region of the Black Sea. Economic 
necessity, the quest for employment, has dispersed many Hungarians 
to areas outside the protective walls of the Carpathians and the Tran-
sylvanian Alps. 
Erdely valtozasa effectively documents the demographic, 
political, social, economic and cultural existence of Hungarians in 
contemporary Rumania. However, there are some weaknesses in the 
presentation. One relates to the author's time perspective, the other to 
the organization of his material. Illyes himself reflects on the former 
weakness in his "Conclusion," which he wrote in 1975. As he points 
out in this section, most of his study was written in the more optim-
istic "reform years" between 1968 and 1973. Consequently, the subse-
quent period of national discrimination was not given consideration 
and what is more serious, the judgements of previous years are 
colored by the hopefulness and the expanding opportunities of the 
"reform years." 
The organizational, or structural weakness is, perhaps, less 
serious. It is due, probably, to the lack of one unifying thesis that 
could be traced from the first chapter to the conclusion. After all, 
Illyes' main concern is simply to document the transformation of 
Transylvania in the context of the past thirty years. To this end his 
presentation is acceptable. Still, it could have been done otherwise, 
reflecting more continuity. As it stands, it is broken roughly into five 
identifiable parts, each of which could stand alone without necessarily 
being part of the same book. 
The lengthy but well-written and interesting first chapter is a 
combination of travelogue and historical background. Illyes cleverly 
intermingles his travels in Transylvania with historical "flashbacks" 
which provide the reader with a vivid picture of the richness and 
variety of the area's past. He describes each important city or region 
as it would look to a present-day visitor. Then in flashbacks he reflects 
on the inter-war experience and the events of the past thousand years 
that are linked to Transylvania's development. 
The second chapter is an essay on the legal, i.e., constitutional 
and political position of the Hungarians in present-day Rumania. It 
could stand as an independent essay. It is rather dry, but contains a 
wealth of useful information. 
The third chapter (which deals with the population dynamics of 
Transylvania) and the fourth chapter (which describes the decline of 
the traditional Hungarian village) both deal with the circumstances 
and characteristics of Hungarian population changes in Transylvania. 
The two together are a separate section with a primarily demographic-
sociological and economic orientation. They too contain a great 
wealth of useful information. 
Chapters five to thirteen deal with the cultural and educational 
opportunities, or lack thereof, of the Transylvanian Hungarians. Each 
one of these chapters could be an independent essay on a special 
feature (e.g., schools, drama, painting, music, etc.) of Hungarian 
cultural existence. Each one is well-written and again a treasure-house 
of data. The author's thoroughness and the space he devotes to this 
analysis also indicates that this section deals with the issues and the 
problems which are most dear to him personally. 
The last section, or chapters fourteen to seventeen, are really four 
separate essays which have been appended to the study to complete 
the overall analysis. Each chapter is in reality a book-review or series 
of book-reviews which deals with some aspect of Transylvanian life. 
Thus, chapter fourteen reviews the writings of contemporary poets 
while chapter fifteen reviews four essayists/novelists. Chapter sixteen 
is a critical review of a recent history of World War II Rumanian-
Hungarian relations. Chapter seventeen is a review of the first history 
of Transylvania's Hungarian literature published in post-World War 
II Rumania. In this manner the last section of the book completes the 
picture, its four chapters being in a sense overviews. As such, they 
summarize and link together some of the information which was 
provided in the first thirteen chapters. However, this linkage could 
have been achieved more smoothly by integrating the observations of 
the last four essays in relevant parts of the preceding thirteen chapters. 
Analytical method and the effective organization of data both 
contribute to the success or failure of a book's function i.e., to convey 
information to the reader. The author's polished style and meticulous 
research make Erd^ly valtozasa simultaneously interesting and highly 
informative reading. Only its structure leads to some duplication and 
awkwardness. However, the latter does not significantly detract from 
the book's message, which is a reviewer's main concern. In reference 
to the substance of his work, Illy£s deserves only praise. In each of the 
sections, in every one of his chapters—and the work as a whole—he 
achieves his major objective: the provision of a documented portrait 
of the past thirty years in the existence of Transylvanian Hungarians. 
Here the reviewer must answer only one question: Does Illy£s' 
portrait coincide with, or accurately reflect, the actual state of affairs 
that he has set out to describe? His documentation in itself is thorough 
and presented in a systematic way. He has drawn extensively on both 
Rumanian and Hungarian sources. True, for recent events, the docu-
mentation is based on the "reform years" noted above. However, this 
provides the study with a more cautious posture relative to the entire 
question of restrictive minority policies. He does not fall into the trap 
of crying wolf when there is no wolf. Consequently, when he demon-
strates that key areas of Hungarian life are under the pressure of 
Rumanization, we can be certain that this is the case. He points out a 
number of such pressure points where restrictiveness expanded even 
during the "reform years." The most obvious examples are the 
Rumanization of census results, the constantly diminishing educa-
tional opportunities for the Hungarians, the newly imposed restric-
tions in minority publications under the guise of a declared "paper 
shortage," and the continued dispersal of the Hungarian population 
by the restriction of job opportunities in Hungarian populated areas. 
Illy£s' cautiousness has other consequences as well, some posi-
tive, some negative, at times both positive and negative. An excellent 
example of this is his report of the destruction of the "Varjuva'r," (a 
symbol of Hungarian cultural survival) by "some of the neighboring 
inhabitants of the region" (p. 13). He does not specify that it was the 
local Rumanians who were responsible for the destruction. While 
"leaning over backwards" in this way means not telling the whole 
truth, it is at the same time a way of avoiding accusations and finger 
pointing. Thus, he tries to avoid exacerbating the conflict whenever 
possible and to lay the foundations for a possible rapprochement in 
the future. 
Illyes' cautiousness also keeps him from making predictions 
about the consequences of this state of affairs in Transylvania. He 
does not speculate about the prospects of Hungarian unrest in the 
future. His omission may be intentional. After all, Transylvania is not 
Cyprus, Northern Ireland or Lebanon—it is situated close to Soviet 
power! Yet, the experiences in the mentioned trouble spots, as well as 
experiences with other examples of "revolutionary circumstances," 
would at least lead to a guarded statement relative to Hungarian 
unrest. After all, the Hungarians are a large minority of two millionl 
—more than the Turks in Cyprus, the Catholics in Northern Ireland 
or the Moslems or Christians in Lebanon—who have a well developed 
national consciousness. They have just undergone a process of decom-
pression in the cultural area. As Illyes points out, from 1968 to 1973 
they enjoyed a renaissance in their cultural existence. This cultural 
revival is now being hemmed in by government restrictions. If deToc-
queville's observations about social-economic d i s c o n t e n t 2 has paral-
lels in cultural discontent, as seems to be the case in areas torn by 
ethnic strife, then the prerequisites exist for a "revolutionary situa-
tion" in Transylvania today. While it is unlikely that a revolution will 
break out, the possibility is there at least for more pronounced ethnic 
conflict. 
The rioting and unrest of 1968 in Yugoslavia's Autonomous Pro-
vince of Kosovo should be a warning signal that Communist states are 
not immune to this type of malady. As an excellent recent study of 
communist minority policies has pointed out, the strife in Kosovo 
came after the Yugoslav leadership had already rejected Rankovic 
(1966) and his high-handed methods regarding the m i n o r i t i e s . 3 Thus, 
a process of decompression, followed by efforts to break Albanian 
desires for more self-government, led to the outbreaks of November-
December, 1968.4 
Responsible statesmen—whatever their ideological preconcep-
tions—must take into account Transylvania's precarious ethnic rela-
tions. Illyes points out that in the case of Transylvania's fate 
responsible statesmen of late have rarely triumphed. Blood and 
anguish, and more blood and more anguish has been the price paid. 
We should ask: when will responsible statesmen interfere before 
bloodshed and suffering prevail? In the case of Transylvania a toler-
ant, farsighted . . . pluralist ethnic policy is needed now! If it is not 
forthcoming, the efforts of dispassionate and compassionate scholars 
like those of Illyes, will have been for nought. For the sake of both 
Rumanians and Hungarians in Transylvania, let's hope responsible 
statesmen are listening. 
NOTES 
1. G.D. Satmarescu, "The Changing Demographic Structure of the Population 
of Transylvania," East European Quarterly VIII (Jan., 1975), p. 438. 
2. Melvin Richter, "Tocqueville's Contributions to the Theory of Revolution," in 
Revolution Ed. Carl J. Friedrich. (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), p. 78. 
3. Robert R. King, Minorities Under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of 
Tension Among Balkan Communist States. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1973), p. 140. 
4. Ibid. 
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France and the Fate of Hungary 
Edward Chaszar 
The Tragic Fate of Hungary: A Country Carued-Up Alive at Trianon. 
By Yves de Daruvar. Translated from the French by Victor Stanko-
vich. Munich: Nemzetor, 1974. (Co-publisher: American Hungarian 
Literary Guild, Astor Park, FL 32002.) Pp. 235, appendix, maps, 
illustr., $8.00 paper. 
For the last fifty years Hungarians have been painfully aware of 
the tragic fate which befell their country in June 1920, when the Peace 
Treaty ending World War I was forced on them at Trianon near Paris. 
The great majority of Frenchmen, however, were utterly unaware of 
what was happening to that small but valiant country which had 
served as Western Europe's outpost for centuries, a first line of defence 
against the onslaught of invaders from the East. It was the ignorance 
of Frenchmen about the process of treaty-making, and the silence 
surrounding the event once it happened, which prompted Daruvar to 
publish his book in France on the fiftieth anniversary of the Paris 
Peace Treaties. 
The son of a Hungarian army officer and a French mother, trans-
planted to and educated in France, Daruvar fought for his adopted 
country in World War II, receiving high military honors and some bad 
wounds. "A knight in shining armour of our days," according to the 
words of the preface to the French edition, "he is going to war once 
more . . . carrying no arms; it is this book with which he proposes to 
fight for the honor of "mutilated" Hungary." 
He does so by resorting to military tactics learned from General 
Leclerc: attack. Daruvar attacks the treaty-makers, and he pulls no 
punches in the process. Feeling morally and emotionally qualified, he 
makes a clean breast of the "ugly act committed by the victors of the 
first world war." It is this moral and emotional commitment which 
lends his work an eloquence and persuasiveness rarely found. No 
wonder a Frenchman finds his book "deeply disturbing" and hard to 
put down. 
While not a professional historian, and using almost exclusively-
secondary sources, Daruvar documents his book carefully, indeed 
with an overabundance of quotations, for which he begs the reader's 
indulgence in the Foreword. In translation his style is good, his words 
flow freely and easily, the quotations are well integrated into the text 
and do not interrupt the narration. Once the reader ploughs through 
the first chapter, containing historical and geographic information on 
Hungary, the origins and evolution of the Great War are told 
concisely and with surprising frankness. This is followed by the 
fast-paced story of the armistice and the Peace Conference itself. 
Defending Hungary against accusations of "war guilt" Daruvar 
points out the historically well-known, but often distorted or simply 
not mentioned, fact of the Hungarian Prime Minister's opposition to 
war in the Austro-Hungarian Joint Ministerial Council in July 1914, 
and quotes the former Italian Prime Minister Nitti: "In all honesty no 
one can be singled out as being responsible for it." This does not, 
however, prevent Daruvar from emphasizing the guilt shared by 
France and Russia, the latter in particular, by adding that "the real 
aggressor is at all events he who is bent on changing an existing situa-
tion by means of war," a reference to Russia's order of mobilization 
issued with French knowledge. Not even a political scientist could 
wish for a better definition of aggression. 
Drawing mostly on Allied, chiefly French, sources, the book 
documents the fateful turn of events which led to the corruption of the 
original war aims, the distortion of the idealistic Wilsonian principle 
of self-determination, the abandonment of the idea of ethnographic 
(linguistic) boundaries in favor of military, political, and economic 
considerations which ultimately resulted in a patchwork of "successor 
states" erected on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. 
Instead of transforming the Habsburg Empire into what was originally 
intended by President Wilson: a federation based on the equality of 
nationalities and a potential stronghold against both German and 
Russian expansionism in Central Europe, the area was "Balkanized". 
One can imagine how shocking it must be for the French reader to 
learn that "for over half a century France has kept telling herself lies, 
not having the courage to face reality," and then be confronted 
immediately with that painful reality. For this Daruvar dug up all the 
available self-criticism French statesmen and politicians produced 
belatedly, often unknown to their countrymen, and then "lays it on 
thick"—to use a colloquialism. Thus, the incited leaders of Austria-
Hungary's Slav and Rumanian minorities who persuaded France "to 
endorse and legalize the occupations by conquest, achieved after the 
cessation of hostilities by the armed forces of the so-called successor 
states, in stark violation of the armistice agreements," become in 
Clemenceau's own words "the jackals of our victory." One also learns 
the opinion of Gabriel Gobron (misspelled as Goron on p. 112), 
according to whom "within 10 years [after the Peace Treaty] the suc-
cessor states have sinned against their minorities more often than did 
the Hungarians in a thousand years." Edouard Benes is "fated to 
become twice during his long career the grave-digger of his own 
country as well as of Europe," and so on. 
Marshalling the protestations of the French negotiators and 
Parliamentarians ("if they were not guilty, what sense would make the 
protestations of some of them?"), Daruvar reaches the height of indig-
nation by exlaiming: "Trianon was a criminal act; there is no other 
term to describe adequately the most wicked of all wartime treaties, 
imposed amid the vapours of blood, the haze of gunpowder, the 
exaltation of victory and the 'Schadenfreude' derived from torturing 
the vanquished. There was the generosity of France for you! Torch-
bearer of civilization indeed!" (p. 164) 
Commenting finally on more recent developments in Europe, 
such as the Soviet-caused tragedies of Hungary (1956) and Czecho-
slovakia (1968), the author states once again that the origins of the 
present unfortunate situation in East-Central Europe go back to the 
disastrous treaties concluded in the wake of the First World War, and 
shortsightedly reaffirmed after the Second. 
Nevertheless, the book ends on an optimistic note with the hope 
that eventually there will be peace in the area, based on a territorial 
solution freely agreed upon, bringing together all nationalities on a 
basis of sovereign equality in a Danubian Federation, itself part of a 
federated, supra-national, united Europe. 
From a purely Hungarian point of view the shock value of 
Daruvar's book for Frenchmen is tremendous. France, after all, is a 
major power to be reckoned with in any future rearrangement of 
Europe. Whether the same is true for the English translation is a moot 
question. The translation itself is, on the whole, good. But, aside from 
certain technical shortcomings (such as typographical errors in the 
text, even in the Translator's Note; the employing of Anglicisms 
strange for the American reader; the French method of presenting 
notes and bibliography; the hiding of the Table of Contents in an 
obscure place), one may wonder whether all the French sources, and 
the frequent lengthy quotations from the same, turn the English-lan-
guage reader "on" or "off"? Likewise, whether the attack against the 
"guilty ones" will induce the enemies of Hungary to repent their sins, 
or merely to launch a counter-attack? The old wound Daruvar 
touched is not healed yet; and no matter how admirable were his 
intentions, his deed at first sight does not appear to have facilitated 
that healing. But, who can really know for sure? 
Somehow, this reviewer feels, the whole affair should have 
remained strictly one between Daruvar and his French readers. For the 
latter, this book will no doubt be "brave, profoundly human, and 
deeply disturbing." As General Ingold, former Grand Chancellor of 
the French Order of Liberation, confesses in the Preface, the book 
"makes us think." 
This, of course, may be sufficient to excuse Daruvar. To make 
Frenchmen think about the fate of Hungary may not be a bad thing 
after all. 
Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies, Vol. Ill, No. 1 (Spring 1976). 
Janos Kaddr: the Myths and the Realities 
Barnabas A. Racz 
Crime and Compromise: Janos Kadar and the Politics of Hungary 
since the Revolution. By William Shawcross. New York: E.P. Dutton 
& Co., Inc., 1974. Pp. 311. 
The communist system in Hungary went through various phases 
of change since the 1956 Revolution. From the Soviet armed interven-
tion to the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) and the accompanying 
liberalization Janos Kadar stood at the helm of the Party and played a 
major role in the execution of Imre Nagy as well as in laying the 
foundations for a more relaxed political atmosphere since 1968. The 
subject of Mr. Shawcross' book is the analysis of this era and Kadar's 
personality as they are interrelated. Most students of the Hungarian 
scene agree that the political and economic system is beset with ambi-
guities and as Shawcross sees it, so is Kadar's personality. Because of 
these contradictions, the author's coherent and lucid analysis which 
sheds light upon the deeper aspects of the system is to be regarded as 
unusually incisive writing. 
Kddctr's political profile is tied to his personality development and 
this is an enlightening approach in the absence of other available 
evidence. He was born as an illegitimate child, a fatherless and 
deprived peasant boy, an unskilled laborer who came in contact with 
Marxism in the factory districts of Budapest, and this early experience 
with communism and the Party grew into his first permanent identifi-
cation to which he—above all—remained attached to the present day. 
However, unlike other communist leaders, he was home-bred and 
remained forever alien to the Moscow trained party-functionaries. As 
leader of the underground party with Rajk during the Second World 
War he appeared to maintain a feeling of community with the worker-
class. Kadar is a dedicated communist, not trained in the Soviet Union 
and this paradox may explain some of the contradictions in his politi-
cal life. 
The author chooses Kadar's personal life as a point of departure 
in each area of the Hungarian milieu examined in this volume. Kadar's 
early childhood took place in the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy and 
in Trianon Hungary. Unfortunately, the treatment of the Hungarian 
history before 1945 is perhaps the weakest part of Shawcross' work 
and is in sharp contrast with his analysis of post-war years. While he 
exhibits keen judgement in the latter, his understanding of the former 
is superficial and the reader is left in the dark regarding his sources. 
Not to include Bethlen and his consolidation is inaccurate and the 
view that all economic problems were caused by an insensitive 
government along with the fact that he disregards the impact of the 
Trianon Treaty is in serious error. To say that Hungarians in general 
felt "nothing but admiration and gratitude for Hitler" (p. 45) is 
untenable position in the light of historical data. 
Shawcross puts the post-fifty-six trends into better perspective by 
tracing the analysis back to Stalinism and the Rakosi-regime. 
However, the real strength of the work lies in the discussion of the 
post-revolutionary and current events. There is no question that 
Kaddr had a decisive role in shaping the political and economic 
institutions, yet he depended on Soviet approval which he could not 
and would not forsake. 
In this reviewer's opinion the centrally significant reforms took 
place in the economic sphere. While not much is mentioned about the 
repressive agricultural collectivization, the permissive New Economic 
Mechanism receives perceptive treatment. The decentralization of 
planning and the expanded enterprize autonomy stand in the focus of 
the reform, which creates stronger individual incentives through 
premium distribution to increase productivity. In terms of overall 
economic activity and standard of living, the NEM was a considerable 
success. For a better understanding of the magnitude of these reforms, 
the author should have given more details regarding premium inequi-
ties, strengthening group conflicts and the functioning of economic 
regulators. It also appears that Shawcross overlooks the fact that not 
all economic indicators improved evenly and, more importantly, one 
of the key objectives of the reform, the increased productivity, 
remained unfulfilled. 
While the NEM registered dramatic successes in some areas, it 
also triggered negative results in the socialist society. The spreading 
"petit bourgeoisie" tendencies, moon-lighting, profiteering, excessive 
preoccupation with material acquisitions became wide-spread 
phenomena in the entire society including the Party. The "New Hun-
garian Man" is the "money grubber." These phenomena created even 
some restlessness and dissatisfaction among the worker-class and 
party leaders as well as sociologists who saw a growing threat to the 
socialist system. It was inevitable that together with economic decen-
tralization, some political power had to be transferred from 
government to management, but some influence inadvertently slipped 
from the hands of the party leadership, thus an increasing erosion of 
party power was noticeable on the middle and lower levels of govern-
ment and party hierarchy. As Shawcross ably points out, the Party's 
influence decreases in proportion to the increase in living standards 
and the Party eventually will have to face the dilemma (p. 198). 
While the economic reforms were far-reaching, the political insti-
tutions remained more static; yet the atmosphere under Ka'dar's 
leadership changed markedly. The new alliance policy is far removed 
from the former terror and was expressed by Kddar in this formula: 
"Whoever is not against us, is with us" (p. 105). Both the "crime" and 
the "compromise" are Kid i r ' s policies and express his seemingly 
paradoxical stance in the various crises of his life. Shawcross sheds 
light on this: K^da'r will always adhere to Marxism-Leninism and the 
Soviet Union, but within these limits will search for a more human 
face for socialism in Hungary. Part of this new approach gained 
expression in the modified election laws which made the nomination 
of opposition candidates in the electoral districts possible. However, 
all candidates represent the Patriotic People's Front's platform and 
must be approved by the National Election Committee. Shawcross 
observes these limitations clearly (pp. 101-102) yet surprisingly he 
falls into the frequent error of Western observers and sees significant 
reform where there is only tokenism. 
More importantly, the "socialist legality" improved and the 
power of the political police has been curbed. There are still political 
trials and detention camps on a reduced scale, but there is great 
improvement in comparison to the Rakosi era and the late fifties. As 
Shawcross stresses, the regime is based primarily not on suppression 
but on suasion and "society is ruled by a collective will, not by . . . a 
dictator or a group of self-appointed oligarchs" (p. 103). The first part 
of author's judgement is correct: suasion is more often used than 
terror but he stretches the point too far by stating that "collective will" 
is the ruling force and fails to define what he means. 
The lighter atmosphere of the alliance policy filtered into 
numerous areas of the life in varying degrees. Preliminary censorship 
was abolished and writers enjoy a latitude of expression unknown 
before but basic criticism is not tolerated by the informal yet effective 
party control and "much of the most important news is not reported in 
the Hungarian media" (p. 169). Kadar's friend George Aczel was in 
charge of the cultural affairs at the time of the writing and he followed 
a balanced "anti-revisionist and anti-dogmatist" policy. Within these 
limits, courting official tolerance, a "commercialization of cultural 
products" emerged under the NEM conditions. Shawcross brings the 
problem into sharp focus by stating that the new libertarianism 
generated serious concern by the left-wing "sectarians" and gave rise 
to a threat by petit bourgeois and anti-socialist tendencies. As George 
Lukacs expressed it, NEM's emphasis on profit-making had drastically 
cheapened cultural life (p. 157). However the new Hungarian 
film-makers did not think so, and similarly to the progressive literary 
traditions of the past, some film-producers play an avante-guard role 
in social criticism, but their work became increasingly suspect and 
restrictive measures have been applied. The limits of the communica-
tion freedom are expressed by Pal Ipper, chief radio commentator, 
quoted by author: "the press should not be used against the general 
interest of the nation's development simply for the sake of informing 
the public" (p. 164). 
Not much is written by author about the status of the academic 
disciplines and scholarship. This is regrettable because these questions 
are of paramount significance in any society. The official position 
stresses that Marxism-Leninism is the sole theoretical foundation of all 
sciences yet there is a healthy fermentation and wider intercourse with 
Western developments, but not freedom from restrictions. Shawcross 
gives an enlightening account of the story of Sociology and the demise 
of the "anti-party Hegedus group", expelled from the Party in 1973 
because of criticism of the NEM. 
One of the more serious problems for the Party is the change in 
social mobility. While there was a strong upward trend from peasant 
and worker-class members in the forties and fifties, this slowed down 
recently. Worker-class children have a declining enrollment and a 
high ratio of erosion at the universities. Shawcross attributes this to 
the commanding advantage of old and new middle-class students but 
fails to mention artificially the admission and retention of worker-
class students on all levels. 
Kada'r's more human socialism began to attack the severe housing 
shortages yet not all problems are solved. The author makes excellent 
connections between tight housing, falling birthrate, desire for 
material acquisitions and the spreading family problems. Since the 
time of the writing, a series of government measures, supporting 
larger families succeeded and the number of live births has increased 
significantly. 
The Party faces a major problem of becoming older—the average 
age of membership increased to forty-four. Kadar recognized the 
problem and lowered the party admission age from twenty-one to 
eighteen but the youth shows lack of interest in joining the Party. 
Apathy and cynicism, noticeable everywhere in today's youth, is par-
ticularly strong in Hungary and the prevailing political emotion is 
indifference and skepticism toward ideology. This raises formidable 
questions to the political leadership in the long run—who is going to 
be the vanguard of socialist construction without dedicated party 
members? The Party tries to correct the situation through organized 
efforts by the KISZ and strengthening ideological indoctrination in the 
schools but according to author the results are meager. The question is 
particularly thorny in light of the fact that "tolerance of their own 
Communist party had led few Hungarians to tolerance of the Soviet 
Union: Russians are disliked more intensely in Hungary than they 
have ever been" (p. 230). Although this appears to be somewhat 
exaggerated, knowledgeable observers agree that there is deep resent-
ment against the USSR and the youth is no exception. 
Mr. Shawcross draws unusually accurate picture of the major 
trends and the prevailing mood in Hungary but occasionally he is in 
error. There is no reason to doubt the present improvements but too 
frequent comparisons to the darkest years of the Rakosi era distort the 
picture. However, the author perceives correctly the ambiguity of the 
situation in the '70's; while the attainment of socialism remained the 
theoretical aim of the Party, the economic and political evolution 
moved away from this objective. This is the Party's major dilemma as 
Shawcross posits it, will there be a crossroad where the Party either 
has to stop or reverse the direction of the reforms (p. 288)7 Events 
since the writing proved that indeed the Party was aware of the crisis 
and undertook serious steps to stem the tide of change. The 1974 
Central Committee decisions, the 11th Party Congress in 1975, and 
various government decrees subsequently abandoned part of the NEM 
and set into motion an economic recentralization and somewhat 
tighter political controls. The new measures probably do not represent 
decisive changes yet they are significant departures from the NEM era. 
As in the past since 1956, once again Kadar remained at the helm of 
political power, and reformed his reform. Who then is Kcid^r? 
Shawcross portrays Kada'r as a dedicated communist who has a 
genuine concern for the interests of the working people. This commit-
ment to ideology is tempered with pragmatism yet he is above all 
faithful to the Party and regards dependency on Russia not only a 
matter of reality but also indispensable to the survival of communism 
in Hungary (pp. 248-49). 
A more complete assessment of Kddir 's moral views could be 
formulated through a fuller knowledge of his motives in the four 
major crises of his life: the Rajk-case, the 1956 Revolution, Imre 
Nagy's execution and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
In none of these situations is there a clear explanation as to his role 
according to Shawcross and any conclusions therefore are largely 
conjectural. There was certain complicity in the Rajk case, however 
Kadar's motives are uncertain and the Dubcek case seems to be less 
important because Kadar probably had no real input regarding the 
invasion decision. The two other incidents are more beclouded with 
mystery. Kadar's changing sides between the first and fourth of 
November 1956, could be explained in various ways. Whatever the 
reasons, it seems to be clear and this has been the predominant view in 
Western analyses that the Soviet invasion did not hinge upon Kadar's 
willingness to form a government but upon the vital political consi-
derations of the Soviet leadership; had Kadar not been available, 
someone else would have played the role. Therefore, it could be 
reasonably argued—as Shawcross does—that Kadar's intentions 
under the circumstances were not all objectionable if he felt that in 
the long-run he could win the approval of both the Russians and at 
least to some extent that of the Hungarians. The same pragmatic 
considerations could apply in Nagy's execution, but author points out 
that none of these may exonerate Ka'd^r from his ultimate moral re-
sponsibility. 
Shawcross' central point is that Kadar, through his skillful reform 
policies became acceptable and commands confidence as he has an 
understanding of the national mind (p. 287) This reviewer feels that 
his view is somewhat unrealistic as there may be a difference between 
"confidence" and tolerance. My experience in Hungary convinced me 
that K^dar enjoys a modicum of support, a situation of quid pro quo; 
he is respected for his accomplishments and people fear a change. 
Nevertheless to many he is merely the "lesser evil" who can work out 
the best accommodation with the Russians. However realistic this 
sentiment may be, it emerges as the predominant feeling. Ka'dar's 
moral responsibility in his four crises is definitely not the focus of 
concern in NEM's pragmatic atmosphere. His absolution would not be 
acceptable in the West and his culpability is rejected by many in 
Hungary and probably by all in the Party. The answer will be 
rendered only by History's future judgement if and when the 
necessary documentation will be released from the hitherto secret files 
of the Party and Ka'dar. 
Mr. Shawcross' book makes exciting and interesting reading, and 
irrespective of some of its shortcomings it is certainly one of the best 
books which has been recently published about contemporary 
Hungary and its controversial leader, Ka'da'r. 
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A History of Middle Europe: From the Earliest Times to the Age of the 
World Wars by Leslie Charles Tihany (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1976, pp. 280, $16.50). 
Ktema es—what Thucydides said about his history is also 
applicable to this book. It is a possession for all time. Especially for 
Hungarians, with St. Laszlo' on the cover and a Hungaro-centered 
comparative history of the peoples inhabiting the Baltic-Adriatic-
Black Sea triangle between the covers. There has never been such a 
book; the closest to it was Halecki's Borderlands (1952), which was 
lexico-graphic, Polish-centered, and used Henrik Marczali's book of 
the 1890's as the most recent German-language source for Hungarian 
history. Tihany's new book is based on the latest available research in 
twelve languages. It is the work of a great historian, Hungarian-born 
and non-engag6, trained in the best American universities, and 
employed for nearly 30 years by the diplomatic service of the United 
States. Tihany knows history not only from studying it but also from 
participating in its making. He writes that beautiful, clear, and 
enthralling English which—as G.B. Shaw said in Pygmalion—only 
Hungarians are capable of using as an idiom. 
Tihany's thesis asserts that history ran different courses for the 
descendants of the Cro-Magnon man in the coastal and landlocked 
areas of Europe because (1) the peoples of the latter were prey to an 
unceasing succession of expansionist empires (Roman, Byzantine, 
Carolingian, Holy Roman, Ottoman, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and 
Romanov); and (2) the states they formed were barred from partici-
pation in world trade for lack of maritime outlets, except for the 14th-
century period of the "Monarchy of the Three Seas" constructed by 
the political genius of the Hungarian Anjous. 
The book is full of unforgettable vignettes. The Hungarians 
riding as conquerors through the ghost town of Aquincum; and as 
conquered, a millennium later, losing most of their country to their 
neighbors. We see Koppany's quartered body nailed to four city 
gates; diver Kund sinking the German fleet at Pozsony; Andrew II 
driving the scheming Teutonic Knights from the Barcasag; Vladislaw I 
leading his lethal cavalry charge at Varna into the Sultan's palisaded 
enclosure; Matthias, with imperial Luxembourg blood flowing in his 
veins, vainly pursuing the dream of the Holy Roman sceptre; 
vanguards of fugitive Gypsies (scouts, spies or refugees?) arriving in 
Brasso before Mohammed the Conqueror orders his ships dragged 
across the isthmus of the Golden Horn to capture Byzantium; Louis II 
sinking on his wounded mount into the Danube swamps; the Turks 
unwittingly safeguarding the vitality of Protestantism; the utter 
devastation of the land by liberators and fleeing occupiers after the 
recapture of Buda; Louis XIV keeping Rakoczi's insurgents under 
arms as a diversion to his Spanish war; Kossuth challenging the gates 
of hell to prevail over a Hungary embattled for freedom; the rise and 
fall of the compromise-based Dual Monarchy with its unfolding 
capitalism, socialism, zionism, and a multitude of centrifugal nation-
alisms pressing against its seams; carnage and party strife continuing 
parallel through the holocaust of the first World War. 
Around this action-rich center of the stage swirls the turbulent 
history of Bulgarians, Serbs, Croatians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, 
Rumanians, Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Poles, Lithu-
anians, Letts; Bogomils and Hussites, rebellious serfs, haiduks, kuruc, 
cossacks, uskoks, janissaries, and ichoglans. Tihany's best chapters 
are: as social history, the transformation of heathens into heretics 
along basic fissures in the structure of society; as intellectual history, 
the evolution of Utopian and agrarian socialism into trade unionism 
and Marxism (a delayed process owing to the pan-German and 
Pan-Slav idiosyncracies of the 19th-century German and Russian 
socialist founding fathers); as political history, the irresistible disinte-
gration of the Polish state during the 18th century through inability to 
do away with unanimity-rule aristo-democracy; and as diplomatic 
history, the treatment of the Eastern Question in its relationship to the 
whole complex of Middle European problems. Here we are shown 
convincingly that the coastal Great Powers never treated as grosse 
Politik any internal issue of the middle zone except where their own 
interests in safeguarding the sealanes and the maintenance of the 
balance of power were at stake. 
What emerges from this scholarly yet highly readable and fascin-
ating book is the continuity, through the ebb and flow of historical 
impermanence, of the millennial state-forming genius of the Magyars, 
a nation situated in the continental heartland for the performance of 
memorable deeds, past and future. 
Northern Kentucky University Alfonz Lengyel 
Esterhazy and Early Hungarian Immigration to Canada. Canadian 
Plains Studies No. 2. By Martin Louis Kovacs. Regina: Canadian 
Plains Research Center, University of Regina, 1974. Pp. x + 170. 
The study presents the most recent research of Professor Kovacs 
concerning the early history of Hungarians in Western Canada. Speci-
fically, the author reconstructs the role of Paul Oscar Esterhazy, 
surveys the history of the Esterhaz colony to 1903 and assesses Ester-
hazy as immigrant leader in the late nineteenth century. In addition, 
he publishes the full text of an historically significant pamphlet on the 
colony, compiled in 1902, and provides critical commentary on its 
value as historical documentation. 
An important contribution of the study is the clarification of the 
early history of the Esterhaz colony. First settled in 1886 by Hungarian 
and other East European settlers arriving from the United States, 
Esterhaz refers to a compact area of settlement in the eastern 
Qu'Appelle Valley of Saskatchewan. The author documents the deci-
sive role of Esterhazy in selecting the site for settlement and relates his 
personal efforts leading to the establishment of the village of Esterhazy 
in 1902 as a railway junction and agricultural market serving the 
entire colony. As a result, the village of Esterhazy became subsequent 
to 1902 the major centre for Hungarian settlement in Western Canada. 
Professor Kovacs explains the origins of this significant process on the 
basis of original source materials, including the Paul Oscar Esterhazy 
Papers, documents from the Public Archives of Canada and the 
Saskatchewan Provincial Archives. 
Also noteworthy is the author's assessment of Paul Oscar Ester-
hazy as founder of Hungarian settlements in Canada, as an advocate 
of Canadian immigration for East European peasants and as a 
particular type of ethnic leader to immigrants from Eastern Europe. 
Professor Kovacs sees Esterhazy as an effective and influential advo-
cate of Hungarian settlers in Saskatchewan. He also suggests an 
explanation for Esterhazy's interest in Canadian immigration. Deeply 
affected by the exploitation of East European immigrants in United 
States mines and factories, he thought that Canadian homestead 
settlement would provide a better haven of protection for them. This 
aspect of Esterhazy's activity is worthy of further exploration, since it 
would clarify the background of East European peasant migration 
from the United States to Western Canada. 
In publishing the pamphlet compiled by Esterhazy in 1902, 
Professor Kovacs had made accessible an important historical record 
for all scholars of immigration relating to Western Canada. In 
addition to a brief historical survey of the colony, it includes 22 con-
temporary photographs of early homesteads and homesteaders, the 
personal statements of 31 original settlers on their Canadian life prior 
to 1902 and a map of the colony. 
The present study offers, essentially, an indispensable foundation 
for a badly needed scholarly assessment of Canadian-Hungarian life. 
It is to be hoped that the author will continue his scholarly efforts by 
preparing such a comprehensive historical study relating the story of 
Hungarian immigrants in 20th century Canada. 
Ohio State University Paul Body 
The Hungarians in America 1583-1974: A Chronology & Fact Book, 
[Ethnic Chronology Series Number 18]. Edited and compiled by 
Joseph Szeplaki. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 
1975. Pp. vii + 152. $6.00. 
Joseph Szeplaki's The Hungarians in America 1583-1974 is one of the 
volumes in "The Ethnic Chronology Series" initiated by Oceana 
Publications, Inc. in 1971. Currently the series contains close to two 
dozen volumes, with several others in various stages of preparation. 
Oceana's Ethnic Chronology Series is one of several such serial 
publications that came into being in consequence of the so-called 
"ethnic revolution" of the past decade. Its editors claim that this series 
"seeks to reflect unpolemically and objectively the role of America's 
minorities in the development of a democratic, multi-ethnic society." 
This is indeed an ambitious and commendable goal, although one may 
perhaps question whether such basic "fact books," geared to the 
non-specialists, can really fulfil all that. The Oceana ethnic volumes 
are neither histories, nor synthetic assessments of the contributions of 
the individual ethnic groups to the general makeup of American civili-
zation. Rather, they are compilations of basic factual information. 
Thus, while they are useful as handy reference works, they can hardly 
hope to reflect their subjects' real contributions to the making of 
America. 
Joseph Szeplaki, the editor-compiler of the Hungarian volume in 
the series, is known to us from several similar publications, all of 
which contributed something to our knowledge about Hungarians in 
America. He again did his best to give us a factual summary of 
Hungarian-American history, and to compile many other useful and 
hardly easily accessible information about Hungarian contributions to 
American civilization. Thus, in addition to about 40 pages of chrono-
logy, stretching from Stephen Parmeneus' landing in 1583 to our own 
ways, he has compiled over 50 pages of useful documents. These 
include a wide selection, from Parmeneus's letter of 1583, to U.S. 
Governmental documents pertaining to the admission of over 30,000 
Hungarian immigrants after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The 
documents are followed by a series of useful lists, containing the 
names of "famous Hungarian Americans," the titles of Hungarian 
American newspapers, journals and serial publications, the names and 
locations of Hungarian societies, churches and schools, statistics on 
Hungarian immigration and on Hungarian population in the United 
States, the names and location of American universities offering 
Hungarian language courses, as well as those that have courses in the 
history, politics and culture of East Central Europe. Moreover, 
Szeplaki's work also contains a list of Hungarian book collections 
(both public and private), as well as a selected bibliography of 
Hungarian-American publications in English. All in all, Sze'plaki made 
an honest and commendable effort to be comprehensive in his 
coverage. If he did not fully succeed, this is due less to the lack of 
effort on his part, and more to the pioneering nature of his work—a 
fact that must not be overlooked. 
Insofar as there are problems with Szeplaki's Hungarians in 
America, these are twofold: there are a number of factual mistakes, 
and the inclusion or exclusion of facts, events, personalities, univer-
sity programs, book collections, etc. in his list appears—at times—to 
be less than fully balanced. Some of the factual mistakes were 
undoubtedly unavoidable, for the facts of the Hungarian-American 
past are not always easy to ascertain. Others could perhaps have been 
eliminated had the editor-compiler consulted a number of other 
specialists in the area, before publishing his work. These specialists 
could also have expanded and balanced his chronology and his list of 
notable events, institutions, publications and personalities; and the 
result would have been an even more useful work on Hungarians in 
America. 
Szeplaki's work is thus not without flaws. Even so, however, it is 
a useful pioneering work, and a good beginning in the right direction. 
We would still urge the author that—before preparing the second 
edition of his work—he should consult with several specialists in the 
area (e.g. Rev. Edmund Vasvary and others), even though we know 
that such efforts are not always successful. We are certain that by 
doing so, his work will improve considerably, and it will become an 
even more useful handbook in the rising field of Hungarian-American 
studies. 
Duquesne University Steven Bela Vardy 
Attila Jozsef, Selected Poems and Texts. Ed. by George Gomori and 
James Atlas. Carcanet Press, Cheadle. 1973. 
Proletarian by origin, representative of a special brand of 
Marxism and Freudism, Attila Jozsef (1905-37) is one of Hungary's 
outstanding poets. The present collection of his poetry is thus far the 
most extensive available in English. The translator's John Batki's brief 
note is followed by George Gomdri's expert introduction, discussing 
the poet's "psychoanalytic Marxism," "humanistic socialism," and 
suicide. The extensive supplementary material includes the often cited 
Curriculum Vitae (1937), a list of the main events of the poet's life, 
three letters written by him, a note on an early attempt at suicide, and 
an English language bibliography. 
The fifty poems selected are fairly representative of Attila Jozsef's 
poetry. They include the celebrated socialist pieces (A Breath of Air, 
Night in the Slum), samples of the Freudian poetry (Belated Lament, It 
hurts a lot) and his most famous love poem, the Ode. The editors may 
well be right in giving less share to the great political poems of socialist 
persuasion than to personal lyrics (Coral Beads, Summer Afternoon, 
Without Hope). Their translation would, the editors contend, involve 
enormous thematic and technical difficulties and no poet in the 
English language is up to the task at present. 
When compared with the 1966 selection of twenty poems, this 
volume more closely resembles poetry. There are fewer awkward 
expressions and concern for fidelity is less to the detriment of poetic 
effect. All in all, the English version only seldom matches the 
brilliance of the original. This may disappoint but need hardly 
surprise bilingual readers who are well aware of the tremendous diffi-
culties in translating a major poet from one language and culture so 
vastly different into another. Yet, it has been done with better results 
into other languages. For example, the French adaptations by such 
eminent poets as Guillevic, Tzara and Rousselot, seem to lose less in 
translation. 
Imagery comes through well in Bdtki's version. Such lines as "A 
small breeze shakes silver laughter" or "silvery axe strokes play on 
poplar leaves" are not without some inspiration. Attempts at preserv-
ing rhyme and rhythm proved generally rewarding. Short of rhyme 
and rhythm, though, the English version can do little more than to 
convey the content. Moreover, rhyming is frequently employed 
arbitrarily and with irregularity resulting in unevenness, as in the 
well-known "With a pure Heart." More attention ought to have been 
given to final lines: when clumsy, they can ruin the musical organi-
zation of the entire stanza. 
Some translations lose in intensity what they gain in faithfulness 
to the original (Belated Lament, It hurts a lot). This may be due to the 
wrong choice or arrangement of words, or, at times, to the differences 
in the verb systems; unlike the Hungarian "ulni, allni, olni, halni" the 
English infinitives do not rhyme: "to sit, to stand, to kill, to die". As a 
combined effect of these and other causes, both the lightness or the 
graveness of a poem may suffer. Pasternak says in Doctor Zhivago 
that art is the commonplace touched by the hand of genius. A poet of 
the commonplace in many instances, Attila Jozsef never becomes 
pedestrian and would hardly approve of the expressions "nationwide 
rain," "not even a piece of bread," "time pretends to be nothing," "I 
kept thinking," "I have been working all day." They just sound too 
plain in English. 
A work of literature loses much of its appeal when deprived of 
local colour. The omission of geographic names was wise as they 
would mean little to a foreign reader. But the line "Kis labaskaban 
hazahozta kegyelmes^ktol vacsordjat" loses its flair when translated as 
"She brought home in a tiny skillet the food they gave her where she 
worked." Another expression "puli pillanat" with its alliteration is a 
lovely image in the original. Its transfer into "puli moment" makes no 
sense in English. 
It is not very likely, that even in the best translation, Attila Jozsef 
could occupy the place in the English world that he rightly deserves. 
Foreign poets, in any case, seldom if ever have the same impact on the 
English culture that they have on the Hungarian. Shorcomings not-
withstanding, Batki's and the editors' joint effort should be congra-
tulated as an important step in bridging gaps separating cultures. 
It should be added that this book has been accepted into the 
Unesco collection of Representative works, European series. 
Carleton University Paul Varnai 
Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies, Vol. Ill, No. 1 (Spring, 1976). 
Review of Reviews 
A History of Hungary. Ervin Pamlenyi, editor. Translated by Laszlo 
Boros et al., (Compiled under the auspices of the History Institute of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.) London: Collet's, 1975. Pp. 676. 
This is not the first history of Hungary in English but the earlier 
works are mostly dated and out of print, and even if they are 
available . . . they are too brief to be of real value to anyone but the 
casual reader. The present volume is of undoubted interest even to the 
specialist, enriched as it is with ninety-two plates, sixteen maps, brief 
biographies of outstanding Hungarians, a detailed chronology, and a 
good bibliography of works in Western languages. The text itself is a 
much improved, albeit abbreviated, version of the now standard two 
volume Magyarorszag tortenete (History of Hungary), published in 
Budapest in 1964 . . . 
With about two thousand years of tortured history to account 
for, and with a prospective readership that conceivably knows 
nothing of Hungary, the authors occasionally overwhelm us with data 
and names, while, as befits Marxist historians, they do not shun broad 
generalizations and hard conclusions. Their style is perfectly ade-
quate, as is the English translation, accomplished by a team of Hun-
garian experts and a second team of Hungarian-speaking native 
Anglo-Saxons. The reader would look in vain for the dramatic histori-
cal accounts or colorful human portraits so dear to the preceding 
generations of Hungarian historians. What we get instead is a con-
scientious briefing in political and economic history, with occasional 
and often excellent excursions . . . into social and cultural history . . . 
. . . It is with the events of the early 1940s that truth and what the 
authors tell us begin to part ways; by the time we reach the late 1940s, 
the parting is almost complete. It is comforting to have Lacko, author 
of the last chapter, denounce "the enormous political and economic 
errors" made between 1948 and 1956; but it is heartbreaking to 
have this fine historian accuse the leaders of the Smallholders' party of 
conspiring against the nation that gave them the absolute majority of 
votes at the free parliamentary elections of 1945, to have him slander 
the Hungarian Independence party of the bourgeois-democrat Zoltan 
Pfeiffer as "openly extreme-right wing," to have him argue that, not-
withstanding the election results, the Hungarians supported the 
Communist take-over almost to a man, to have him ignore the show 
trial of Cardinal Mindszenty and the execution of Imre Nagy, and to 
have him suggest that the armed Soviet intervention in Hungary dates 
from November 4, 1956, and not October 23. Were it not for the last 
chapter—and for some outrageous falsifications in the brief biogra-
phies—we could celebrate this volume as the very best and the most 
useful of all Hungarian histories. 
Istvan Deak (Columbia University) in the American Historical 
Review, Vol. 81, No. 2 {April 1976). 
Eotvos Jozsef olvasmanyai. By Miklos Benyei. Budapest: Akademiai 
kiado, 1972. Pp. 231. 
The recent upsurge of interest in Baron Jozsef Eotvos (1813-71), 
Hungarian liberal statesman, political thinker and novelist, was 
undoubtedly intensified by the occasion of the one hundredth anni-
versary of his death in 1971 . . . . Eotvos spent his life expiating the 
sins of his class, and particularly of his family, whose unbroken tradi-
tion of providing servile civil servants to the Habsburg crown brought 
its name into disrepute. For a long time Eotvos seemed to be largely 
the property of literary scholarship, and not without reason. His 
novels possess remarkable artistic qualities, and at least one of them, 
The Village Notary, a panoramic portrayal of Hungarian society in 
the 1840's, is a masterpiece . . . 
His political ideas . . . never gained much support. He was criti-
cised by contemporaries for relegating the cause of national indepen-
dence to second place and by later critics for the comparative lack of 
influence his ideas had on Hungarian political thinking. On the other 
hand, Marxist scholars, until quite recently, have also found fault 
with Eotvos because, like Szechenyi, he never claimed to be a radical, 
let alone a revolutionary . . . 
Miklos Benyei's painstaking examination of the literature that 
influenced Eotvos' intellectual development deserves high praise. 
Eotvos read in five languages and, fortunately, his library was pre-
served. Benyei divides Eotvos's library collection into five categories 
—fiction, philosophy, history, political science, and natural science 
—and discusses each category in detail. Evidence is offered by the 
author to support Eotvos's competence in philosophy (sometimes 
questioned) and his surprising proficiency in the natural sciences . . . 
Lorant Czigany (London) in Slavic Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Sept. 
1975). 
A Hungarian Count in the Revolution of 1848. By Gyorgy Spira. 
Translated by Thomas Land and Richard E. Allen. Budapest: 
Akademiai kiado, 1974. Pp. 345. 
. . . historian Gyorgy Spira quite successfully describes the thought 
process and politics of Count Istvan Szechenyi. With great power of 
expression the author reconstructs— with the aid of his hero's 
voluminous diary and correspondence—six months in the life of a 
truly important historical figure . . . Spira also introduces a new 
thesis that satisfactorily proves the famous count's active participation 
in the revolution of 1848, his cooperation with Kossuth, and his 
struggle for Hungary's limited sovereignty. 
Count Istvan Szechenyi was an initiator and leader in the reform 
era that preceded the events of 1848 in Hungary. Not only did he 
advocate the economic, social, and political modernization of his 
country, but he dedicated most of his energy and wealth to such pur-
pose. Reform was his vehicle for progress . . . In 1848 the count had 
not abandoned his ideals but now believed that the process of reform 
should simply accelerate. As his cabinet colleagues adopted more and 
more radical measures for the pursuance of a de facto independent 
Hungary, Szechenyi's doubts multiplied and culminated in the loss of 
his rational faculties . . . 
Spira's work, a faithful translation of the 1964 Hungarian version 
of the same book, contributes to our understanding of 1848 and of 
Szechenyi's role in those turbulent times . . . 
Peter I. Hidas (Dawson College, Montreal) in the American Historical 
Review, Vol. 81, No. 2 (April 1976). 
A magyarorszagi Szocialdemokrata Part es az agrarkerdes—1900-
1914 kozott. By Dezso Farkas. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1973. 
A magyarorszagi Szocialdemokrata Part ellenzeke es tevekenysege, 
1906-1911. By Lajos Varga. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1973. 
Contemporary Marxist historians in Hungary have an avid interest in 
the period between the 1890s and 1914, a period that exhibited 
agrarian unrest in a countryside characterized by the extremes of land-
less millions and giant estates . . . This period also witnessed the birth 
and growth of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party which, how-
ever, was primarily concerned with socialist education and organiza-
tion of industrial workers in the citites. 
The books by Dezso Farkas and Lajos Varga deal respectively 
with the agrarian position of the party and with its overall political 
tactics. Both are critical of the Social Democratic leadership, which, 
torn between faithful adherence to orthodox Marxism and the realities 
of a primarily agrarian country, alternated between emphasis on 
revolutionary rhetoric, strikes and demonstrations and a policy of 
compromises and negotiated deals. 
The critical approach is certainly warranted in the case of the 
party's agrarian policy, described by Farkas in a thorough, scholarly, 
and well documented, though somewhat dry manner . . . 
Farkas's criticism is basically sound and valid in the theoretical 
sphere. It does not deal with the methods and tactics actually used by 
the party in the countryside. Such an omission, whether intentional or 
accidental, saves his book from the pitfall confronting Varga's treat-
ment of tactical issues in the party's uphill struggle . . . Varga has 
written an interesting, lively, and dynamic book on this subject. He 
carefully avoids painting a one-sided picture by acknowledging the 
genuinely socialist credentials of the leadership and the human frailties 
of the opposition within the party . . . Yet he maintains the impos-
sible assumption (pp. 114 and 186) that somehow a more radical 
socialist policy could have succeeded in pre-1914 Hungary. In fact, the 
socialist leadership could be faulted for doctrinaire rigidity, mistaken 
notions on many issues, misplaced trust in opponents, and occasional 
tactical errors, but their basic instinct toward caution was a critical 
choice of self-preservation over self-annihilation in the best interest of 
the Hungarian working class . . . 
In conclusion, both books are important and valuable contribu-
tions to our knowledge of the period immediately preceding World 
War I. However, neither a purely theoretical nor a somewhat unhis-
torical approach can do full justice to the complex problem of Hun-
garian socialism at the turn of the century. 
Gabor Vermes (Rutgers University, Newark) in Slavic Review, Vol. 
34, No. 3 (September 1975). 
The New Found Land of Stephen Parmenius: The Life and Writings of 
a Hungarian Poet, Drowned on a Voyage from Newfoundland, 1583. 
Edited by David B. Quinn and Neil M. Chesire. Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1972. Pp. XII, 250. 
Given Hungary's geographical location, it is only natural that Hun-
garians have failed to distinguish themselves in the area of seafaring 
and maritime explorations. Thus, discounting a number of unsubstan-
tiated claims about Hungarian travelers in pre-Columbian America, 
the first Hungarian to visit this continent was Stephen Parmenius of 
Buda (ca. 1555/60-83), who joined Sir Humphrey Gilber's second 
expedition in 1583 and then drowned along with Gilbert off Sable 
Island near Newfoundland. 
But not even Parmenius was an "explorer" in the traditional sense 
of that term. He was a young Protestant scholar and poet, and an 
accomplished Latinist, who was drawn to Oxford in order to further 
his studies . . . Once in England, however, he became acquainted 
with Richard Hakluyt and, through Hakluyt, with Sir Humphrey 
Gilbert, who soon persuaded the young Hungarian to accompany him 
on his colonizing effort to North America as a "chronicler." . . . 
Parmenius's claim to fame rests largely on two Latin poetic works 
in praise of the American expedition, and especially on his long and 
informative letter to Hakluyt about his experiences in America, which 
he penned about three weeks before his death . . . Parmenius's 
description is still valuable, and the two editors should be commended 
for making it available to modern scholars. 
Both of the editors have excelled in scholarship. Their painstak-
ing introductory chapters on Parmenius are the best in any language, 
as are their meticulously annotated translations of his writings . . . 
Steven Bela Vardy (Duquesne University), in the American Historical 
Review, Vol. 81, No. 2 (April 1976). 
Xantus Janos. By Istvan Sandor. Budapest: Magveto konyvkiad6, 
1970. Pp. 408. 
. . . In this work, Sandor presents a substantial semi-popular 
biography, giving equal space to Xantus's life before he left America 
and to his travels in Asia and his museological work in Budapest until 
his death in 1894. This latter half of Xdntus's life is here presented for 
the first time in book form. A list of Xantus's 243 writings and a 
number of bibliographical notes complete the volume, which is hand-
somely printed and bound. 
It is curious to note that Sdndor's short biography of 1953 gives 
some attention to a supposed interest of Xantus in the "international 
workers' movement," whereas his biography of 1970 does not 
mention this fantasy . . . Aside from revealing welcome ideological 
change in Hungary, Sandor's later work is a useful, if somewhat 
turgid, survey of the life of a man who deserves far more attention in 
the history of science in the United States than the mere bestowal of 
his name on a murrelet and a lizard. 
Henry Miller Madden (California State University, Fresno), in 
American Historical Review, Vol. 81, No. 2 (April 1976). 
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iastical history. His major work is A domonkosrend Magyarorszdgon 
a reformatio elott [The Dominican Order in Hungary before the Re-
formation] (Debrecen, 1938). Presently he is editing some unpublished 
works of his late father, the author and playwright Zsolt Harsanyi. 
The Very Reverend JOSEPH A. BATORI (1900-1975), Piarist Provin-
cial (1960-67), received his doctorate in Hungarian and Latin in 1923. 
Assigned to the Piarist Gymnasium in Budapest, he continued his 
interest in Hungarian literature and the training of youth, especially in 
developing the unique Hungarian Scouts movement, becoming its 
national Vice-Scoutmaster in 1930. Later he became Headmaster of 
the Piarist Gymnasium in Debrecen. Sent in 1951 to Buffalo as Father 
General to the Piarists in the United States, he established the houses 
in Buffalo and Derby, N.Y., Devon, Pa., and Washington, D.C. Even 
after his retirement in 1967, Father Batori continued his interest in the 
Hungarian Scout movement in America and often lectured on topics 
related to Hungarian literature and culture. 
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Editor's Foreword 
This collection of essays celebrates the twentieth anniversary 
of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. It does so by bringing 
together a wide range of views on the origins, events and conse-
quences of the uprising. While some of the contributors offer 
perspectives gained from personal involvement in the events, 
others try to grapple, from different vantage points and levels of 
analysis, with some of the historical questions surrounding the 
Revolution. The papers in the collection represent their authors' 
personal tribute to the memory of an event which made an 
indelible impact on the lives and beliefs of a great many people 
in Hungary and elsewhere in the world. But the volume does 
more than honour an anniversary: by offering an unrestricted 
discussion of Hungarian affairs, it carries on in the Revolution's 
spirit and strives to embody its demand for the free exchange 
of ideas. 
The publication of this issue of the Canadian-American Review 
of Hungarian Studies was made possible by the dedicated and 
patient collaboration of a great number of people, not all of 
whose names appear on the list of contributors. Professors Louis 
A. Fischer, Andras Gollner, Be/a Kiraly, Bennett Kovrig and 
Laszlo Laszlo (Concordia University) have all read one or two 
of the articles. Editorial assistance in French was rendered by 
Professor G. C. Kuun and Professor S. J. Kirschbaum (Glendon 
College, York University). All the manuscripts in English were 
patiently edited by Professor Thomas Spira; those in French, by 
Professor David Graham (Royal Military College of Canada). 
Mrs. Karen Brown typed the final manuscript versions in English 
with speed and efficiency. 
One half of the printing cost of this issue was defrayed by a 
grant from the Ontario Department of Culture and Recreation, 
for which we are indeed grateful. All other costs were met by the 
Hungarian Readers' Service, Inc., secured through the tireless 
efforts of HRS President and Review manager Dr. Ferenc 
Harcsar. 
Kingston, 1976 November N. F. Dreisziger 
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Foundations of Soviet Domination and 
Communist Political Power in Hungary: 
1945-1950 
Andras B. Gollner 
One fundamental question concerning the Hungarian uprising of 
1956 revolves around the issue of causality. Twenty years have passed 
since those heroic days in Budapest but this question is far from re-
solved. Not only is there a basic disagreement between official Hun-
garian and Soviet historians on the one hand and Western or emigre 
scholars on the other, but there are also a number of contending schools 
of thought among Western liberal and Marxist academics. The aim of 
this paper is much more modest than to provide a comprehensive answer 
to this question. It merely proposes to explore a specific and inter-
dependent group of hitherto neglected causes of the uprising focusing 
on the roots of Soviet domination and Communist power in Hungary 
under Matyas Rakosi. The paper wishes to show that certain powerful 
pre-1945 demands for radical change, the effects of World War II and 
of postwar Soviet economic exploitation, coupled with the Hungarian 
Workers Party's (HWP) economic strategy between 1945 and 1950, 
created a very tight circle of constraints on Hungary's political decision-
makers during 1950 1956, which greatly restricted the number of alter-
natives available for Hungary's modernization. Indeed, they provided 
a potent impulse for the political excesses of the Rakosi regime during 
the six or seven pre-Revolutionary years.1 These factors stand at the 
gateway of the revolution. 
The Need for Modernization and the Legacy of 1918-1945 
The challenges facing Hungary's post-World War II leaders can only 
be understood in the context of the social, economic, and political situ-
ation inherited from the Horthy era. While this legacy has been fairly 
well documented, it often suffers from distortions, and is clouded by 
rhetoric. Official Communist historians tend to overemphasize the 
enormity of postwar Hungary's burden in order to diminish Soviet and 
Communist responsibility for the country's political and economic 
crisis in the early and mid-1950's. At the same time, Hungarian emigre 
writers often minimize the fact that the social and political system of 
interwar Hungary had severely restricted the opportunities of most 
Hungarians and that, generally speaking, the country's interwar regimes 
retarded its advance into the twentieth century. 
What were the pre-1945 grievances that could be rectified only by an 
immense national effort? They manifested themselves in many areas of 
Hungarian life: in politics, the economy, in society's structure and 
norms, as well as in the country's external relations. Politically, there 
was the need to establish the foundations of democratic practice. The 
1930's witnessed a gradual shift towards fascism, so that by 1940, and 
certainly during the war years, participatory democracy in Hungary 
was but a fagade. By the time World War II began, some of the funda-
mental civil and political rights taken for granted in many Western 
democracies were, in Hungary (as well as in the other East-Central 
European states), the privilege only of those who acquiesced in the dic-
tates of the regime, or who could be trusted not to go beyond verbal 
protest. As a former director of the Hungarian National Bank pointed 
out: 
The interwar governments retained their power not so much by 
genuine popular support, but by exerting pressure to achieve safe 
majorities in the elections. . . Far reaching reforms could be advo-
cated . . . but the opposition . . . was never allowed to show its prowess 
in taking over government, and the government could seldom be com-
pelled to yield or offer redress.2 
The economic state of affairs was equally depressing and in need of 
radical change. Agriculture, the mainstay of the Hungarian national 
economy up to 1945, suffered from structural distortions, the most 
visible of which stemmed from the uneven distribution of landowner-
ship. Over half of the arable land was owned by one per cent of the land-
owners. Beneath this thin veneer of wealth and privilege stood a large 
peasant class—numbering about three million—comprising the so-called 
"dwarf holders," seasonally employed farmhands, and estate servants, 
many of whom spent much of the year unemployed and in abject 
misery.3 The Depression had a disastrous effect on the country's econ-
omy generally, but particularly on agriculture. Struggling with out-
dated farming methods, and unable to compete with American grain 
sellers in Europe, Hungarian agriculture served as an extremely shaky 
foundation for the economy. 
The late 1930's witnessed a remarkable growth in industry. A thorough 
examination reveals, however, first, that industrialization was largely 
spawned by increased war preparation and primarily served Germany's 
grand design; and second, that Hungarian manufacturing was over-
concentrated, that it rested on a shallow raw material base (resulting 
from the dismemberment of Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon) and 
that it was structurally uneven—pockets of modernity in a sea of back-
wardness. By the end of the decade, Hungary was Nazi Germany's eco-
nomic satellite and her economic development reflected Germany's 
needs.4 
Economic dependence was followed by political subservience. Fear 
of Communism, a belief that Germany would assist in regaining lost 
Hungarian territories, a feeling that support for Germany would be far 
less costly than opposition and, finally, sheer economic necessity and 
geographical factors, all contributed to Hungary's involvement in World 
War II on Germany's side. It is true that one premier, Pal Teleki, com-
mitted suicide in 1941 rather than submit to German dictates. Another 
one, Miklos Kallay, during 1942 and 1943 strove in vain to unhitch the 
Hungarian state from the Nazi bandwagon. During the closing stages 
of the war the Regent, Admiral Miklos Horthy, himself made a last-
ditch effort to extricate Hungary from the fate of unconditional sur-
render by ordering his troops to join the Allies;5 but his attempt failed. 
Within minutes of his announcement, he was thrown out of office by 
the Nazis and their local supporters. A new government was formed by 
Arrow Cross Party leader Ferenc Szalasi, which immediately rescinded 
Horthy's order and thereby committed the nation to go under with the 
rapidly sinking German ship of state. 
1945 was to be the beginning of a new era for Hungary. The country's 
progressive elements, with a few exceptions, were united in the convic-
tion that the old ruling class had had its day and that the new, sovereign 
Hungary would live at peace with her neighbours and work arm-in-arm 
with the other Central European states for rapid modernization, for the 
betterment of her people, and of the region as a whole. They also be-
lieved that a fundamental modernization of Hungary's polity, economy 
and society simply could not be postponed any longer. Perhaps no one 
was more willing to participate in this task of building a new Hungary 
than the Hungarian working class and peasantry, which, during the 
first steps of economic reconstruction after 1945, were to display a 
superhuman effort. Often working on empty stomachs, frequently with-
out pay or roof over their heads, they were to work 12-14 hours a day, 
sometimes seven days a week, hoping that, this time, the sacrifices de-
manded of them would be in their own interests. 
The greatest obstacles to this postwar modernization were the ravages 
and the accumulated debts of a lost war. Economic damage sustained 
during the early war years was slight, confined primarily to a mounting 
German financial debt column to Hungary. Only after March 1944, 
when German forces occupied the country in preparation for the coming 
battle with the advancing Red Army, did allied bombing of Hungary 
begin in earnest. And then, from September 1944 until April 1945, the 
country became the scene of some vicious ground fighting as well. As 
the German and Hungarian armies retreated westward under a constant 
barrage of bombs and artillery, they blew up most of the country's river 
and railroad bridges.6 Tracks were ripped up, and most of the rolling 
stock taken to Germany. Some of the Danube merchant ships were 
sunk by the Nazis, while the rest, including all barges and tugs, were 
taken upriver to Germany, as were most automobiles and motor trans-
port vehicles. 
In order to prevent the Red Army from drawing on Hungarian eco-
nomic resources the German High Command ordered a policy of sys-
tematic industrial dismantling and removals. As a consequence, about 
500 important factories not severely damaged by Allied bombs were 
either wholly or partially dismantled, their equipment requisitioned or 
scattered around the countryside. Paralleling this action, a considerable 
quantity of immovable property was destroyed by Nazi demolition ex-
perts. The list of removals and destruction is very long indeed, consist-
ing of vast amounts of industrial and agricultural goods. Even the 
country's entire gold and silver reserves were taken to Germany. 
The removals did not involve merely equipment and articles. Ap-
proximately 500,000 people retreated with the Germans into Austria, 
including members of the government, the bureaucracy, large numbers 
of plant managers and owners, and thousands of ordinary citizens. 
Statistical analyses published after the war claimed that financial 
losses from the war owing to material damage or removals equalled 
approximately 40% of Hungary's 1944 national income.7 The severest 
damages, and the most significant for future development, were regis-
tered in heavy industry, primarily in iron, metallurgy and machine 
building,8 and amounted to 33% of Hungary's total industrial losses. 
Within this sector, losses in machinery far outweighed those in buildings 
and stocks. 
With the armistice agreement of 1945, Hungary was compelled to pay 
a very stiff economic penalty for her involvement in the war. The USSR 
was given rights to war booty, and all formerly German or Italian-
owned assets were transferred to Soviet ownership. Moreover, the 
country was levied a very heavy reparations burden payable to the 
USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.9 While most other states in 
East Central Europe (e.g., Poland and Czechoslovakia) received very 
sizeable financial and material support from the UNRRA, Hungary 
received scarcely anything. 
Constraints of Soviet Economic Exploitation 
1. Soviet Military Management of Hungarian Industry: 1944-1945 
After 1945 the difficulties stemming from the economic havoc wreaked 
by the war were accentuated unexpectedly by another obstacle: Soviet 
economic exploitation. It came to equal, if in a different way, the in-
tensity of those pre-1945 constraints which had for so long denied 
decent socio-economic standards for Hungary's people. 
As the Red Army advanced westward through Hungary, all enter-
prises falling within its territory—some vacated only a few hours earlier 
by Nazi demolition experts—were assigned Soviet military commanders. 
These saw to it that factories still in working order began producing 
immediately for the war effort against the retreating Germans.10 Soviet 
military personnel also supervised production in the coal mines, and 
deliveries to the army began forthwith. 
An illuminating collection of documents, shedding a great deal of 
light, indirectly and perhaps unwittingly, on this period of Soviet mili-
tary management, has been published recently by the Hungarian National 
Archives.11 Intended to illustrate—and they do so admirably well—the 
self-sacrificing role of Hungary's working classes, factory committees 
and councils in the early reconstruction phase of the war-torn economy 
during 1944 -45,12 these documents also paint a vivid picture of Soviet 
military management, providing clear-cut evidence of the following 
(and hitherto officially denied) aspects of the Soviet military role in 
postwar Hungary between November 1944 and July-August 1945: 
1. The complete depletion of economic stocks by the Red Army; 
2. Wholesale removal of all liquid assets from Hungarian banks and 
enterprise safes by Soviet military personnel; 
3. Widespread dismantling and removal of equipment from factories; 
4. Breakneck production under difficult working conditions, heed-
less of the need for maintaining equipment; 
5. Soviet requisitioning of industrial products without remuneration; 
6. The difficulty of ensuring labour supply because of arbitrary street 
arrests by Soviet patrols and deportation of large numbers of skilled 
workers to the Soviet Union; and 
7. The non-payment of workers' wages by Soviet military managers. 
When Soviet military management ended in July-August 1945, the 
affected firms were in utter chaos. Thousands of valuable machines and 
tools were lost, stocks were used up, and machines left badly damaged. 
Most of the firms were also hopelessly in deficit.13 The magnitude of 
direct Soviet military intervention in Hungary's economic revival during 
the critical first postwar months, and the immense strategic advantage 
enjoyed by the USSR in shaping that revival, can be seen even in the 
official Hungarian figures. According to Ivan T. Berend, during the 
nine months of Soviet military management 75% of Hungary's indus-
trial output was channelled directly by and for the Red Army.14 
The situation in agriculture was similar. The Red Army requisitioned 
vast quantities of agricultural goods without payment, and drove away 
tens of thousands of cattle, horses, and other livestock. From the middle 
of 1945, requisitioning, in the main, was carried out by the Hungarian 
authorities who compensated the peasants. Consequently, instead of 
the peasants bearing the brunt of the occupation cost, the load was 
shifted onto the Hungarian treasury. 
There should be no misunderstanding here. A victorious power has 
the right to exact certain payments from a defeated enemy. One should 
also not belittle the sacrifices, the suffering and hardship of millions of 
Soviet citizens, or the tremendous damage inflicted during the war on 
the Soviet economy. Hungary's belligerency against the USSR could 
certainly not be suddenly forgiven or forgotten by the Red Army. Nor 
could it be expected to ignore Hungary's factories and rely on supplies 
shipped over great distances. Our concern here stems from the fact that, 
since 1945, Communist economic historians have consistently claimed 
that the period in question was very brief, that it benefitted Hungary, 
that it laid the foundation for rapid economic recovery during the Three 
Year Plan, and that it showed great Soviet concern for the well-being 
of the Hungarian populace. The evidence does not bear this out. On the 
contrary, Soviet military management accelerated the collapse of Hun-
gary's private sector, hastened the economic catastrophe of 1945-46, 
impoverished millions of Hungarian workers and peasants, and con-
founded the country's new and inexperienced public administrators. 
The effects of Soviet military management were so devastating that the 
most thorough and encompassing central planning and control were 
mandatory. In 1945, the Communist Party captured a commanding 
position in economic reconstruction—the Supreme Economic Council 
(SEC). This important instrument enabled it to sever the jugular vein 
of private capital and hasten the Stalinist type of command system. 
2. The Retribution Payments 
The reparations agreement with the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and 
Yugoslavia was signed on June 15, 1945. It established the various 
reparations goods prices, designated the product mix of the reparations 
package, and stipulated deliveries in six equal yearly installments. At 
first glance the total sum of 300 million dollars does not seem excessive.15 
We must consider closely, however, the price structure, the total product 
mix, and the timing of the deliveries, in order to gauge the true impact 
of this agreement on Hungary's postwar economic development. 
When the Soviet-managed firms were finally returned to civilian 
Hungarian control in July-August 1945, reparations payments began. 
No sooner had Hungarian industry finished supplying the bulk of her 
production gratis to the Soviet command than she had to begin all over 
again, only under a different pretext. There was, moreover, no possi-
bility of deducting any of the earlier unpaid-for deliveries from the 
retribution bill. Under the terms of the Paris Peace agreements, the 
Soviet Union forced Hungary to waive all claims arising from the earlier 
Soviet management of Hungary's economy.16 
a. Product mix: 
War damages caused by bombing and Nazi sabotage were the most 
severe in Hungary's heavy industrial sector, especially in the engineering 
and machine building branches. This fact seriously handicapped the 
pace of economic reconstruction. The reparations agreement exacer-
bated this handicap by stipulating that the greatest share of reparations 
goods to the USSR be composed of heavy industrial manufactures. 
After the switch-over to civilian production during 1945 and 1946, 
almost 90% of Hungary's heavy industrial production was tied down by 
reparations orders. Even at the end of 1946 and 1947, when (thanks to 
staggering deliveries over eight years instead of the initial six years) the 
quantity of yearly deliveries was reduced, retribution production still 
claimed about 60% of heavy industry's total output.17 The Hungarian 
General Creditbank also showed that at the end of August 1946, 76,000 
out of 95,000 employees in heavy industry were engaged in retribution 
work, and in December of that year, 60,000.18 According to the Credit-
bank, production for civilian consumption rose only marginally, owing 
to dismissals and a reduction in working time to forty hours per week.19 
Although agricultural goods comprised only 15% of total repara-
tions, these were also extremely difficult to procure and their delivery 
caused many difficulties to the economy and the civilian population. 
From late 1944 until the beginning of 1947, when the Paris Peace Treaty 
was signed, Hungary was required, under the terms of the Armistice 
agreement, to supply all of the food requirements of the occupation 
army. A severe drought in 1945, the low acreage sown at the end of 1944, 
initial dislocations caused by the land reform in 1945, and the under-
mechanization of the new postwar land reform system, together with 
massive requisitioning by the occupying army, were responsible for a 
disastrous agricultural situation in the fall of 1945. Compulsory agri-
cultural deliveries for retribution compounded the damage and hin-
dered the development of the newly-formed farming system. The result 
was widespread starvation. 
b. Pricing: 
The June 15 agreement reiterated the terms of the Armistice agree-
ment, namely, that the price of retribution goods be calculated at the 
level of 1938 U.S. dollars. For many reasons (e.g., a 400% rise in trans-
portation costs and a 700% increase in the import price index)20 the 
costs of producing the goods stipulated in the June agreement were 
significantly higher in 1945 than they would have been in 1938. Accord-
ing to Hungary's premier, the Hungarian delegation protested in vain 
that the goods could not be produced at the rates indicated and that, 
because of undervaluation, the deliveries would in effect triple or quin-
tuple the amount indicated in the retribution agreement.21 
Underpricing was not the only factor substantially raising the nomi-
nal costs of the reparations package. At the time of signing, the Hun-
garian currency, the pengo, was overvalued with respect to the dollar. 
According to Berend, the real costs of the reparation package doubled 
as a result.22 Nicholas Spulber has claimed that the new exchange rate 
between the forint (the new currency introduced in August 1946) and 
the dollar, quadrupled the value of the reparation package: ". . . the 
average Hungarian 'reparations dollar' appears to have been equal in 
1946 to 43 forints or nearly 4 current dollars. That is, to obtain credit 
for one dollar of reparations, Hungary had to deliver goods worth 
almost 4 dollars at the current exchange rate."23 It can be safely said 
that the combined effects of these factors pushed up the reparations 
bill's real value to about 1.5 billion 1946 U.S. dollars.24 
c. Reparations as a share of exports: 
The share of foreign trade (and the dependence on imports for raw 
materials) in Hungary's national income had been already very high in 
1938. One of the greatest negative effects of the retribution payments on 
Hungarian economic revival and modernization was that it kept ex-
ports to a minimum. For the first three postwar years, the value of 
retribution deliveries exceeded the entire export trade and even in sub-
sequent years retributions consumed about 50-60% of exports. This 
posed serious problems for Hungary's balance of trade, monetary and 
import policy, and economic reconstruction in general. 
d. Timing: 
The June 1945 agreement, the terms of which were retroactive to 
January 1945, directed that deliveries be made in six equal yearly in-
stallments. This meant that reparations for 1945 had to be produced 
and delivered in six months instead of the normal twelve. Should deliv-
eries lag, a penalty of 5% per month on the value of outstanding goods 
would be imposed. 
The pressure on the treasury had already been severe prior to the 
signing of the agreement. There had been demands for government 
investment in reconstruction, for government subsidy of firms with 
large deficits under Soviet military management, for government fi-
nancing of the maintenance costs of the Red Army, and for a host of 
other programmes. State revenues were virtually non-existent, the coun-
try's gold reserves had been lost, and no export revenues were available 
because of the collapse of foreign trade. In short, the six months target 
for the 1945 reparations payments meant that considerable financial 
outlays had to be made immediately, in the absence of appreciable in-
crease in state revenues, and that an inordinately large proportion of 
current production would have to be exported gratis. Only a small 
fraction of production would remain for home consumption. Faced 
with the threat of stiff financial penalties and a stream of Soviet protest 
notes about the slowness of deliveries, the treasury responded by print-
ing more and more money, in order to finance the companies producing 
for retribution. This action quickly snowballed into the most severe 
inflation ever experienced in world history. 
It would be incorrect to assert that the Hungarian inflation started 
only with reparations payments, the Red Army's maintenance costs, or 
with its printing presses churning out Hungarian currency during 1944 
45. The rate of inflation had increased steadily already during the war. 
It was with reparations, however, that the currency went out of control, 
so that, by the end of 1945, the cost of living (excluding rent) was 
mounting at a rate of 15% per hour. As will be seen in the discussion 
of the Communist-controlled Supreme Economic Council's practice, 
these Soviet claims and pressures were fully integrated with the SEC's 
secret policy of bankrupting Hungary's private sector, thereby gener-
ating the need for ever greater state control over the economy, ostensibly 
to safeguard the national interest. 
3. Soviet Takeover of Formerly German and Italian-Owned Corpora-
tions and the Creation of Joint-Stock Companies 
According to the Potsdam Agreement, the Berlin Foreign Ministers' 
Conference, and the Paris Peace Treaty, all formerly German and 
Italian-owned assets and companies in Hungary were to become the 
property of the Soviet Union.25 Moreover, the Order in Council of 
January 4, 1948 stated that "claims which arose before January 20, 
1945, cannot be enforced against trading companies in which half or 
more of the share capital or of the shares were handed over to the Soviet 
Union as German property. The same applies to individual firms ceded 
to the Soviet Union."2 6 
On March 8, 1947, the Hungarian government published a list of the 
fully German or Italian-owned companies which were transferred to the 
Soviet Union,27 totalling 201 enterprises with over 3,500 plants and 
premises. The large number of concerns in Hungary with partial Ger-
man-Italian shareholding were disposed of similarly. Through switching 
and amalgamation, the Soviet Union created five new Soviet-Hungarian 
joint-stock companies in 1946, each country having a 50% share. The 
extent of these assets was enormous. Berend and Ranki cite Premier 
Teleki, according to whom, "The German Empire in 1939 had such an 
extensive and widespread network of economic interest in our country, 
that through this she could check and indeed influence the whole of 
Hungarian economic life,"28 
The share of German capital in Hungarian economic life increased 
during the war, first of all in the manufacturing industry. Studies by 
the Statistical Office have shown that between 1938 and 1942 the stock 
of industrial and commercial shares held by German interests in the 
Hungarian economy increased by 50%, and in credit concerns closely 
associated with industry, the ownership of German shares went up by 
100%. During these years, when the country became increasingly sub-
ordinated to Germany, beyond those companies in which Germany 
had a total or majority shareholding, German capital also acquired 
shares in all important Hungarian concerns.29 
In short, all of these assets, through which Germany had exercised eco-
nomic control over Hungary, were transferred to the USSR after the 
war. This enabled the Soviets to exercise stringent control over Hun-
garian economic life. 
The operative control of joint stock companies, like that of the fully 
Soviet-owned firms, was vested in the hands of the general manager, 
who, by law, had to be a Soviet citizen.30 The joint stock companies 
were given preferential treatment by being placed in a much more 
profitable position than any other companies in Hungary. Indeed, their 
advantages and concessions surpassed even those which they had en-
joyed under German domination.31 For example, in monopolistic joint 
stock companies (e.g., the Pecs and district coal mines, an affiliate of 
Meszhart), a radical upward price adjustment was ordered by the Soviet 
manager and approved unquestioningly by the Hungarian Price Office.32 
It is well known that many of the formerly German-owned companies 
had floated substantial debts with the Hungarian treasury during the 
war. These were cancelled by the Soviet Union upon gaining control of 
the shares. However, in formerly German-owned firms that were owed 
payment by Hungary—in many cases incurred during Soviet military 
management—the Russians demanded full payment with a substantial 
mark-up to offset the effects of inflation. Initially, the Soviet Union 
pegged the amount owed by the Hungarian treasury to these firms and 
to Germany in general at 200 million dollars. Finally she settled for $45 
million. Investments in the joint-stock companies were to be on a fifty-
fifty basis, shared between the two countries. The source of the Soviet 
share was the above-mentioned $45 million. In effect, the Hungarian 
treasury defrayed the full Soviet investment.33 
Two of the joint companies, Meszhart and Maszovlet, apart from 
controlling a number of diverse affiliates (such as Hungary's best and 
most productive coal-fields in Pecs), monopolized Danube shipping 
and civil aviation. The other three companies—Hungarian-Soviet Crude 
Oil Ltd. (Maszovol); Hungarian-Soviet Oil Works Ltd. (Molaj); and 
the Hungarian-Soviet Bauxite-Aluminum Co. Ltd. (which controlled 
two affiliates, the Hungarian Bauxite Mine Co. and the Danube Valley 
Alum Earth Industry Co.)—were also privileged companies. They vir-
tually monopolized bauxite mining (Hungary's major mineral industry), 
aluminum processing, petroleum refining, and oil prospecting. 
Respecting the concessions won by the joint-stock companies, Nicholas 
Spulber has written that the ". . . exemptions amounted to a virtual sub-
sidy by the local governments to each of these companies... [Moreover 
they were given] complete latitude in the utilization of their foreign 
exchange. . . Enjoying complete extra-territoriality, they could cut 
across both the local frontiers and the local planning. Although in 
principle they were supposed to adjust themselves to local economic 
plans, in practice the local economic planners had to adjust their plans 
to the objectives of the joint Soviet companies." 34 
It is a well-known fact that, as a consequence of the Treaty of Trianon, 
Hungary had lost all of her important mineral deposits, and that, after 
Denmark, she is the poorest European country in mineral resources.35 
In this bleak picture there are four bright spots: Hungary's bauxite 
reserves are considered to be the second largest in the world; after 1946, 
significant uranium deposits were found in western Hungary; the Komlo 
region of Pecs boasted good deposits of high-grade black coal (Hun-
gary's other coal fields all yield the low calorific, brown coal, or lignite 
variety); and she had limited oil deposits. After 1946, the USSR ob-
tained control over all of these mineral resources for a decade. The 
uranium fields, by now largely depleted, are still under Soviet manage-
ment. 
After 1946, the Soviet Union became Hungary's major trading part-
ner, absorbing about one third of that country's foreign trade. It is 
noteworthy that the servicing of this commerce was not carried out 
through the Hungarian-owned Foreign Trade Bank, which, under Hun-
garian law, must handle all foreign transactions. Until 1955, all business 
deals with the USSR were channelled through the Hungarian Com-
mercial and Industrial Bank, which was under Soviet ownership and 
management from 1946 until 1955.36 Having profited handsomely from 
these formerly German-owned companies for a period of 8-9 years, the 
Soviet Union began to sell her shares to Hungary not long after Stalin's 
death, in order to finance her investments in some of her other holdings 
in the country. One official source tells us that in 1952 the Soviet Union 
estimated the value of her fully owned assets in Hungary to be 3.6 billion 
rubles, or $900 million at the going rate of exchange.38 
It is impossible to calculate the Soviet Union's net financial extrac-
tion during the first post-war decade. It might amount to approximately 
2.5 billion dollars.39 Currently, only two other "informed guesses"exist 
on the net financial cost of Soviet economic imperialism to the Hun-
garian economy between 1945 and 1955. Jan Wszelaki has suggested $1 
billion, which he admits is a very conservative estimate, and which 
excludes amounts incurred after 1947. His calculations, which are un-
fortunately impossible to check, "point to an amount in excess of $1 
billion. By 1954, when mixed companies were dissolved, they must have 
been much higher."40 The other figure, $1.3 billion, suggested by Paul 
Marer is, undoubtedly, also a conservative estimate.41 However, owing 
to the secrecy surrounding Soviet-Hungarian economic transactions, 
none of the figures is verifiable, at least not yet. Nonetheless, the USSR 
had an unmistakeable and irrefutable tendency to exploit the Hun-
garian economy during the first and certainly most critical decade of 
socialist construction. 
No country, poor in industrial raw materials and suffering from ex-
tensive war damages, can afford to lose such a vast amount of capital 
and to have such a large percentage of her industrial capacity tied down 
with reparations precisely when she needs to rebuild her economy and 
begin a long overdue process of rapid political, economic, and social 
modernization. This burden on the Hungarian national economy de-
manded great sacrifices from Hungary's long-oppressed working classes. 
The targets of modernization and the payment of external debts could 
only be exacted and maintained by ruthless police methods and strict 
political regimentation. Democratic practices and fair wages could 
simply not come into effect under such constraints. The roots of the 
Rakosiite police state, its political excesses, were deeply conditioned if 
not determined by Soviet demands and exploitation in the immediate 
postwar period. It was not accidental that the primary aim of the 1956 
uprising was to terminate this Soviet exploitation of Hungary's economy. 
Yet even these two interrelated variables—the need for rapid moderni-
zation and reconstruction, and Soviet economic exploitation—do not 
sufficiently explain the impulse towards Hungarian communist totali-
tarianism. We must add a third set of variables, that of the HWP's own 
postwar economic strategy. 
* * * 
The Hungarian Workers Party's Postwar Economic Strategy 
From December 23, 1944, Hungary's "liberated" territories and its 
affairs not directly related to the still raging war were to be administered 
by a coalition government appointed by the first National Assembly in 
Debrecen. It was instructed to follow the economic programme enunci-
ated by the National Independence Front (NIF)—a loose coalition of 
various anti-fascist groups, including the Communists. The NIF's eco-
nomic programme was in fact drafted and then publicly endorsed by 
the HWP42 and by the other NIF parties as a reasonable and positive 
strategy for Hungary's postwar economic revival. 
The NIF first of all instructed the government to introduce radical 
land reform.43 Second, it stipulated that the country's future economic 
progress be based on respect for and guarantee of private property. The 
government was to promote private initiative in reconstructing the war-
torn economy. After reading these and other Communist-promoted 
programmes, Oszkar Jaszi, a former prominent liberal politician and 
commentator on Hungarian affairs who had taken up residence in the 
United States after World War I, was moved to write: 
The old demagogy of the first Bolshevik revolution was completely 
absent: Communism has become respectable and gentlemanly . . . 
Generally speaking, there is not much talk about Communism in Hun-
gary today. The leitmotif is democracy with intensely patriotic over-
tones.44 
In a sense, Jaszi was right—there was not very much talk of Com-
munism during those years. But he was greatly mistaken in assuming 
that the absence of talk meant the Communists had given up their quest 
for power. 
Between 1945 and 1947, during the premiership of FerencNagy (head 
of the Smallholders' Party), strategically important economic posts in 
the administration were diverted to Communist control. The economic 
policies applied by the HWP from these commanding heights contra-
dicted the NI F's economic programme. Rather than promote free enter-
prise, the HWP, through the Supreme Economic Council and with the 
tactical support of the USSR, secretly and deliberately worked to ruin 
the private sector of the Hungarian economy. The HWP's real aim was 
to engineer a national economic collapse in order to discredit the ruling 
Smallholders' Party, to eliminate the economic power base of the bour-
geoisie, and to make the state's expropriation of private enterprises 
relatively easy. This is what was later referred to as "the dry road to 
Socialism." 
Though immediate constraints did play an important role in the evo-
lution of these economic tactics, the general strategy for the liquidation 
of all non-communist forces in Hungary, including the forces of demo-
cratic socialism, and the subsequent erection of the Stalinist type com-
mand system, had been carefully prepared in the USSR years before the 
war's end, during the halcyon days of Soviet-American relations. That 
such a plan existed was denied by the HWP until 1949. Only when the 
HWP had finally monopolized power did it admit that its strategy was 
not designed to respond to certain bellicose actions by the Allies— 
specifically the United States—after 1945, but was in fact part of an 
earlier and longstanding Soviet-inspired blueprint. As Rakosi was to 
state in 1951 — and those Western historians who argue that the Com-
munists were forced into instituting proletarian dictatorships in Eastern 
Europe against their own earlier intentions because of certain aggres-
sive postwar actions by President Truman and other Western leaders 
should pay particular attention: 
Stalin showed us . . . a new road to the building of socialism, and 
with his help we worked out its theoretical problems. Those comrades 
who did not know about our strategic plans, which we worked out 
during the war, were frequently surprised later, and on more than 
one occasion were hostile to our participation in the coalition govern-
ment . . . We did not mention this to the Party members at the time, 
since to mention even theoretically that our goal was the dictatorship 
of the proletariat would have created great difficulties for our winning 
the support of the petty bourgeoisie, and even that of the majority of 
the workers. As we have said, the Hungarian Communist Party, al-
ready during the war, had worked out the strategy that it was to pursue 
during its fights with the fascist, imperialist and feudal elements . . . 
We formed the Supreme Economic Council with which we gradually 
won control over all of the key economic areas.45 
Apart from the need for economic modernization, the rebuilding of 
the country's war ravaged economy, and meeting the exacting repara-
tions schedules, there were four specific economic conditions necessi-
tating vigorous state intervention in the economy after 1945: 
1. Most of industry, and especially heavy industry, depended entirely 
on state credits to finance deficits and reparations production.46 This 
dependence on the treasury required close central supervision of enter-
prise behaviour in order to ensure a judicious utilization of the state's 
scarce resources; 
2. The transmission of state credits to enterprises through the coun-
try's banking houses also required that banking activity be closely regu-
lated and supervised by the central authorities; 
3. Economic collapse brought on by the inflation and the demands of 
maintaining financial stability necessitated strict state control over 
prices and wages, foreign trade, monetary and credit policy; 
4. The widespread scarcity of industrial raw materials and energy 
resources required tight central supervision of the allocation of these 
resources to ensure the fulfilment of state priorities. 
The Supreme Economic Council (SEC), a supra-ministerial commit-
tee, was established in 1945, ostensibly for the purpose of coordinating 
the above tasks. The powers granted to the SEC were formidable. It was 
empowered to supervise, control, and direct any economic activity in 
the country if it so wished, according to its own judgement, to ensure 
the successful completion of reparations schedules, uphold the interests 
of the national treasury, and maintain financial stability.47 The chief 
executive and initiative powers of the SEC were vested in its Secretariat, 
headed by Zoltan Vas, one of the leading Muscovite members of the 
Hungarian Communist Party. 
The SEC Secretariat, through its control of export-import licences, 
tax, credit, price and wage policy, and the distribution of vital energy 
resources and raw materials, was in a position to prepare the way for a 
radical restructuring of industrial production well before January 1950, 
the date generally identified as the beginning of Stalinist type economic 
policies in Hungary. Although the SEC Secretariat frequently stated 
publicly that the stringent deflationary policies it pursued after the 
1944-45 inflation were governed by the need to maintain financial 
stability and confidence, one of its confidential internal memoranda 
clearly points to the opposite objective: driving the private capitalist 
sector into bankruptcy: 
We must make the widest possible use of the situation which exists, 
whereby most private enterprises have taken state credits or will have 
to rely on state credits. We must force these enterprises, with the threat 
of bankruptcy, that in return for postponing payment, they should 
hand over to the state, or to the nationalized banks, a significant por-
tion of their shares. Until the time that we can rely on wholesale 
nationalization we must increase state control so that private capital 
should be forced to convert into the state capitalist sector.48 
Both the "situation," i.e., the forcing of enterprises into a one-sided 
dependence on state credits, and the way out of this situation—free 
enterprise or state ownership—were under the firm control of Soviet 
and Hungarian Communists. And they were able to regulate these 
parameters easily to ensure that political-economic developments in 
Hungary progressed in conjunction with the strategy devised in Moscow 
during the war. 
The overwhelming powers of the SEC and its true intentions can be 
illustrated by another example. During the stabilization period follow-
ing massive inflation, the government created an Office of Prices and 
Materials (OPM) for the purpose of gaining more control over the 
allocation of scarce materials and to better regulate price formation. 
Because it was headed by a non-Communist, the OPM soon found itself 
on a collision course with the SEC. The executive powers vested in this 
body by an order-in-council in May 194649 were severely curtailed in 
practice by the SEC and later by the Ministry of Industry (headed after 
1947 by a high-ranking officer of the Red Army, Istvan Kossa). 
Throughout its existence, and under the chairmanship of the Small-
holders' Party's economic adviser, Istvan Varga, the Office of Prices 
and Materials was frequently condemned by the H WP and the SEC for 
"supporting capitalist speculators and profiteers," when it merely at-
tempted to regulate prices in order to stave off widespread bankruptcies. 
On a number of occasions when the OPM had wanted to institute price 
changes to reflect shifting scarcity conditions, its decisions were vetoed 
by the SEC. For example, in December 1946 the OPM decided to in-
crease industrial wholesale prices in order to align them with the sharp 
price rises of raw materials from the USSR, and to counterbalance the 
huge wage increases engineered by the Communist-dominated trade 
unions.50 This was vetoed by the SEC, and rather than increase the 
wholesale industrial price index it forced through a reduction. This 
action bankrupted a large number of firms, while the HWP and the 
union leadership blamed the collapse on speculation and financial em-
bezzling. Ivan T. Berend, after consulting Party archives, has pointed 
out correctly that this ". . . battle against increased prices was not at all 
simply a question of economics," but a consciously applied mechanism 
in the battle for political power.51 
After the signing of the first postwar trade agreement with the Soviet 
Union, Hungary's foreign trade policy came under close Soviet and 
HWP supervision. The enormity of reparations had made state control 
imperative during the first three postwar years. Whereas granting of 
export and import licences to individual firms was the prerogative of 
the SEC Secretariat, that of foreign currency for all trade transactions 
came under the aegis of the National Bank, and its department for the 
allotment of foreign currency was headed by a high-ranking Muscovite 
member of the HWP, Laszlo Hay.52 By 1948, all movements in the 
volume, destination, and structure of foreign trade were undertaken 
strictly in response to central Communist Party commands. But the 
greatest acceleration towards the Stalinist type command economy 
came with the introduction of the first Three Year Plan in August 1947. 
The Plan was drafted jointly by the Social Democratic Party and the 
HWP. Both had evolved separate plans of reconstruction in late 1946 
and early 1947.53 The finally adopted Three Year Plan was an amalgam 
of the two variants. The visible differences between the two were not as 
marked as might have been expected. The Communists postulated a 
greater percentage of total investments accruing to the capital goods 
production sector, and less to consumption, and they also desired a 
higher share of investments for agriculture. The Social Democrats en-
visioned that some of the investments could be financed through loans 
in the West. The Communists opposed this idea, which resulted in a 
great deal of haggling in the coordinating committee. A compromise 
produced two versions. Variant "A" would feature foreign loans, Vari-
ant "B" would omit them. In the end, no Western loans were contracted 
owing to Communist pressure, and Variant "B" prevailed.54 
The nature of the Three Year Plan is generally misunderstood in 
Western literature, as most analysts consider 1950 and the first Five 
Year Plan to be the beginning of the policies and mechanisms of the 
Hungarian command economy. There are a number of reasons for this 
misunderstanding. First, the original Plan lacked the well-known Soviet 
type "steep ascent" industrialization policy, which had been first un-
veiled in the USSR in 1928. The Plan objectives accented equilibrium, 
agriculture, reconstruction, and increasing real wages—the antithesis of 
Stalinist developmental policy.55 
Second, the HWP vigorously denied that the Plan augured the build-
ing of socialism. On the contrary, its purpose was to engender a planned 
and proportionate reconstruction of the war-torn economy, to guide 
economic development through the hurdles bequeathed by the war and 
reparations. Even in a speech to comrades at the H WP's Academy Erno 
Gero maintained: 
There are those who will say that what we really want to achieve 
with this Plan is nothing less than socialism. What we say to these 
people is: No! There is no question here of socialism, but only of laying 
the basis for the peaceful progress of our economy. Not only do we not 
want to interfere with the private property of the little people, but the 
Plan will even protect such property f rom the encroachment of the big 
capitalists. Even more, the implementation of the Three Year Plan 
cannot even be imagined without the enthusiastic cooperation of our 
200,000 artisans and handicraftsmen. . . Their skill and ant-like dili-
gence is greatly needed by the country. . . And there is no question 
whatsoever of the elimination of the big capitalists. . .56 
Four years later Gero admitted that his statement was a lie, necessitated 
by tactical political considerations. In fact the Party was already laying 
the economic basis for socialism during the Three Year Plan: 
Naturally, in 1946, when that speech was made, the Party couldn't 
show all of its cards . . . because it would have helped our class ene-
mies. . . This is why it was necessary during the introduction of the 
Plan to mention merely that we were trying only to reconstruct our 
war-torn economy, and not to build socialism. . . But in actual fact 
we were, already during the course of the Three Year Plan, building 
socialism in Hungary.57 
There are additional reasons for the existence of the mistaken view 
that the Three Year Plan ". . . did not contemplate any major structural 
change in the economy . . . [and that it] resembled more the plans of 
Western Laborite Governments immediately following World War II, 
than the Soviet Plans or the subsequent Hungarian Five Year Plan."58 
In 1948, Hungary introduced a moratorium on statistical information, 
and consequently there were no accurate data available on the nature 
of economic restructuring achieved by the end of the Plan period.59 
While the Planning Office had issued a 180-page statistical analysis of 
achievements at the end of the first Plan year, at the end of the Three 
Year Plan only a very general and brief document was published. Ac-
cording to Timar, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office was not 
completely certain, even in 1968, about the situation at the end of 1949.60 
The SEC carried the lion's share of the responsibility for these devel-
opments for, as George Kemeny has pointed out, it had usurped for 
itself the strategic role in the application of the Plan: 
Clause III [of the Parliamentary Act on the Three Year Plan] 
authorized the government to establish a Planning Board and a 
National Planning Department for the elaboration of the Plan and 
for controlling the work of carrying it into effect. [But] the Planning 
Board never acquired a leading role. It was but an interdepartmental 
advisory body. The power of decision was vested in the Supreme 
Economic Council.6I 
The SEC also had a very good statistical "cover" in Zoltan Vas who was 
not only general secretary but also editor of the prestigious statistical 
journal, Gazdasagstatisztikai Tajekoztato (published by the Central 
Statistical Office), and hence could conceal statistical evidence about 
the SEC's deviations.62 We also know that a later official eulogy of the 
Plan's accomplishments, again written by Vas, contains statistical falsi-
fications exceeding 100% in some crucial areas.63 For over twenty-five 
years Western commentators have been using this document as their 
primary source on the Plan's achievements, investment ratios, and in-
dustrial restructuring. 
What was the actual extent of deviation from the Plan? As Timar has 
pointed out, we cannot be really precise since the statistics were scrambled 
by the Party. We do know, however, that the general strategy laid down 
in the Plan was not implemented. Agricultural investments, which were 
to constitute the largest overall share, actually came to less than 15%, 
and instead, military expenditures received the largest share—over 
30%.64 After August 1948, industrial investments were drastically in-
creased—by 60%—of which over 90% was used for the development of 
heavy industry.65 
In the handicraft and artisan industries, similar deviations had begun 
to emerge by 1948. Rather than relying on what Gero had called the 
"ant-like diligence" of the little people, by the summer of 1948 we find 
the state busy cancelling about 1,500 permits per month66 and insti-
tuting a series of discriminatory credit, tax, and price policies. As a 
consequence, the percentage of workers employed in this sector rapidly 
declined during the Three Year Plan.67 
Radical transformations had also occurred in wholesale trade by the 
end of the Plan period in 1949. In a confidential memorandum, the SEC 
stated that the prospective nationalization of the wholesale sector must 
be implemented with great circumspection lest the suspicions of the 
other political parties be aroused. "These decisions must be imple-
mented in such a way that to outsiders and superficial observers they 
should appear as merely fragmentary decisions."68 Through a combi-
nation of "dry road" policies (i.e., driving wholesale dealers into bank-
ruptcy through the denial of state credits, or by setting a very high 
interest rate on commercial credits, and discriminatory pricing) and 
outright nationalization, almost the entire wholesale trade sector was 
absorbed into the state sector by the end of 1948. 
Paralleling the Three Year Plan, the HWP demanded that all of the 
banks be nationalized. Only thus could Plan targets be realized and 
financial control maintained. But since the SEC could already exercise 
extensive control over banking activities, it would seem that this motive 
for nationalization was not the true one. According to Ranki, the Party 
was in fact motivated by the political goal of delivering "another blow 
to the power of the bourgeoisie." 69 
After nationalization, a radical reorganization of the banking system 
was introduced in 1947, patterned on the USSR. All enterprises were 
instructed to convert to the single account system, through which the 
state could practice (via the National Bank) extensive financial control 
over the behaviour of both nationalized and private firms.70 
Once the National Planning Office and the Planning Board had 
established themselves and had collected and compiled comprehensive 
statistical information on all enterprises, a widespread nationalization 
programme was introduced. With the slogan, "The Factory is Yours, 
You're Working for Yourselves," suddenly and without giving prior 
notice—even to Parliament—all firms employing more than 100 people 
were nationalized at the beginning of 1948, only six months after the 
introduction of the Three Year Plan. All these firms were assigned new 
managers on the eve of nationalization. Appointed by the Communist 
Party, they had no advance notice of their promotion, had not applied 
for the jobs in advance, and were not selected on the basis of their 
administrative skills. Indeed, they possessed no such skills. They were 
physical labourers at the enterprises concerned, and had been selected 
on the basis of their political reliability and their record of active coop-
eration with the Party during the preceding three years. 
Within a matter of days, the new managers were made largely sub-
servient to the central planning bureaucracy. Ostensibly because of 
their entrepreneurial inexperience, the authorities considerably ex-
panded their own already extensive regulatory rights, arguing that the 
new managers were to receive all of the "expert guidance" they needed 
to carry out the great national tasks ahead. In May 1948, without any 
prior debate or popular participation in the formulation of the new 
administrative structure, the government established 20 industrial direc-
torates of the branch ministries to exert strict economic control over the 
units of production.71 
And so, having been given "control" over their factories, and having 
had the private ownership of the means of production eliminated, the 
working classes still found themselves back where they had started in 
terms of their decision-making powers. Instead of dominating the pro-
cess of production, the workers were overwhelmed by the forces and 
relations of production. The new working-class manager's sole privilege 
was to supply the central bureaucrats with requested information and 
fulfil to the letter all the detailed instructions from the industrial 
directorate's "experts." The Plan, which had not been formulated by the 
workers but was, rather, the product of the political preferences of their 
self-appointed vanguard, became sanctified. The new managers had 
thus been given a "new kind" of freedom: they had to place "all moral 
and material means at their command" in the service of the Plan. Those 
who failed to cooperate were either dismissed or, depending on the 
nature of their opposition, persecuted "with the full rigour of the law, 
as enemies of the Hungarian people, enemies that might seek to thwart 
the aims of the Three Year Plan."72 
The HWP, which hitherto maintained that the proletariat had been 
working like slaves under capitalism, suddenly began to proclaim that 
the workers should work even harder now than before: 
We looked at the statistics . . . and it turns out that our workers are 
producing much less for our democracy than they did for Horthy. But 
we cannot progress this way comrades. . . Increasing productivity; 
this is the decisive question for our democracy. We must create order 
in this area.73 
And "order" they did create. Upon his return to Hungary with Soviet 
troops in 1944, Istvan Kossa was immediately appointed (under Soviet 
pressure from the Allied Control Commission and without a polling of 
the rank and file union membership) general secretary of the Hungarian 
Trade Unions. In 1948 he was appointed Minister of Industry. From 
being the "representative" of labour, he suddenly became the agent of 
management. By 1948, the trade unions were placed into that well-
known "transmission belt" function which only the Stalinist type com-
mand economy has been able to reserve for them. Their primary function 
became to fulfil the central planning authorities' preferences speedily. 
Wage levels were centrally determined and not negotiable. Act no. 34 
of 1947 revoked the right to strike, and labour union opposition to 
centrally defined wage or norm levels and to any other plan directives 
was outlawed. This measure provoked hostile reaction from some mem-
bers of the working class, especially when they had overfulfilled the 
centrally-designed piece rate norms, and instead of receiving the pay-
ment stipulated in their contracts, they were informed that the norms 
had been erroneously set too low by the "experts" and that no payments 
would be made as a consequence. The most celebrated case of this kind 
involved the series of wild-cat strikes in the Csepel industrial center 
during October 1947. Csepel had a long tradition of being the center of 
radical trade unionism in Hungary (a position that was reaffirmed in 
1956 and holds true even today). The ring-leaders were arrested and 
shot, and once the situation was safe, Rakosi informed the Csepel 
workers in person why there should never be a repetition of strikes and 
other acts of opposition to the Party: 
The question had cropped up that if striking is a good thing in 
France, then why isn't it a good thing in Hungary. These comrades, 
due to their poor theoretical knowledge, didn't recognize the dif-
ference between the anti-people government of France and the people's 
democratic government of Hungary. And they didn't recognize that 
what is a necessary and correct defensive battle in France, is nothing 
but a reactionary manifestation in Hungary. . . One has to be blind 
not to see that those people who started this strike were members of 
that same general anti-people reactionary offensive . . . who wanted to 
weaken the basis of the Hungarian democracy. . ,74 
By the last year of the Three Year Plan period, the traditional Stalinist 
methods of boosting production by labour competitions, "voluntary" 
labour donations, holiday, overtime, lunch hour or extra shiftwork— 
all without remuneration—had become commonplace. These commit-
ments were not spontaneous, they were exacted by centrally-directed 
commands. The planners had calculated this measure to be essential for 
achieving their plan indices.75 Labour competitions and donations 
would be ordered by the party on virtually any pretext—Stalin's or 
Rakosi's birthday, the execution of the "Rajk Gang," to celebrate a 
victory by the national soccer team, or just to celebrate the celebration 
of another factory. Hundreds of thousands of workers were bullied by 
roving bands of Stakhanovites—elite "shockworkers"—whose feats 
were widely publicized and whose achievements—conducted under the 
most favourable possible conditions—all workers had to emulate. But 
even this was considered insufficient by Rakosi, who decided that even 
the Hungarian Stakhanovites were not productive enough. And so, 
Soviet "heroes" who surpassed the Hungarian Stakhanovites by leaps 
and bounds were imported, and this then became the level for which 
everyone had to strive. As Rakosi pointed out: 
I know that some of our comrades are getting worried about this 
excessive drive, and had said "all right, all right, but there must be a 
limit to the increase in product ion." To this I simply reply: "The sky is 
the limit."7 6 
There was no talking back to this totalitarian mobilization. "When we 
say Rakosi, we mean the Hungarian people. And when we say the Hun-
garian people, we mean Rakosi! On Rakosi, on the Communists, and 
on the words of the Hungarian Workers' Party, one can build as securely 
as on solid rock." 77 
The HWP's final act in this series of betrayed promises involved the 
collectivization of agriculture. During the first year of the Plan the col-
lectivization of agriculture was never contemplated publicly. Anyone 
even daring to mention that the Party was thinking along these lines 
was condemned as a reactionary scaremonger. As Rakosi himself so 
clearly put it: "The reactionaries are trying to frighten the peasants with 
the 'kolkhoz story', but the peasantry can be certain that we communists 
will protect their land and private property with all our strength";78 and, 
". . . we do not want kolkhozes, but strong and prospering small 
farms."7 9 Another member of the HWP's leading triumvirate, Jozsef 
Revai, also went on record as late as August 1947: "We declare: the 
system of private farming must be made even stronger."80 And finally, 
Erno Gero, the Party's chief economic administrator and policy maker, 
also proclaimed that "the history and traditions of the Hungarian 
peasantry differ from the Russian peasants. We would be extremely 
foolish, indeed insane, if we did not realize that our peasants want to 
progress by way of private farming."81 And to those who doubted the 
sincerity of such declarations, Gero frequently asserted that such sceptics 
". . . should realize, that in this country the time has ended once and for 
all, when decisions would be taken behind the scenes, and behind the 
people's backs, on questions of vital importance."82 
These and similar statements, on which everyone should have been 
able to build "as securely as on solid rock," were merely designed to buy 
the votes of the peasantry—unsuccessfully, as it turned out—in the 
elections of 1945 and 1947. By the end of 1948, the collectivization of 
agriculture was in full progress. As Rakosi pointed out: 
Once our Party had secured for itself all strata of our working 
people, we brought up, during the fall of 1948, the question of large 
scale collective farming and the socialist transformation of the country-
side.83 
The Kolkhozes show the true way to the socialist t ransformation 
of our economy . . . this is the road which the Soviet peasants are 
following with great success, and this is the road that the masses of 
private farmers in the people's democracies must follow too.M 
External Accelerators 
In this rapid progression towards the Stalinist type command system, 
three external political developments must be pointed out as having 
played an important role between 1947 and 1949: (1) The deteriorating 
relations between the USA and the USSR during 1947-49; (2) Stalin's 
veto of a proposed coordinated industrialization programme for Eastern 
Europe; and (3) The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute. 
One of the important functions of the "dry road" strategy had been 
to give outsiders the impression that Communism could function within 
a parliamentary system. Until 1947, it seemed that some of the Western 
European Communist parties might prevail at the polls, and great 
efforts were made by the Eastern European Communists to give no 
pretext for alarmist stories. With a change of fortune for the Western 
Communist parties during mid-1947 and the growing Soviet-American 
tension, the "dry road" became increasingly unnecessary. It was above 
all this change in international politics that accelerated the transition 
to the command system in Hungary in early 1948—as is admitted in one 
of the Party's own confidential memoranda: 
As you know, our original plans were that socialization was to be 
carried out by way of the "dry" road. At that time we did not count on 
such a rapid t ransformation in the international situation . . . and did 
not calculate that in our plans. In my opinion we would be making a 
mistake if we stuck to our original schedule and [did] not utilize the 
favourable situation.85 
Stalin's veto of a Bulgarian initiative to coordinate the economic 
plans and industrialization of the East European economies was the 
second external accelerator.86 The effects of the imposition of industrial 
autarchy were extremely costly for Hungary, which lacked the raw 
materials needed for the Stalinist type industrial structure. Under these 
circumstances the process of system maintenance required increasing 
use of authoritarian measures in Hungary. 
Third, Stalin's 1948 quarrel with Tito greatly escalated the negative 
effects of the other two external accelerators. By the beginning of 1948, 
good working relations with Yugoslavia had become of considerable 
economic importance for Hungary, since that country was rapidly be-
coming the most important supplier of the raw materials needed in 
Hungary's expanding iron and steel production. During 1946 48 a 
series of bilateral economic agreements had been signed concerning 
trade and the joint development of resources and industries. After the 
circulation of the Cominform letter criticizing the behaviour of the 
Yugoslav Communists,87 Hungary broke off all relations with Yugo-
slavia. At once, the Soviet Union consented to deliver the necessary raw 
materials and to purchase goods destined for the Yugoslav market. 
Thus Hungary not only became even more hopelessly entwined in the 
Soviet economic net, it was also cast in a considerably worse financial 
position. Soviet raw materials fetched a much higher price than the 
Yugoslav commodities, reflecting the cost of shipping over huge dis-
tances. Henceforth, Hungary's heavy industrial production became 
even more of a financial burden, even more uneconomical, and once 
more increased the sacrifices exacted from Hungarian workers. 
The Soviet-Yugoslav break had another escalating effect on Hun-
gary's postwar transformation into a Soviet-type command system. 
With Tito's expulsion from the socialist "peace camp" came an intensi-
fication of the drive to pattern all aspects of life in Hungary on the 
Soviet model. The single most serious crime that anyone could be 
accused of became "domesticism" or "deviation" from the so-called 
authentic and only true form of Marxism-Leninism, i.e., Stalinist prin-
ciples. Of all the East European leaders, perhaps Rakosi was most 
fanatic in demonstrating subservience to the Soviet Union. Quite apart 
from the tens of thousands of non-Communists who were imprisoned, 
tortured, and executed in Hungary on all sorts of trumped-up charges, 
200,000 HWP members were purged, i.e., 18% of the total.88 The most 
celebrated case was that of the former Minister of the Interior, Laszlo 
Rajk, whose trial and "confessions" in 1949 served as the basis for 
hounding and persecuting "deviationists" and "imperialist saboteurs" 
throughout the socialist world.89 After Rajk's execution, Rakosi pub-
licly bragged about his own role in the affair: 
We read of the 1936-38 experiences of our model, the great Bolshe-
vik Party . . . and yet here in H ungary we merely talked about vigilance 
in general terms. . . We had no practice in wrapping up these kinds of 
cases, but we knew that we could not proceed light-headedly. It was 
not easy to work out the way, and I must confess to you that it cost me 
many sleepless nights, until the plan of executing it finally crystallized. 
(Applause) 
By unmasking and rendering harmless the Rajk gang, our Party has 
earned great respect f rom our people. . . It is no exaggeration to say 
that the trial, which was broadcast on the radio, and whose transcripts 
were printed word for word in the newspapers, was followed with 
extreme interest by all of the people. 100,000 copies of the special book 
that we published on the trial were bought up in a couple of days. 
250,000 copies of the lecture given at a meeting of the Great Budapest 
Party Activists were also sold out within a few days, and we were 
forced to pr int an additional 150,000 copies. All of this shows with 
what great attention the masses followed this case.90 
And indeed the people did follow the development of the Rajk case with 
great interest. Scarcely two weeks after Rajk was officially declared 
innocent and his remains ceremoniously reburied in October 1956, the 
workers replied not with another series of labour donations, but by 
smashing the Rakosiite political system, and by demanding an end to 
Soviet imperialism, which had derailed the long overdue political-
economic modernization of Hungary between 1945 and 1956. 
Conclusions 
In 1945 Hungary seemed to be on the threshold of a new era of mod-
ernization. With varying degrees of intensity most members of the 
country's intelligentsia and professional elites, as well as the leaders of 
all progressive parties, recognized the need to part with many of the 
outdated pre-1945 social, political, economic wisdoms and practices. 
We can certainly include in this group most of the country's landless 
peasants and industrial proletariat. The need for deep-going reforms 
and modernization did not express itself simply as a demand for a new 
political regime. A new regime was to be but one of the postwar era's 
many important elements. Additional and comprehensive reforms were 
also needed: an industrial revolution, an agricultural revolution, a 
social revolution as well as a revolution in Hungary's relations with 
Germany and the other Central and East European States. 
It is important to realize that the success of this modernization de-
pended on an immense national effort which in turn demanded the most 
optimal and judicious utilization of scarce human and material re-
sources by the modernizing elites. The dynamics of modernization all 
over the world have demonstrated that the scarcer the resources, the 
greater the obstacles on the path to modernity, or the more that re-
sources are squandered by national leaders, the more likely it is that 
this process will degenerate into totalitarianism and a new kind of 
backwardness. And this is precisely what happened in Hungary. The 
social, political, and economic costs of constructing this new era were 
sky-rocketed out of all humanly attainable proportions by the combi-
nation of the following factors: massive material and human losses 
suffered during the war, vast Soviet extraction of resources and capital 
from Hungary, and the destructive economic policies of the HWP be-
tween 1945 and 1950. The neglect of Hungary's own developmental 
necessities, the imposition of Soviet fiat, the derailment of reconstruc-
tion and modernization, and the betrayal of the hopes of millions of 
working people during 1945-1950 opened the door to the large-scale 
utilization of terror and political ruthlessness during the !950's. The 
Soviet-designed "model" of a new Hungary could not be sold to the 
populace by any other means than the force of machine-guns and tanks. 
Herein lie the roots of the political oppression which prompted Hun-
garians to revolt in 1956. 
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Between the Awakening and the Explosion: 
Yogis and Commissars Reconsidered, 
1953-1956* 
Tamas Aczel 
I hope you will forgive me if I begin on a personal note, with a con-
fession that may sound like an elegy: it is strangely mystifying and 
difficult to believe that twenty years have already elapsed since I last 
saw the landscapes of my native country, the streets of the city where I 
was born and grew up. But I have no intention of writing an elegy, 
simply because 1 do not feel elegiac: my participation in the Hungarian 
Revolution and in the intellectual movement that preceded it created 
the basis of an intellectual and spiritual development which, in turn, 
led me toward an experience and understanding I could not have reached 
without the initial impetus of the years 1953-1956. 
The role and function of intellectuals, mainly writers, in the Hun-
garian revolt—in the revolt of the mind, if 1 may borrow a phrase from 
myself—has been extensively and meaningfully analyzed during the 
past two decades by numerous authors in many books, essays, articles, 
and memoirs. The nature of the revolt has become, in a sense, common 
knowledge, public property. So much so that, when the Prague Spring 
arrived in 1968, the world simply assumed that it was initiated, led, 
supported, developed, and spurred on by intellectuals, mainly Com-
munist ones, whose disillusionment became the spiritual axis of that 
historical event. Far from taking the 1956 Revolution for granted, 
Western observers viewed our steps—tentative as they may have been, 
and uncertain as they surely were—toward some kind of understanding 
of ourselves and our historical situation, with suspicion and distrust. 
Their attitude was understandable for reasons that have been sufficiently 
analyzed, hence I do not propose to discuss them here. I wish, however, 
to propose a brief inquiry into the nature and meaning of Hungary's 
intellectual condition between 1953 and 1956, between the awakening 
and the explosion. 
* Paper presented at the Eighth National Convention of the A A ASS, October 
6-9 , 1976, in St. Louis, Missouri. 
The scope of various analyses, dealing with the role and function of 
writers in Hungary, (and, of course, in Poland and later in Czecho-
slovakia) has been wide-ranging; their works, their attitudes, their 
successes and failures as political or ideological leaders; their intel-
lectual and theoretical contribution—or the lack of it—have been con-
sidered through different lenses of the political, historical, sociological, 
psychological, and moral cameras of the analysts. As a result, it is now 
generally agreed, that in their specific political situation the intellectuals 
behaved almost predictably, true to historical form. They were linked 
to traditions and expectations; they acted as social catalysts; they 
underwent deep psychological conversions; but most importantly, they 
created or, rather, re-created a morality that had been buried under the 
ruins of totalitarian dictatorships. According to a virtual consensus 
among observers, it was on the plane of morality, of moral rebirth, that 
Eastern Europe's intellectuals rendered their most significant contri-
bution to human affairs: this seems to be their lasting achievement. By 
attempting to create a humane and moral society, a socialist society, 
if you like; by borrowing a great deal from the liberal and socialist 
conceptions of the 18th and 19th centuries, they succeeded in setting 
valuable historical precedents and guidelines for the continuing conflict 
between democracy and totalitarianism. In other words, their major 
achievement was their return to a traditional morality of self-imposed 
limits, responsibilities, and understandings away from the unbridled 
immorality of totalitarian violence; or—to use Michael Polanyi's ex-
pressive phrase—from the inverted morality of modern nihilistic 
fanaticism. 
All this is true, of course. It is noteworthy, however, that no, or hardly 
any attempt has been made to analyze the writers' achievements from 
the purely literary point of view, as embodied so clearly and vividly in 
the poems, short stories, novels, and plays they had written during the 
period; that no, or hardly any attempt has been made to follow and 
understand their development, their evolution from an ontological-
existential point of view as an effort to restore the long-lost balance and 
perception of the transcendental, the universal, the cosmic, and the 
archetypal. 
In the widest sense, two major groups of writers can be distinguished 
during the years between war's end and the outbreak of the Revolution: 
the Communist writers and the non-Communists. In retrospect, how-
ever, it becomes evident that these groups were neither unified nor 
stable; that they carried within themselves the seeds of decay; and that 
their lines of loyalties, allegiances, ideological and intellectual commit-
ments were constantly shifting, changing, meandering, so to speak, as a 
narrow path in an endless desert. But apart from their instability and 
disunity, they also had another factor in common. Both had to live 
under a Communist dictatorship, which attacked their traditional 
standards of morality and spirituality. One has only to quote Gyula 
Illyes's poem, One Sentence on Tyranny, to understand the funda-
mentally common predicament shared by the two different groups: 
Where there's tyranny 
everyone is a link in the chain 
it stinks and pours out of you 
you are tyranny yourself. 
(Paul Tabori's translation.) 
They were—to use Koestler's apt definition—the yogis and com-
missars living in the same cell, under the same skies, having to deal 
with the same power in almost identical straight-jackets. The results 
are well known. The commissars, having turned away from the mystery, 
lost their sense of the infinite; the yogis, having turned toward the 
mystery, lost their sense of the finite; the transcendent reality of the 
cosmos on one hand, and the everyday-reality of the world, on the 
other. For some, the equation may seem to be much too symmetrical 
and, of course, in historical reality it never worked that smoothly. Yet 
the evidence of those distortions in sense and perception can be seen in 
the fact that no Hungarian writer, be he yogi or commissar, or—for that 
matter—anybody in between—had succeeded in producing any piece 
of literature artistically, intellectually, or spiritually profound or sig-
nificant during the years of Stalinist dictatorship. 
But no man can live and no artist can create meaningfully without a 
sense of balance between Freud's oceanic feeling and ordinary reality, 
between the sense of wonder man feels at the sight of the mystery or, as 
Eliade would put it, the sacred, and the sense of absurdity and comedy 
man feels at the sight of himself and his fellow men. The sense of 
mystery guides the artist toward what Jung called the numinous, the 
spiritual, the divine; the sense of reality, of this-worldliness permits him 
to deal with human beings and human relationships as they appear, act 
and interact against the background of transcendental, universal and 
archetypal images. "Geometry," wrote Kepler, "existed before the 
Creation, is co-eternal with the mind of God, is God;" and Kepler, as 
we know, was a religious man, a believer in the existence, goodness, and 
omnipotence of God. "I must, before I die," wrote Bertrand Russell, 
"find some means of saying the essential thing which is in me, which I 
have not yet said, a thing which is neither love nor hatred nor pity nor 
scorn but the very breath of life, shining and coming from afar, which 
will link into human life the immensity, the frightening, wondrous and 
implacable forces of the non-human;" and Bertrand Russell, of course, 
was an atheist. 
It is obvious that the body of literature created by Hungarian writers 
between 1953 and 1956 is primarily and eminently political in its con-
cepts, substances, themes, metaphors, and symbols. But it is equally 
obvious—a glimpse convinces us—that from the very first moment of 
release from under the heavy clouds of Stalinist violence, Hungary's 
poets had tried to find, and then express, Russell's "essential thing," 
Kepler's "geometry," Freud's "oceanic feeling," or Jung's evasive 
"numinosity." It was not an easy task. What they were trying to find 
and assert was not a political report, a historical metaphor, or an ideo-
logical symbol. Nor was their quest simply a search for moral principle, 
an ethical concept, or a conscious definition of the Categorical Impera-
tive, though it included all that. It was much more. 
As early as October 1953, the poet Lajos Konya posited a conflict 
between "the mind and the heart" in an article about the existence—or 
non-existence—of literary freedom in Hungary, and he indicated that 
whereas his conscious mind was in error, his subconscious, emotional 
affinities were correct. This, of course, is no great wisdom, no revealing 
insight. If, however, one is willing to understand that in that world of 
allusions, metaphors, secret literary and political codes, "mind" repre-
sents the pure and unadulterated reason of the Party, of history, of 
history's quintessence, and that "heart" represents all the dark, irrational 
forces of society and human beings that the Party considered philo-
sophically "idealist" and politically "counter-revolutionary," one can 
easily understand his thrust. 
About the same time, another poet published a poem that became, 
almost overnight, one of the most significant symbolic expressions of 
unrest, confusion, disillusionment, and longing for something—some 
hidden order, perhaps—as yet not quite perceived. His name was Peter 
Kuczka and the poem was Nyirseg Diary. Nyirseg Diary may not be 
the greatest poetic achievement in the Magyar language, but it is cer-
tainly an interesting political signpost on the road toward the rediscovery 
of the "essential thing" in Hungarian literary life. It is a thoroughly 
political piece, more journalistic than poetic, a little clumsy perhaps in 
its metaphors and metrics, yet its depiction of an old peasant woman, 
lost amidst the raging storms of her age, social condition and historical 
situation, gray, abandoned, exploited, misled, deprived of her social 
heritage and religious tradition, is certainly one of the earliest attempts 
to create an archetypal image against the background of a system which 
denies the existence of such images politically and philosophically. But 
it is Kuczka's main attitude that interests us: he holds the system 
responsible for the condition of the old woman not merely politically 
but also existentially: the "comrades" in those "northern villages" are 
the ones who denied her "the kind words and deeds" that are more 
important than material reality: what she needs is "human light in place 
of electricity." 
Political uncertainty coupled with metaphorical darkness was creeping 
in slowly where once there was light and almost absolute certainty. It 
may have been difficult to comprehend, but there it was: 
I'd trusted, hoped and now I look around 
hesitantly—something's utterly wrong. 
Amidst my gathering anxieties I walk in circles 
like an innocent hostage in a blind, closed cell. 
Istvan Simon wrote these lines expressing a common puzzlement, a 
general sense of loss, of unease, about the disappearance of perspectives 
and hopes, about a climate of "defeated armies and bold hopes," as 
Vorosmarty had put it more than a century earlier. 
Among the writers of the left—radical or moderate—this was the 
first phase in an important evolutionary process which, in tragic litera-
ture, is known as the first step of the tragic hero on his way to victory 
and defeat: Poiema, Pathema, Mathema — Purpose, Passion, Per-
ception. In the Purpose phase the recognition that "something's utterly 
wrong" is coupled with a commitment to assume its challenge, to 
understand it and—perhaps—even to fight it. The commitment may 
come late or early—with Prometheus and Antigone early, with Hamlet 
late—but it involves the hero in social action. The underlying element 
in this phase of his evolution is the feeling of guilt, its dynamic is 
suffering. The case histories of Konya, Kuczka, and Simon are indeed 
textbook cases. Overlapping, the second phase set in almost simul-
taneously with the first. 
In January 1954, Gyula Illyes published an essay in Irodalmi Ujsag 
about "doubt and pessimism" in poetry, and what was even more 
important, in contemporary Hungarian poetry, from whence doubt and 
pessimism had long been banished by various Party decrees and pro-
nouncements. What should a poet do if he feels "sad," has "doubts" 
about "certain things," or feels "pessimistic" about the future that has 
been officially designated as rosy, indeed, paradisiac? Illyes' advice is 
both dubious and ironic: "Perhaps it is best if the poet does not even 
write down a poem like this," he intones, no doubt, tongue-in-cheek, 
"or if he cannot resist his creative urges, let him write the poem, but not 
publish it." This is amusingly sarcastic, almost comic. But then, he 
changes his tone. "Either way, he mutilates himself, makes literary life 
colorless. This has already happened. It is the reason why the eternal 
rhythm of life sounds so empty in our volumes of poetry." The impli-
cations are clear. The attack is two-pronged: one is directed against 
literature, or rather, against a system of ideological, political, and police 
methods that excludes human suffering from the pages of books or 
magazines; the other is an attempt to re-establish the connection between 
life's "eternal rhythm" and literature, restore the role and function of 
rite and ritual—the perception of the sacred—in social and individual 
life. In his poem, Doleo, ergo sum, Illyes asserts the significance of 
suffering in human life and consciousness by translating Dostoyevsky's 
injunction that "suffering is the whole origin of consciousness" into the 
interestingly political-ontological language of a new poetry. 
Sacred is the advice I can give you now and forever 
Leaders of peoples be always living nerve-ends! 
This is the second phase of our development, the Passion. The com-
mitment, which may have been vague or tentative in the first phase, is 
now fully understood, accepted and seen, moreover, as an inevitable 
head-on collision with the forces of oppression, political or metaphysical. 
Easy or difficult . . . and I may even die 
no matter now, I shall bargain no more, 
writes Lajos Tamasi. Even if one is "frightened, frightened," as Zelk 
writes, it is not the political situation but the existential condition that 
determines one's fundamental response: 
I am but human, live like humans do 
How could I be brave? 
I fear, I fear only more 
that I could be worthless 
more than from death. 
The moral conflict between escape and compromise is resolved, but on 
an ontological plane, and the result of accepted suffering and commit-
ment is a new, yet old perception of existence, of suffering, love, and 
hope; an awareness, as in Jankovich's poem, that "where there's pain, 
there is hope," or a desire to present the resolved conflict in quasi-
religious, universal, transcendental images, as in the direct words of 
Istvan Vas, an otherwise irreligious poet, to his Creator: 
Thank you for having created me 
Oh Love, and having put me here 
to be a man amidst 
stars, mists, mountains. 
The desire to break through the narrow confines of political or ideo-
logical boundaries becomes apparent in Illyes's beautifully evocative 
archetypal imagery in "Oceans," where "limitless space and limitless 
courage" open and merge in an "infinity of blue-tinged distances of 
green forests, " leaving behind "our small fatherland's narrow borders 
of dust, wires and stone, " in the cosmic journey. A political allusion, 
easily understood in contemporary Hungary, it becomes the stepping 
stone to the stars. 
We are now in the third phase of development, perception, when "the 
re-acceptance of an ancient order" (Janos Pilinszky) becomes impera-
tive, and "the hope to stand in our winter without sin"(Zelk) is both 
the punishment and reward of the poet. It is the "readiness" of Hamlet, 
the final moment of King Lear's translucence. 
For I have caught success's butterfly 
and became not happier but more cowardly 
its scale turned into dirt on my fingertips 
all that wasn't born of torment turns into torment. 
This is Benjamin at his best and most moving: I can only apologize for 
the inadequacy of the translation: 
Mert fogtam en a siker pilleszarnyat 
s nem boldogabb, de lettem tole gyavabb 
maszatta rondult ujjamon a himpor 
mind kinna torzul, ami nem lett kinbol. 
This is also the moment of change, together with the discovery of a 
new vision, of an order behind the immediate disorder of the world, an 
ontological identification with "the early morning light" in Lajos 
Kassak's poem: 
I don't have to be loud since the smallest leaf of grass 
would understand my joys, my sorrows 
just as I can understand everything and identify with everything 
. . . walking down on the other side of the hill 
so that I'll see new and unknown landscapes on this beautiful day 
enchanted by all those millions of little miracles 
of reality. 
The central theme of freedom regained, resides precisely in Kassak's 
simple metaphor. 
In a celebrated passage, inspired by Edgar Allan Poe, Baudelaire 
reveals the importance of "an immortal instinct [in man] for the 
beautiful which makes us consider the earth and its various spectacles 
as a sketch of, as a correspondence with, heaven," and which enables 
us to experience that "insatiable thirst for all that is beyond" which is 
no more or less than "the most living proof of our immortality." Even 
such a demonstrably programmatic "anti-metaphysical" poem as Illyes' 
Mors Bona Nihil Aliud, which sets out to prove that "there's no other-
world, no Damnation, no Grace, "ends with an elevated ode to "beauty, 
justice, goodness and freedom," and with a suspiciously religious 
warning about "fear and cowardice" being the "roots of sin. " 
The commissars and their friends, and very often their enemies, have 
all apparently undergone a transformation which is not simply a moral 
change. They have reached a conclusion which is not simply an ethical 
concept. Yet they did not turn into yogis on the "ultra-violet" end of 
Koestler's spectrum; they have continued—and still continue—their 
actions for social justice and the betterment of man. But the new per-
ception which completed their developments both on the social and 
ontological-existential planes, was not—could not be—their individual 
affair. Their changes, their new insights, the balance they have managed 
to restore, however tentatively and temporarily, between the sacred 
and the profane, between the oceanic feeling and the ordinary reality 
that surrounded them, had a profound impact on society, on the leaders 
of society and Party, on the social fabric, as well as on the individual's 
consciousness. In their quest for meaning, the poets suffered symbol-
ically for man and society; man and society accepted them as their 
prophets, and, quite naturally, used them as scapegoats. The wheel 
which had come full circle, began turning again. 
One final word. My description of the evolution of some of H ungary's 
poets and writers, my comparison between the development of tragic 
man and that of my friends, should not be construed as an attempt to 
elevate them (or, by some mischief, myself) to the tragic magnificence 
and translucence of an Oedipus or a Hamlet, though their road ap-
proached, and often paralleled, the road travelled by tragic heroes. But 
they were also close to the comic, especially in their innocence, naivete, 
gullibility, and it may be—just may be—that their profoundly human 
oscillations between tragic grandeur and comic absurdity was—and 
will remain—their most memorable achievement. 
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The First War Between Socialist States: 
Military Aspects of the Hungarian Revolution* 
Bela K. Kiraly 
Academic journals usually publish research papers or new inter-
pretations based on fresh evidence that challenge established concepts. 
Such articles are the result of painstaking scholarly endeavors. This 
essay is not one of these, but on certain occasions it seems fitting for an 
eyewitness to an historical event to relate his experiences and views. In 
the present case the occasion is a twentieth anniversary and the author 
was an eyewitness. 
As the title indicates, the author's contention is that the Hungarian 
events of 1956 constituted a revolution as well as a war waged by one 
socialist state against another. "Socialist" is used here in the Soviet 
sense; "Bolshevik" or "Soviet" would have done as well. Furthermore, 
using "socialist" in this sense by no means implies any sort of endorse-
ment. Who, after all, could endorse a system that was introduced into 
East Central Europe almost without exception by force, and to which 
the genuine popular responses have included the Hungarian revolution 
of 1956 and the ill-starred Czechoslovak attempt of 1968 to create 
communism with a human countenance? The socialism that could be 
successfully implemented with the consent of the governed in East 
Central Europe or anywhere else in Western civilization would have to 
be pluralistic, humane, participatory, and democratic. Soviet socialism 
has none of these ingredients. 
The Hungarian struggle in the fall of 1956 has been called a revolu-
tion, a revolt, and an uprising. In East Central Europe itself, if men-
tioning it cannot be avoided, they either say "the events of 1956" or they 
use the derogatory term, "counterrevolution."1 It was in fact a revolution 
in the proper sense of the word: force was unintentionally used by those 
demanding change, and quite intentionally, the old regime was replaced 
T h i s essay was presented to the Eighth National Convention of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in St. Louis, Mo., on 
October 7, 1976. 
with a new one. After October 28, following the declaration of an 
armistice,2 Imre Nagy's government held undisputed power in Hungary, 
and no other force could offer any meaningful challenge to its authority. 
Revolutions are domestic affairs; as such, the Hungarian Revolution 
of 1956 was a success. What crushed it was not a domestic force but an 
international one; the revolutionary regime was destroyed by inter-
national war. 
International war is the massive application of armed might between 
states, prosecuted systematically in order to destroy an opponent's will 
or means to fight. The purpose of war is the achievement of certain 
objectives, such as the acquisition of territory, the imposition of a 
religion or ideology, or the securing of economic and/or other ad-
vantages. When Soviet forces invaded Budapest at dawn on October 24, 
1956, and began their indiscriminate destruction, they were interfering 
directly in Hungary's internal affairs. It is possible that Erno Gero, the 
First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, had con-
sented to the intervention; it is likewise possible that it was he who 
advocated intervention, and he might even have begged for immediate 
armed protection. Whichever was the case, the Soviet invasion still 
need not have amounted to war. As in Berlin in 1953 and in Czecho-
slovakia in 1968, the intention and hope might have been to use a show 
of force to intimidate the Hungarians into reestablishing the Soviet 
type of socialism and a regime loyal to the Soviet Union. However, 
when the Soviet invasion was put back in motion on November 1, 1956, 
when the airports were gradually occupied, and massive armored 
columns were marching on Budapest, when an iron ring of armor had 
been forged around the capital by November 3, and when the Soviet 
artillery opened fire on the night of November 3-4, first on Kiskunhalas 
and then all over the country, it was obvious that the Soviet socialist 
great power had premeditatedly launched a major offensive of arms 
against socialist Hungary. This military operation was executed sys-
tematically in order to smash Hungary's armed forces and to shatter 
the nation's will to resist. The Soviet government evidently intended to 
reimpose its own brand of socialism through the regime it installed in 
Hungary—and it did so. Soviet political and military actions exactly 
met the preconditions of war. There is no shadow of doubt in the 
author's mind that after November 1, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics was at war with socialist Hungary. November 1 is the date of 
the invasion and the start of the war; but the shooting did not commence 
till November 4. The Soviet Union has the dubious distinction of being 
the first socialist state in history to make war on another socialist 
country. 
General Sergey M. Shtemenko, the late chief of staff of the Warsaw 
Pact forces, wrote in the weekly Za Rubezhom in May, 1976, on the 
twenty-first anniversary of the conclusion of the pact: ". . . measures 
are taken for the suppression of counter-revolutionary and aggressive 
action against Socialist countries. Thus, for example, in 1968 the states 
of the Socialist community provided fraternal assistance to the Czecho-
slovak people in defense of the Socialist achievement against encroach-
ments by internal counter-revolution and international reaction."3 
General Shtemenko thus made the Warsaw Pact's real mission quite 
clear: to maintain socialism of the Soviet type and to quash dissidence. 
To those in the know, it was a statement of the obvious. Two facets of 
the statement are particularly interesting: that it seemed necessary at 
that moment to give the policy publicity in the Soviet Union, and that, 
while it was possible to mention the bloodless intervention in Czecho-
slovakia, the sanguinary suppression of the Hungarian revolution was 
still a nonevent. 
It is also a nonevent even in the West, as was recently shown by a 
controversial statement by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger's chief political adviser. His widely criticized comment 
that the nations of East Central Europe should look for organic links 
with the Soviet Union was strange enough, but far more repellent was 
Sonnenfeldt's conclusion: "We should especially disabuse them [the 
East Central European nations] of any notion that our interest in their 
relative independence is greater than their own and therefore they have 
a free ride."4 It is very odd that after the Hungarian revolution, Poland's 
"spring in October" of 1956, and the Czechoslovak attempt at "com-
munism with a human countenance" in 1968, it should be assumed that 
these nations are looking for a "free ride." 
The Hungarian revolution may be a nonevent in the West but in the 
East it is far more so. There it is neither spoken of nor written about, 
but it is not really forgotten. It lives on in the subconscious and the 
conscience. In time of crisis, when realities have to be faced, the specter 
of it reemerges, as it recently happened in Peking. After Chou En-lai's 
funeral, the people of Peking demonstrated against the totalitarian 
regime and precipitated a serious crisis. The image of the Hungarian 
revolution flashed immediately into the Chinese leaders' minds. A 
resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 
published on April 7, 1976, noted: "In the past few days these elements 
. . . have lauded Teng Hsiao-ping and attempted to nominate him for 
the role of [Imre] Nagy, the chieftain [s/c] of the counterrevolutionary 
incident in Hungary." 5 The ghost of the Hungarian revolution had 
appeared once again. 
* * * 
The Hungarian People's Army was a thoroughly socialist force by 
1956.6 It was the last of Hungary's central institutions to have been 
transformed. The legislative, executive and judicial branches of govern-
ment had been "socialized" by 1948, but not the military. Until then 
there had been no need for a Hungarian army, which might even have 
posed a threat to the country's totalitarian transformation. Accordingly, 
as in other countries under Soviet control, the army was reduced to its 
bare bones. Its traditional role in the "defence" of the country was filled 
by Soviet occupation forces. But in September of 1948 the socialization 
of the Hungarian army was started and was pushed forward rapidly, 
more rapidly indeed than had been the case with the civilian branches 
of government. By the time Lieutenant General Gyorgy Palffy, the 
inspector general of the army, was executed in September 1949, the 
process was complete. 
The socialist transformation of the army and its concomitant and 
equally speedy reorganization, rearmament, and expansion, were 
prompted by the eruption of the crisis in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. 
On March 18, 1948, the Soviet military and technical advisers departed 
Belgrade and on June 28 Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform. 
Hungary, which was already the Soviet Union's obedient ally under 
Matyas Rakosi, was now in the forefront of the ideological, political, 
and military confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. As a 
result, the neglected Hungarian armed forces suddenly became a key 
factor. What happened between September 1948 and the summer of 
1949 to some extent resembled the socialization of the civilian govern-
ment, and to some extent had a character of its own related to the 
specific nature of the military. The socialist transformation of the 
military included the replacement of the supreme command with party 
leaders (Politburo member Mihaly Farkas became Minister of Defense 
and Central Committee member Sandor Nogrady, his first deputy), 
reorganization of political control in the Soviet style, including intro-
duction of the politruk system through which political officers became 
co-commanders of troops, gradual substitution of party officials for 
professional middle-ranking and junior commanders, training many 
party cadres in Hungary and the U.S.S.R. for professional military 
posts, massive anti-Yugoslav propaganda, introduction of Soviet mili-
tary doctrine and regulations, rearmament with Soviet weapons and 
equipment, retooling Hungarian industry to manufacture Soviet types 
of arms and weapons, and the integration of Hungary into Soviet war 
plans. All this was carried out under the watchful gaze of an ever-
expanding network of Soviet advisers. 
While the army was being refashioned, its integration into Soviet 
plans for a war against Yugoslavia was also started. The first such 
strategic plans had been completed before the Rajk trials of 1949. They 
were revised and adjusted annually to keep pace with the army's in-
crease in strength. The Hungarian army's role in these Soviet strategic 
plans was simple: it was to provide the first wave in a Soviet offensive 
against Yugoslavia. The Hungarian army was to attack between the 
Danube and Tisza rivers, break through the Yugoslav frontier defenses, 
advance to Novi Sad, cross the Danube, and occupy the Fruska Gora 
hills to create a bridgehead south of the Danube. From this bridgehead 
Soviet forces were to overrun Belgrade itself. Rumanian, Bulgarian, 
and Albanian forces were assigned similar missions in their respective 
sectors. Where the Polish and Czechoslovak forces were to be thrown 
in, the Hungarian general staff did not receive information. 
The last two major events in the socialist transformation and rapid 
expansion of the Hungarian army were the replacement of the supreme 
war command of the field forces, and the purge of the strategic leader-
ship, both of which took place in 1950. The supreme war command of 
the Hungarian field forces was tendered to the commander of the 
infantry (land forces), a post that I filled. In March, however, the 
position of commander of the infantry was abolished and the minister 
of defense, Colonel General Farkas, took over. I was transferred to 
command the War (General Staff) Academy. The transfer was actually 
a blessing in disguise because in June all the generals who started their 
career in the old army and were still in strategic positions were purged 
(Generals Laszlo Solyom, chief of the general staff; Gusztav Illy, chief 
of personnel; Istvan Beleznay, commander of the First Army Corps; 
Kalman Revay, commander of the Armored Troops; Gyorgy Porffy, 
commander of the Artillery; Surgeon General Gusztav Merenyi-Scholtz; 
and Colonel Sandor Lorinc, the general staffs chief finance officer). All 
of them were supplanted by party cadres with inadequate professional 
training. By that time the Soviet advisers were completely familiar with 
the Hungarian environment and would have provided the professional 
leadership. The new Hungarian "commanders" would simply have 
signed the advisers' orders. All that was needed to start the war was 
the signal. 
When the Korean war broke out, the East Central European armies 
were poised to strike against Yugoslavia. Had the United States and the 
United Nations not resisted in the Far East preventing the conquest of 
South Korea, war would have broken out in the Balkans. The United 
Nations resistance in Korea made it seem likely that an attack on Yugo-
slavia would also have been resisted and Stalin was not ready to run 
that risk. Western action in the Far East averted an offensive against 
Yugoslavia by its socialist fellow states. 
The preparedness of the armies of East Central Europe was at its 
peak during the years 1950 and 1951, and after then it gradually de-
clined. Once war with Yugoslavia was no longer a feasibility, large 
armed forces in the satellite countries lost their raison d'etre. The 
strength of the Hungarian army, like that of its East Central European 
peers, was substantially reduced between 1951 and 1956. Further troops 
cuts were planned for 1956 and some were carried out. A dispropor-
tionately large number of trained professional officers faced transfer 
to civilian jobs. Because many of them lacked civilian skills, they were 
confronted with the prospect of becoming handymen, mechanics, or 
collective farmworkers. As a result, morale sagged. The officer corps 
was also afflicted by widespread discontent with Soviet control and 
domestic despotism. Highly demoralized, many of them turned toward 
the reformers under Imre Nagy who had already begun to criticize the 
regime openly, at first hesitantly, then with increasing boldness. 
Looking back from a distance of twenty years, I can perceive four 
noteworthy basic military factors in the Revolution: the loyalty of the 
troops, the revolutionary government's power and control over the 
armed forces, the military strategy, and Imre Nagy's last command. 
In a conventional war, the fighting man's loyalty to the government 
is crucial; in a revolutionary upheaval, it is the decisive factor. In a 
revolution the old regime has a good chance to survive if it retains the 
standing army's support. If the army is neutral, the chance of success 
is more slender. Without the army's support, the old regime will col-
lapse almost as a rule, provided the revolution remains a domestic 
affair. In 1956 the Hungarian armed forces, except the Secret Police, 
stayed neutral for only the first few hours. At the start of Soviet inter-
vention, however, they began to throw in their lot with the revolution-
aries. The Secret Police was neutralized fairly quickly, and within a few 
days the Stalinist regime found itself with no support other than the 
armed backing of Soviet troops. The massive desertion of the armed 
forces, that is, of young people under arms to whom the regime had 
promised a glittering future, was proof of the dramatic failure of Soviet-
style socialism in Hungary. 
A regime under attack by the masses can be saved by a substantial 
group of key officers even if the rank and file of the army are ready to 
join the revolutionaries. In the Hungary of 1956 numerous upper-
echelon officers remained loyal to the Stalinist regime and acted 
cohesively enough to cause the Imre Nagy government considerable 
difficulties. A new military leadership devoted to the new government 
was badly needed—not only new men but a new structure too. The new 
organization that was established was the Revolutionary Council for 
National Defence (Forradalmi Karhatalmi Bizottsag). I happened to 
draft the decree creating the council, which Imre Nagy promulgated on 
the government's behalf.7 I was elected its chairman, jointly with 
General Paul Maleter.8 A screening committee was formed, charged 
with bringing back into the armed forces officers unjustly purged since 
1948. Its first meeting was slated for November 4, 1956. 
Meanwhile, freedom fighters, workers' guards and other para-
military groups were being consolidated into a National Guard, into 
which were also absorbed those army units that joined them during the 
fighting. The National Guard was thus becoming a genuine armed force 
of the revolutionary government. The main purpose of these revolu-
tionary forces and commands was to preserve public peace and order 
and to forestall any armed disturbance—a tall order in view of the 
number of weapons in the hands of young people. Internal order was 
the key to survival, for any lengthy anarchy would have been seized 
upon by the Soviet government as a pretext for intervention. Domestic 
tranquility was in fact secured. On the night of October 28-29, for 
instance, there had been 28 armed affrays in Budapest; there was not 
one during the night of November 2-3. By the day before the Soviet 
incursion flared into armed hostilities, the country was ready to consoli-
date its gains and pursue its peaceful evolution toward a democratic 
socialist state and society. 
The question of revolutionary strategy was fairly straightforward, 
for the Imre Nagy government had no plan for war with the Soviet 
Union, not even a defensive one. Only a shallow defense perimeter was 
established around Budapest, more for observation purposes than as a 
lasting shield. In the event of an attack, this line would have secured a 
few hours' or at most a few days' delay to give the government time for 
political decisions. This was the context of Nagy's last command. 
During the night of November 3-4, the advancing Soviet columns 
opened fire on the garrison at Kiskunhalas. I at once relayed this infor-
mation to Imre Nagy, with whom I had a direct telephone line. My 
reports became more and more frequent as the Soviet onslaught en-
gulfed us. When the outer defense line of Budapest came under attack 
in several sectors, I suggested to Imre Nagy that either he or I should go 
on the air to inform the troops that a state of war existed. This seemed 
essential, since for days they had been instructed very explicitly not to 
fire on the Soviet troops except as a very last resort in order not to 
afford them any excuse to interfere in our domestic affairs. Now our 
troops needed a dramatic order that everything had changed: they must 
open fire. Wire communications with our troops were inadequate, so 
that the radio was the only means to inform them that the Soviet Union 
was openly at war with us. 
Imre Nagy reminded me that such a decision was a political rather 
than a military one and forbade me to make any radio announcement. 
I replied that I was aware of the political nature of the announcement 
and that was why I had not gone straight on the air but had asked him 
to make the decision. Nagy told me that Soviet Ambassador Andropov 
was at his elbow and had assured him that the Soviet government did 
not want war and that all that was happening was the result of a mis-
understanding. The telephone was not picked up in Moscow, of course, 
when Nagy had tried to contact the Soviet government. It is an open 
question whether Nagy really believed Andropov. Clearly, however, 
Nagy wanted no war, not even a defensive one. 
In the early morning hours the Soviet armored columns reached my 
headquarters but, instead of attacking, they turned toward the Parlia-
ment building where Nagy had his office. I reported this to him and he 
responded: "Thank you. I don't need any more reports." It was a strange 
order for the commander-in-chief of the freedom-fighters at the 
height of the Soviet attack. A few minutes later Imre Nagy's voice came 
over Budapest radio. The prime minister declared that the Soviet troops 
were attacking Hungary with the obvious intention of overthrowing 
the legal government. He concluded: "Our troops are in combat."9 
An apparently irreconcilable contradiction existed between Nagy 
telling me he wanted no more reports and his telling the nation that our 
troops were at war. Why did Nagy hedge? Apparently, he wanted no 
further reports from me because he would have been expected to issue 
commands in response, and he did not wish to give the order to fight. 
The memory of Budapest in ruins after the Soviet siege at the end of 
World War II was still too vivid. A fight against Soviet power would 
have been futile. "Our troops are in combat," he had said. That was 
neither an encouragement to fight nor advice to surrender. In Hungary's 
history there had been surrenders when troops had laid down their arms 
in good faith only to be cruelly brutalized later. He could not urge the 
freedom fighters to accept such a fate. 1 had advised him that we could 
still fly him abroad a few hours before the Soviet troops reached the 
heart of Budapest; he did not want to flee. He wanted to stay among 
his people. At the height of the war waged by the socialist Soviet Union 
against socialist Hungary, he made no decisions. He left the decisions 
to the individual freedom fighter and the judgment to history. He would 
not denounce the revolution. Instead he remained true to its ideas and 
goals and to those who participated in it and settled for martyrdom. 
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La Révolution Hongroise de 1956 et 
l'Idée de la Confédération Danubienne 
Paul Pilisi 
Oui, la Hongrie, à partir de maintenant, s 'efforce d'établir l 'héritage 
de Kossuth: réaliser la confédération des peuples danubiens. La réali-
sation de ce projet historique doit être l'exigence la plus importante de 
notre politique extérieure, parce que seule cette voie est susceptible de 
sauvegarder, aux petites nations, leur indépendance et leur liberté. 
Programme fédéraliste de la révolution hongroise de 1956. 
(Magyar Szabadság, le 1er novembre) 
Introduction 
Il y a vingt ans que la révolution hongroise de 1956 a remis en 
question le système stalinien, réclamant le droit d'auto-détermination 
du peuple hongrois. La contestation armée, sous les yeux bienveillants 
du monde occidental, n'avait pas comme seul objectif la liberté hon-
groise, mais aussi le retour à l'idée danubienne, héritage historique du 
fédéralisme central européen. Certes, les circonstances historiques 
n'étaient pas favorables à la réalisation des objectifs, mais la signifi-
cation historique de la révolution reste valable. 
Pendant et après la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, les partis politiques 
et les mouvements de résistance envisageaient la création d'une con-
fédération en Europe de l'Est avec la participation des pays suivants: 
la Pologne, la Hongrie, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Roumanie, la Bulgarie 
et la Yougoslavie. Parmi les partisans fédéralistes, nous retrouvons les 
leaders les plus illustres du mouvement communiste notamment Tito, 
Dimitrov, Patrascanu, Rajk et Imre Nagy.1 En 1947, Nagy, en tant que 
ministre de l'agriculture, s'efforce de contribuer à la réalisation du "rêve 
de Kossuth," c'est-à-dire, mettre sur pied la "Confédération Danubi-
enne" adaptée aux circonstances nouvelles. László Rajk se prononce 
plusieurs fois en faveur de cette confédération et, à l'occasion de son 
procès en 1949, son engagement fédéraliste fut considéré par le tribunal 
du peuple comme "haute trahison" envers l'Etat et envers les Démo-
craties populaires.2* 
Le programme de "déstalinisation" lancé par Khrouchtchev en-
courage les leaders communistes hongrois favorables aux réformes. 
Pour certains d'entre eux, la "déstalinisation" signifie aussi le retour à 
leurs idées d'après-guerre. En particulier, le rétablissement des liens 
rompus avec les Démocraties populaires voisines redevient l'objectif 
majeur. De plus, la réhabilitation de Rajk à l'été 1956 indique un 
tournant décisif dans le processus de déstalinisation en Hongrie. De 
toute évidence, la réhabilitation de Rajk ne signifie pas seulement la 
réhabilitation du leader communiste mais aussi celle de l'idée danubienne. 
1. Le fédéralisme révolutionnaire d'Imre Nagy 
Précurseur du courant réformiste, Nagy élabore son programme 
entre juin et septembre 1955 dans un "mémorandum"adressé au Comité 
Central du Parti. Son mémorandum fait référence aux problèmes con-
crets d'actualité. Au début de 1956, il rédige quatre chapitres complétant 
ce mémorandum qui reste négligé par le Comité Central.3 Le pro-
gramme d'Imre Nagy préconise en premier lieu une "coopération 
étroite" entre les pays socialistes de l'Europe centrale et orientale. 
Cette coopération égalitaire et régionale vise ensuite la coopération 
entre pays danubiens. La philosophie de ce programme, faisant allusion 
à l'idée de la Confédération danubienne de Kossuth, souligne la néces-
sité de retourner aux traditions progressistes des peuples danubiens: 
Lajos Kossuth** nous a indiqué la voie à suivre: la coopération étroite 
avec les peuples voisins dans le cadre d'une confédération égalitaire 
entre peuples libres. Il nous faut retourner à ces principes.4 
* Suite à l 'opposition de Staline aux fédérations balkanique et danubienne, 
dont Milovan Djilas, dans son livre intitulé Conversations avec Staline donne 
des détails, Ra jk et Nagy ont été écartés du pouvoir. Ce dernier est devenu 
professeur d'Université. 
**KOSSUTH, Lajos (1802-1894) homme d'état hongrois, chef de la révolution 
hongrois de 1848. Il dirigea la guerre d ' indépendance de 1848-1849 contre 
l 'Autriche et l 'armée interventionniste tsariste. Dans l'exil, il préconisa la 
formation d 'un confédération pour défendre les petites nations contre l'Autriche 
et la Russie. Ce projet initial, conçu en 1850 en Asie-Mineure, connaîtra une 
version définitive en 1862 sous le titre: Confédération danubienne. Le projet de 
Kossuth prévoyait la participation des "Etats danubiens" notamment la Hon-
grie, la Serbie, la Croatie et la Roumanie (Moldo-Valachie à l'époque). Kossuth 
Pour réaliser une "coopération étroite" au niveau régional, Nagy 
souligne la nécessité de garantir la condition suivante: l'égalité des Etats 
concernés. Il propose en même temps la "réconsidération" démocratique 
des relations soviéto-hongroises dans un esprit d'amitié et d'égalité. 
D'après sa conclusion, les conditions générales des pays danubiens sont 
différentes de celles de l'U.R.S.S. mais similaires entre elles. Nagy 
s'emploie à rétablir des "relations amicales" avec les pays danubiens, y 
compris la Yougoslavie: 
Personnellement, je fais la première démarche pour rétablir les 
relations amicales que nous avions avec la République Démocrat ique 
de Roumanie car elles offrent des avantages mutuels. Dans cette 
région, i! faut aussi rétablir des relations avec la Yougoslavie et effacer 
les graves erreurs du passé au profit de nouvelles relations amicales. 
J 'ai également fait des efforts à cet égard à travers des contacts avec 
les cercles yougoslaves.5 
La popularité d'Imre Nagy et de son programme grandit sans cesse. 
Le 30 juin 1956, le Comité Central du Parti se prépare à éliminer le 
mouvement "d'opposition" et le programme d'Imre Nagy. La société 
hongroise—à l'exception d'une mince minorité privilégiée—soutient 
Nagy et son programme. Ce soutien prend une forme spectaculaire à 
l'occasion de la réhabilitation et de l'exhumation de László Rajk, 
leader communiste exécuté en 1949. Pour Nagy et aux yeux de la grande 
majorité, aussi bien que pour un grand nombre de communistes, la 
réhabilitation de Rajk signifie en même temps la légitimation du projet 
considérait également qu'une telle confédération serait la meilleure forme 
étatique pour résoudre les problèmes nationaux. 
Influencé par la structure politique et par la constitution américaine, le projet 
de la Confédération danubienne de Kossuth reste l'idéal démocratique pour les 
courants politiques des XIX e et XX e siècles favorables à la coopération "f ra-
ternelle" des Etats danubiens. Le projet de confédération parut la première fois 
le 1er mai 1862 dans le journal italien ALLEANZA à Turin. 
Au début du XX e siècle, les radicaux-bourgeois de Hongrie considéraient ce 
projet de Kossuth, en tant que principe fondamental dans la réorganisation 
confédérale de la Monarchie austro-hongroise. Cfr. O. JÁSZI , Magyarország 
jövője és a Dunai Egyesült Államok [L'avenir de Hongrie et les Etats-Unis 
Danubiens], Budapest, 1918 (2e édition), pp. 5-10. Quelques références au sujet 
de la Confédération danubienne de Kossuth: dans historiographie occidentale 
J . KÜHL, Föderationsplane in Donauraum und in Ostmitteleuropa, München, 
Südost-Institut, 1958, pp. 16-20 et R. W I E R E R , Der Föderalismusim Donau-
raum, Graz-Köln, 1960, pp. 60-62. Dans l 'historiographie marxiste, Gy. 
M É R E I , Föderációs tervek Délkelet-Európában és a Habsburg Monarchia 
1840-1918 [Projets de fédération en Europe de Sud-Est et la Monarchie des 
Habsburg 1840-1918], Budapest, 1966, pp. 84-86. 
de la coopération danubienne telle que défini dans la période d'après-
guerre. Imre Nagy affirme ouvertement qu'il faut "retourner à ces 
principes." Ainsi, la révolution d'octobre 1956 apparaît comme l'héritière 
de ce programme: "Le but de la révolution n'a pas été seulement la lutte 
pour l'indépendance, illusoire en soi, mais surtout l'établissement d'une 
confédération de peuples libres, celle des peuples de l'Europe centrale 
et orientale." 6 
Le gouvernement révolutionnaire sous la présidence d'Imre Nagy 
mène une politique visant à obtenir la neutralité de la Hongrie. 
Au sujet des relations hongro-soviétiques, la révolution hongroise 
conteste l'écart existant entre la théorie marxiste de l'internationalisme 
et le système établi autoritairement par l'Union Soviétique à son profit. 
Or la déstalinisation n'apporte aucun changement considérable dans le 
système: "Pour la première fois, avec la Hongrie, la progression du 
socialisme calqué sur le modèle soviétique était remise en question."7 
La révolution hongroise conteste avant tout le sommet du système 
de centralisme est-européen, c'est-à-dire la suprématie de la puissance 
soviétique en Hongrie et dans les pays est-européens ainsi que dans la 
coopération des pays du COMECON.8 
2. Le gouvernement et l'opinion publique face au fédéralisme danubien 
Le programme de Nagy trouve un appui solide au sein du parti 
comme dans l'opinion publique. György Lukács, philosophe marxiste, 
ministre du gouvernement révolutionnaire, appuie entièrement le pro-
gramme de Nagy. Dans sa déclaration officielle faite à la radio le 27 
octobre 1956, il affirme que la Hongrie désire bâtir le socialisme con-
formément aux conditions et particularités du pays: "Nous autres, nous 
ne voulons pas bâtir un socialisme en l'air, nous ne voulons pas 
l'instaurer en Hongrie comme une marchandise importée."9 
Lukács évoque la tradition propre et l'esprit international de la 
"République des Soviets de Hongrie" ainsi que la capacité des com-
munistes-socialistes de Hongrie, d'avoir une idée claire du socialisme. 
Dans cette perspective, la Hongrie révolutionnaire s'efforce de réaliser 
deux exigences de la révolution: la déstalinisation et la désatellisation. 
La renaissance de l'idée de la Confédération danubienne apparaît donc 
comme la continuité d'un programme collectif des pays de l'Europe 
centrale et orientale. Imre Nagy, président du gouvernement révolu-
tionnaire, reprend alors ses idées concernant ce programme. Il se ligue 
avant tout contre la politique de "divide et impera" de l'Union Soviétique, 
politique pratiquée à l'égard des Démocraties populaires de l'Europe 
de l'Est par des traités bilatéraux. Il préconise non seulement le 
rapprochement et la coopération entre les pays socialistes, mais aussi 
entre Est et l'Ouest: 
Un provincialisme particulier des Démocraties populaires, une aliéna-
tion intensive dans ces efforts ont dressé une véritable muraille de 
Chine, non seulement entre notre patrie et les pays capitalistes occi-
dentaux, mais aussi entre la démocratie populaire hongroise et d'autres 
pays du camp socialiste.10 
Le communiste Imre Nagy déclare que la volonté ferme de la révolu-
tion est de retirer la Hongrie du COMECON et du Pacte de Varsovie, 
instruments institutionnels d'intégration économique et politique des 
pays socialistes de l'Europe de l'Est, dirigés par l'Union Soviétique. En 
1956, pour quelques semaines seulement, la Hongrie possède la liberté 
d'expression. Elle affirme que l'intégration de l'Europe de l'Est revient 
à l'initiative et au droit de ces peuples: 
La confédération des peuples de l 'Europe Centrale et Orientale, les 
manifestations marquantes et observables, les possibilités du fédér-
alisme en 1956, comme la tendance fédéraliste de la révolution, ont 
rendu actuel le problème du fédéralisme." 
Le "Conseil Ouvrier" du centre industriel de Miskolc fait introduire 
l'idée de la "Confédération Danubienne." L'assemblée générale des 
ouvriers et étudiants de Miskolc exige du gouvernement d'Imre Nagy 
d'entrer immédiatement en contact avec les gouvernements des pays 
danubiens, en vue d'exposer clairement la politique fédéraliste du 
gouvernement révolutionnaire hongrois: 
Nous désirerions aussi faire connaître notre opinion face à la Con-
fédération Danubienne. Si nous examinons la question du point de 
vue de l'avenir, une union entre les pays du bassin danubien devrait être 
réalisée. La spontanéité et les intérêts tant économiques que culturels 
d 'une telle union devraient être pris en considération. Notre pays veut 
ainsi devenir membre de la "Confédération Danubienne" projetée par 
Kossuth,>2 
affirme le mémorandum de l'assemblée de Miskolc. 
Le même programme fédéraliste est adopté par le "Conseil Révolu-
tionnaire de la Province de Veszprém." Dans son mémorandum adressé 
au Comité des affaires étrangères du Parlement, il exige la "reconsidéra-
tion" des institutions du processus d'intégration des pays socialistes de 
l'Europe de l'Est, la prise d'initiatives dans l'établissement d'une "Con-
fédération Danubienne." 13 
Dès les premiers jours de la révolution, des "Conseils Ouvriers" se 
constituent à l'échelle provinciale et nationale. Au sein des "Conseils 
Ouvriers" et des organes révolutionnaires, les ouvriers industriels, les 
étudiants et les intellectuels comme les membres de l'armée, communistes 
ou sans parti, jouent le rôle le plus important. Les "écrivains populistes," 
partisans de l'unité culturelle des peuples danubiens, influencent sen-
siblement la renaissance de l'idée de la "Confédération Danubienne": 
"Qui, en Hongrie, à partir de maintenant, s'efforce d'établir l'héritage 
de Kossuth, de réaliser la confédération des peuples danubiens. La 
réalisation de ce projet historique doit être l'exigence la plus importante 
de notre politique extérieure, parce que seule cette voie est susceptible 
de garantir aux petites nations leur indépendance." 14 
La radio du "Conseil Ouvrier" et du "Parlement Estudiantin" de 
Miskolc poursuit ses émissions en hongrois, en roumain, en serbe et en 
slovaque faisant campagne en faveur de la confédération danubienne: 
"Frères roumains, slaves. Nous faisons couler notre sang et vous êtes 
silencieux. Nous avons conscience que vous vivez sous le même des-
potisme duquel nous tentons de nous évader. Les intérêts étrangers 
essayent par des propos mensongers de vous détourner de nous. Quand 
nous parlons de la confédération, nous la voulons sous le signe de 
l'unité démocratique. Nous vous proposons le développement des 
peuples libres au sein d'une confédération égalitaire." 15 
Le gouvernement d'Imre Nagy adopte officiellement le programme 
fédéraliste. Imre Nagy, président du gouvernement révolutionnaire, 
poursuit une politique sans équivoque à cet égard. Il déclare que 
l'expérience historique des petits peuples danubiens prouve que leurs 
libertés ne peuvent pas être garanties en les rattachant à l'une ou à 
l'autre puissance. La seule voie pour ces petits pays est de s'unir au sein 
d'une "Confédération égalitaire." "A la suite de l'oppression de notre 
révolution de 1848-1849, Lajos Kossuth interprète la grande leçon 
historique pour notre pays et indique la voie à suivre. Aux yeux de 
Kossuth, la garantie de l'indépendance, de la souveraineté et de l'exis-
tence nationale libre du peuple hongrois ne réside pas dans le rattache-
ment du peuple à une grande puissance ou à un groupe de puissances, 
mais bien dans la coopération serrée avec les peuples voisins en une 
confédération égalitaire de peuples libres." 16 
Il est certain que la tendance fédéraliste de la révolution hongroise 
représente un aspect européen inconnu de l'événement. En relevant les 
circonstances politico-historiques, il est aussi évident que toute con-
dition préalable à la réalisation d'une "Confédération Danubienne" 
égalitaire des "peuples libres" est absente. Malgré cela, la révolution 
hongroise constitue une partie des efforts fédéralistes des peuples de 
l'Europe Centrale et Orientale du XX ieme siècle. 
L'Union Soviétique considère le programme fédéraliste des années 
1948 et 1956 comme une tentative de sortie du bloc socialiste vers le "camp 
capitaliste." Ainsi, l'Union Soviétique, après la "déstalinisation," inter-
vient militairement en Hongrie en 1956, et met fin non seulement à la 
révolution nationale mais aussi à la renaissance et à toute manifestation 
de l'idée de la "Confédération Danubienne." En fin de compte, l'Union 
Soviétique, contrairement à l'idée de la déstalinisation, s'efforce de 
rétablir le système politique établi en Europe Orientale par Staline. 
Dans son mémorandum adressé aux pays occidentaux, lors des 
derniers jours de la révolution, le ministre d'Etat, István Bibó, leur 
demande de pratiquer une politique active et non agressive à l'égard 
des pays de l'Europe de l'Est. 11 serait souhaitable, selon le ministre, que 
le monde occidental constitue pour eux une force "d'attraction" sans 
toutefois contester leur système politique et social: 
La révolution hongroise et en général les mouvements des pays de 
l 'Europe de l'Est signifient que le monde occidental ne doit pas 
adopter une politique agressive basée sur la force mais doit pratiquer 
une politique active et prendre une initiative positive afin que, sans 
avoir la volonté de s'imposer, leur système économique et social, 
puisse gagner pas à pas les pays de l'Est et finalement l'Union 
Soviétique au profit d'une politique morale basée sur la liberté et la 
technique occidentale.17 
Ainsi, le monde occidental, par sa force d'attraction, devrait orienter 
les pays socialistes de l'Europe de l'Est et l'Union Soviétique vers une 
"politique nouvelle." Après Budapest, Prague et au lendemain de la 
Conférence sur la sécurité européenne, le monde occidental répondra-
t-il à ce message? 
Conclusion 
La révolution hongroise de 1956 réaffirme la continuité de l'idée 
danubienne relative à une solution fédérale des problèmes historiques 
de la vallée danubienne. Le gouvernement révolutionnaire et les organi-
sations ouvrières et estudiantines, pendant si peu de temps, avaient des 
idées claires et nettes sur la politique à suivre à l'égard de pays voisins 
comme face à l'URSS et à l'Occident. Au lieu d'adhérer par la force à 
une puissance étrangère, la révolution désigna la voie à suivre pour la 
Hongrie aussi bien que pour les autres pays du Bloc soviétique. 
La révolution de 1956, sous la conduite du leader communiste Imre 
Nagy, s'engage dans cette voie malgré l'absence des conditions néces-
saires pour la réalisation des objectifs. Malgré sa défaite, la révolution 
hongroise de 1956 reste un témoignage, une victoire morale des principes 
démocratiques. 
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Commentaire 
G. C. Kuun 
L'incroyable est arrivé. Une petite nation se dresse contre le colosse 
russe et pendant quelques jours recouvre sa liberté. Les Russes, sans 
ignorer les conséquences d'une intervention brutale, décident de réprimer 
la révolte hongroise dans le sang. Le monde occidental surpris et com-
patissant n'ose intervenir. L'exode d'environ 200,000 Hongrois repré-
sente une lourde perte pour la nation hongroise, mais ceux qui restent 
doivent continuer à vivre sous le régime communiste. Ce régime toute-
fois tirera une leçon de ce soulèvement. La révolution hongroise de 
1956 n'est pas une victoire, mais elle n'a pas eu lieu en vain. 
Aujourd'hui on ne peut parler du communisme sans mentionner les 
événements de Budapest de 1956 et ceux de Prague de 1968. Ces deux 
mouvements de résistance populaire et l'intervention russe qui les a 
suivis prouvent qu'en Europe Orientale les régimes communistes sont 
maintenus uniquement par la présence de l'Armée Rouge. 
Il y aurait beaucoup à dire de ces deux soulèvements; les deux 
événements sont cependant bien différents. La différence provient en 
grande partie des deux pays intéréssés et de leur attitude réciproque 
face à l'intervention soviétique. Ce qui ne peut être mis en doute, c'est 
que les petits peuples de l'Europe Orientale sont à la merci des grandes 
puissances qui profitent de leurs rivalités. Le monde serait probablement 
aujourd'hui beaucoup plus heureux si précisément dans l'Europe de 
l'Est les nations s'étaient mieux comprises et mieux respectées. C'est 
cette collaboration souhaitable des peuples de l'Europe de l'Est dont 
traite Paul Pilisi dans son article. Il ajoute à notre connaissance des 
événements de 1956 un aspect fort intéressant et jusqu'ici peu connu: 
celui de l'idée du fédéralisme danubien ressuscitée. 
L'idée du fédéralisme danubien est assez ancienne et assez bien 
connue des experts en histoire est-européenne. Ceux qui furent les 
partisans de cette idée sont d'origines diverses. Le Français Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon, le Tchèque Palacky, le Slovaque Hodza, le Roumain 
Popovici, le Croate Pilar et enfin le Hongrois Kossuth sont le plus 
souvent mentionnés comme défenseurs de l'idée d'un fédéralisme 
danubien. La question qui se pose est de savoir pourquoi cette idée n'a 
pas rencontré plus de succès et emporté l'adhésion des peuples dan-
ubiens. La réponse à cette question pourrait bien être que les partisans 
de la fédération danubienne manifestèrent leur enthousiasme à des 
périodes différentes. L'intérêt pour le fédéralisme s'est révélé parmi les 
Slaves et les Roumains d'une part, les Hongrois d'autre part dans des 
circonstances différentes. Nous avons l'impression que les Hongrois 
ont manqué "l'express danubien." Il nous semble que le moment 
propice pour la réorganisation de la région danubienne s'est situé vers 
la fin du XIXe siècle ou au début du XXe siècle, moment où la Hongrie 
fut une des nations dominantes du bassin danubien. 
A cette époque-là cependant, ceux qui furent les maîtres de la région 
danubienne ne voulurent pas renoncer à certains de leurs privilèges 
pour faire place aux Slaves et aux Roumains. Les deux races dominantes 
de la monarchie Austro-Hongroise, les Autrichiens et les Magyars, 
appuyés par les Allemands, refusèrent de consentir à la division de la 
double monarchie en état fédéral. 
Parmi les hommes d'Etat qui reconnurent le danger menaçant la 
monarchie il y eut l'archiduc François-Ferdinand lui-même. Un de ses 
plus proches collaborateurs fut le Roumain Aurèle Popovici qui s'attira 
la fureur des circles dominants hongrois en publiant le livre Die 
Vereinigten Staaten von Grossösterreich (Les Etats-Unis de la Grande 
Autriche) en 1906. Dans ce livre l'auteur roumain préconise la formation 
d'un état fédéral de quinze états "semi-souverains." La langue officielle 
serait l'allemand, les employés fédéraux seraient tenus à parler la langue 
officielle de leur état et l'allemand. L'empereur représenterait l'empire 
au niveau international.1 
Les Magyars, comme c'est le cas de toutes les élites gouvernantes du 
monde entier, ne voulaient pas abandonner leur position privilégiée. 
Ils savaient que numériquement, comparés aux Slaves, ils étaient en 
minorité. Il leur aurait fallu la sagesse d'un Aristote et l'abnégation d'un 
saint pour faire ce qu'on leur reproche de ne pas avoir fait. La Première 
Guerre Mondiale vint mettre fin à la vieille monarchie bicéphale, mais 
l'idée du fédéralisme danubien ne mourut pas avec elle. 
Il serait trop long d'énumérer tous ceux qui ont essayé de ressusciter 
l'idée du fédéralisme danubien après avoir constaté le vide laissé par la 
destruction de la monarchie habsbourgeoise. Les circonstances ayant 
changé, les Hongrois sont devenus les plus fervents partisans du 
fédéralisme danubien. Assurer une vie libre aux millions de Hongrois 
répartis parmi les états successeurs tel était le but des Magyars qui 
propagèrent le fédéralisme danubien pour remplacer les petits états 
hostiles, prêts à se lier avec n'importe quelle grande puissance pour 
obtenir des avantages politiques, par un état fédéral où toutes les 
nations seraient égales et libres. 
Cependant il y eut aussi des Français, comme l'historien Jacques 
Bainville2 et le premier ministre André Tardieu, qui virent le danger 
que présentait l'Europe de l'Est divisée. Tardieu voulut unir la Petite 
Entente avec l'Autriche et la Hongrie3 dans un cadre fédéral, mais son 
plan ne fut pas couronné de succès. La Tchécoslovaquie, la Roumanie 
et la Yougoslavie, ayant reçu des territoires de l'ancienne monarchie 
austro-hongroise, défendirent le statu quo et ainsi l'Europe danubienne 
devint la proie d'Adolphe Hitler. 
Pendant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, c'est un ancien ministre de 
la Tchécoslovaquie, Milan Hodza, un Slovaque, qui est revenu à l'idée 
de la fédération en Europe Centrale. Son livre Federation in Central 
Europe, Reflections and Reminiscences fut publié en 1942 à Londres. 
Le plan de Hodza—comme tous les autres plans—n'a pas pu être 
réalisé, mais l'historien autrichien Rudolf Wierer, auteur du livre Der 
Föderalismus im Donauraum (Le Fédéralisme dans l'Espace Danubien) 
le considère "quand même une grande idée." Après beaucoup de souf-
frances et de pertes humaines, en 1945 le statu quo de 1938 fut rétabli 
dans les pays danubiens. Cette fois-ci sous l'hégémonie de l'Union 
Soviétique. La révolution hongroise de 1956 fut un essai de se libérer 
de cette domination. 
En général les événements de Budapest de 1956 sont assez bien 
connus. Il s'agit d'une révolution spontanée du peuple hongrois qui ne 
pouvait plus supporter les rigueurs d'un régime ayant perdu le contact 
avec le peuple. Les Russes furent surpris par la révolte des Magyars, ils 
hésitèrent, mais finalement ils se jetèrent sur les Hongrois. Cette lutte 
inégale ne pouvait pas durer très longtemps, mais les Hongrois ont 
montré au monde que l'Union Soviétique est vulnérable. Jusqu'à quel 
point les Russes pourront compter sur les pays de l'Europe de l'Est en 
cas d'un conflit armé entre les Etats Unis et l'U.R.S.S. voilà qui est 
difficile à dire. Une chose est certaine: les Russes ne sont pas en faveur 
de l'idée d'un fédéralisme danubien. 
Paul Pilisi écrit très justement que l'idée d'un fédéralisme danubien 
fut avancée sous des aspects différents par des personnalités com-
munistes comme Tito, Dimitrov, Rajk et Nagy. Ce qui est intéressant, 
et c'est là l'argument principal de Pilisi, c'est de constater que même 
pendant cette brève révolution de 1956 le fédéralisme danubien fit une 
courte réapparition, mais assez typique. 
Imre Nagy, le leader populaire de la révolution, était fédéraliste 
depuis assez longtemps. Devenu chef du gouvernement révolutionnaire, 
il essaya de mener l'idée fédéraliste aussi loin que possible. Il voulut 
coopérer avec tous les pays voisins, y compris la Yougoslavie. Pour lui 
la révolution d'octobre fut la continuation logique de tout ce qu'il avait 
écrit et dit sur le fédéralisme danubien et si l'on veut remonter encore 
plus loin dans l'histoire, ce fut la suite des idées de Kossuth. Kossuth, 
le révolutionnaire de 1848-1849 devenu fédéraliste en exile, inspira 
Nagy, le communiste, qui ne put résister à l'appel de la patrie. 
Du point de vue intellectuel, il est de la plus grande importance que 
Georges Lukács, le "grand old man" de la philosophie marxiste ait 
donné aussi son appui au fédéralisme danubien. Tout à fait dans la 
tradition titiste le penseur devenu ministre déclara que la révolution ne 
voulait pas "un socialisme en l'air." 
Nous croyons cependant que plusieurs des déclarations préconisant 
le fédéralisme danubien furent plutôt le produit du coeur que de la tête. 
Pilisi cite le mémorandum de l'assemblée des ouvriers et étudiants de 
Miskolc qui parle de la "spontanéité" du mouvement fédéraliste et du 
désir de devenir membre de la "confédération danubienne." Eh bien, 
cette spontanéité n'exista que du côté hongrois. On peut également dire 
la même chose de l'idée de la confédération danubienne. 
Nagy, lui aussi, se laissa emporter par un rêve. Il parle des "possibili-
tés du fédéralisme en 1956." Mais quelle autre nation exprima des vues 
fédéralistes? Du côté Tchèque ou Roumain on ne fut pas prêt à venir 
en aide à la confédération danubienne. Tito non plus ne se déclara pas 
pour la causé fédéraliste. 
La phrase du professeur Pilisi: "malgré cela le caractère fédéraliste 
de la révolution hongroise constitue une partie organique des efforts 
fédéralistes des peuples de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale du XXe siècle" 
nous paraît un peu grandiloquente. Parler de "partie organique des 
efforts fédéralistes des peuples de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale. . ." ne 
nous semble pas correspondre à la vérité. Malheureusement en effet il 
n'y a jamais eu de réalité à laquelle on ait pu donner le nom du "fédéral-
isme danubien." Et quant aux "peuples," cela nous semble également 
un peu exagéré. C'est un fait regrettable, mais le fédéralisme n'est 
devenu un mouvement populaire dans aucun des pays danubiens. 
Même en Hongrie ce mouvement n'atteignit, à notre avis, que les intel-
lectuels. Ce qui ne veut pas dire que le fédéralisme ne soit pas la solution 
pour le bassin danubien. 
Nous aimerions terminer cette discussion en mentionnant deux 
allusions faites au sujet du fédéralisme danubien. Sans être très récentes, 
elles datent cependant d'après 1956. 
La première de ces allusions a paru dans le journal "Esti Hirlap"4 en 
1965 qui publia un article relatif au voyage d'un groupe de journalistes 
hongrois en Autriche. Le journal de Budapest écrit ceci: "Quoique 
récemment la nouvelle de l'Union Danubienne, à laquelle participeraient 
l'Autriche, la Hongrie, la Tchécoslovaquie et la Yougoslavie, fit la 
ronde, en réalité il ne peut s'agir que du fait que des relations amicales, 
politiques, économiques, culturelles et humaines se développent. 11 
s'agit un peu du développement de relations familiales." 
Qu'il y ait eu ou non des "relations familiales" parmi les peuples 
danubiens en 1965 nous l'ignorons, mais toujours est-il que même s'il 
y avait de telles relations l'invasion de la Tchécoslovaquie en 1968 par 
les troupes du Pacte de Varsovie, y compris les Hongrois, les a probable-
ment ébranlées quelque peu. 
La deuxième allusion que nous aimerions citer est celle de M. Kádár 
lui-même.5 Le 12 décembre 1964 il souligna l'importance d'une entente 
entre les peuples de la vallée danubienne. Voici les paroles de l'homme 
qui, avec l'aide des Russes, étouffa la révolution hongroise de 1956: 
"Les peuples du bassin danubien vivent dans une communauté de sort. 
Ou ils prospèrent ensemble ou ils périssent ensemble. Il n'y a pas d'autre 
solution pour ces peuples du bassin danubien." 
Le grand mérite de Paul Pilisi est de nous rappeler que l'idée du 
fédéralisme danubien n'est pas complètement morte. Chaque essai de 
ranimer la discussion ne peut que servir l'intérêt commun des peuples 
danubiens. 
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The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 
Viewed from Two Decades' Distance 
Peter Gosztony 
When the next generation writes the history of the Hungarian 1956 
Revolution many will note the strange phenomena which, like comets, 
are said to announce the coming of wars, to forewarn the country and 
its people of the cataclysmic event: floods on the Tisza River and in 
Transdanubia, earthquake in Pest County, and a strange accident on 
Margit Bridge in Budapest, where a speeding bus (fortunately not 
packed with passengers) plunged straight into the Danube. But those 
aware of the situation in Hungary needed no special warnings about the 
coming storm. 
For seven years the country had been ruled by the Hungarian 
Workers' Party (the Communist Party of Hungary) under the direction 
of Matyas Rakosi. The results of his leadership were disastrous in 
almost every respect. A regime of economic planning, designed to serve 
the political purposes of a foreign power, had led Hungary to the brink 
of economic collapse by the fall of 1956. As one Hungarian party 
official put it in 1969, "grave economic problems" contributed to the 
deterioration of the general political situation before October 1956 and 
increased the people's discontent. The author of this study, Dr. Janos 
Berecz, Director of the External Division of the Hungarian Communist 
Party's Central Committee, is worth quoting at length: 
At the end of September it was announced that all long-distance 
bus service will be suspended temporarily, that because of the lack of 
coal some 600 passenger trains will be idle for three weeks, and that 
the fuel supply of state farms will also be decreased. Work was stopped 
on many large construction projects. It was characteristic of economic 
management at the time that the head of the country's Statistical 
Bureau confessed in his letter to the President of the State Planning 
Bureau: because of the several thousand modifications in the coun-
try's economic plan, the Statistical Bureau no longer knows which 
plan is in effect.1 
In agriculture the Party's elite had used the methods of forced, 
"bureaucratic" leadership. Year after year, and often even several times 
annually, they increased the farmers' obligations to the state. Com-
pulsory deliveries and heavy taxation had taken away the peasants' 
incentive. Disinterest in expanding production had grown to the extent 
that, just to give one example, by 1953 more than 10 per cent of the 
country's arable land lay fallow!2 
By the mid-1950's, deficits had become a regular phenomenon in 
industrial operations. Contrary to repeated Party promises, workers', 
peasants', and most wage earners' living standards declined steadily. 
By the early 1950's they had sunk well below pre-World War II levels.3 
But the situation was much worse in the realm of the citizenry's legal 
rights. 
The Communist Party of Hungary exercised complete power not 
only over the army and police, it also controlled the special internal 
security force, the Allamvedelmi Hatosag, the Secret Police or AVH. 
This agency answered directly to Rakosi and was exempt from all other 
supervision or control. During Rakosi's seven years in power, the 
prisons were packed, forced-labour camps were established following 
the Soviet pattern, and the hangman was kept busy. The watchful eye 
of the AVH was not reserved for the Party's enemies alone. The ordi-
nary citizen, even the common workingman could also become a 
"potential enemy" if the Party's interest so demanded. Sandor Nogrady, 
one of the top political officers of the Armed Forces before 1956, writes 
the following in his memoirs about the Rakosi era: 
It did not take much to imprison someone. It took virtually nothing 
to expel someone from Budapest, apart f rom pronouncing him an 
"undesirable element" there. This could happen even to someone who 
was born there and had no criminal record!4 
When, in the 1960's, this same Sandor Nogrady paid an official visit 
to the by then disgraced Rakosi in Russia, the ex-dictator still defended 
his policies. This was the natural process of the revolution—he said. 
"They [the people] must feel—God'amn it—the dictatorship of the 
proletariat!" He didn't want to hear about the principle of "revolu-
tionary legality" : that was "something out of nothing."5 Nogrady 
himself admitted that there had been no legal bases for the thousands 
of arrests and imprisonments. Between 1949 and 1956 trial followed 
trial in Hungary. These were "show trials" with forged evidence, forced 
testimonials, and conducted before audiences ordered to attend. Civic 
leaders, communist functionaries, high-ranking churchmen alike were 
dragged before these courts. Sentences were imposed on "kulaks" 
(well-to-do peasants), "economic saboteurs," "spies," and "anti-socialist 
elements," in total mockery of traditional court procedures. The terror 
which accompanied the day-to-day activities of the Party was virtually 
unparallelled in the history of Hungary. Again it is worthwhile to quote 
some shocking facts from contemporary Hungarian sources. These are 
from Dr. Berecz's book: 
It is characteristic of the campaign to class-enemies and of the 
excesses in the administration [of justice] that between 1952 and 1955, 
that is, in the course of four years, investigative proceedings were 
started in 1,136,434 cases. Charges were brought against 516,708 
people, 45 per cent of those investigated. . . All this seriously affected 
many law-abiding and peaceloving working people; and it produced 
a crisis in citizenship. . ,6 
Just as the citizen was deprived of his basic rights and was forced to 
keep silent, so Hungary's cultural life was subjected to the principle of 
socialist realism, an idea imported from the Soviet Union. The Union 
of Artists, the Union of Journalists, and the Union of Writers were 
subordinated to the almighty Party. All the members of these associ-
ations were obliged to toe the party line. Whoever refused to accept this 
state of affairs and objected to it, could consider himself fortunate if he 
only lost his job and status as writer or artist, and was not handed over 
to the AVH as a "class enemy." Following is an excerpt from a little-
known document dating from 1955: 
The degree of the individual's material dependence on the state, 
which forces him to abandon his convictions and individuality, is 
incompatible with healthy national life. With us this state of affairs 
is a wide-ranging sickness affecting the whole of society. The over-
centralized economy and political mechanism of a people's democracy 
is the necessary byproduct of a personal dictatorship. What political 
morality can prevail in public life in a state where critical thought is 
not only silenced but is severely punished, where critics are ostracised 
with utter disregard of the civil rights granted by the constitution, 
where those who oppose the prevailing political line are barred from 
their professions (journalists from publishing and writers from writing), 
where I was deprived not only of public office but of my teaching post 
and membership in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences as well, 
making it impossible for me to carry out any activity that would 
enable me to make a living. What is all this if not the shameful 
degeneration of political morality? Can one talk of a bill-of-rights, 
rule-of-law, legality and clean civic life where the conflict of opinions 
is resolved with such despicable methods. . . ? This is not socialist 
morality but Machiavellian politics in a modern form. The all-pervasive 
material dependence [of the individual on the state], this constant 
concern about day-to-day survival, is the killer of the noblest of 
human traits which, in a socialist society, should be encouraged: 
steadfastness, courage and strength of convictions. In place of these 
they foster self-abasement, cowardice, spinelessness and dishonesty. 
The corrupt ion and degeneration of national life and the consequent 
destruction of society's morals is one of the gravest manifestations of 
that moral and ethical crisis which is taking place before our very eyes.7 
These sentences issued from the pen of a Communist Imre Nagy's 
December 1955 memorandum to the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of Hungary. His words were not heeded. The country's 
masters were so far out of touch with reality and were so vain and full 
of self-delusions that they did not for a moment doubt the correctness 
of their policies. 
At this juncture the unexpected happened: in February 1956 the 
20th Communist Party Congress of the Soviet Union (CPSU) met in 
Moscow. Nikolai Sergeievich Khrushchev broke the silence on Stalin 
and condemned stalinist leadership in its many horrible aspects before 
an audience stunned by the brave words. Although his speech was not 
meant for public consumption, it soon became widely known through 
unofficial channels, and not only in the Soviet Union. The first tremours 
of the destalinization campaign associated with Khrushchev's name 
were soon felt in Eastern Europe. In June 1956 the earth began to shake 
under the feet of the Communists in the Polish industrial city of Poznan. 
By October the situation had become stormy in Warsaw as well. Polish 
armed forces surrounded the city to prevent intervention by Soviet 
troops. Khrushchev had to fly to Warsaw so that, with Premier 
Gomulka's aid he might avert the outbreak of a new Polish-Soviet 
conflict. 
In Hungary the situation was in many respects different from Poland's. 
In the wake of the 20th CPSU Congress, the country's intellectuals 
began to stir. Under the aegis of the Union of Communist Youth, the 
Petofi Circle was established gathering into its ranks those who, al-
though favouring the continuing struggle for socialism, demanded that 
the existing leadership be forced to account for its deeds. Although not 
stated at the time, they also favoured a free Hungary, independent from 
the Soviet Union. Moscow, which was ultimately responsible for 
decision-making in Hungary, at first made a few concessions in response 
to popular demand. On Soviet orders, Rakosi resigned as Chief Secre-
tary of the Communist Party of Hungary and left the country, citing 
"ill-health" as the reason for his departure. The Russians chose another 
"Rakosi," Erno Gero, in his place. Gero was not as well known to the 
masses, but he had been equally responsible for the reign of terror 
between 1948 and 1956. Such changes could only slow the course of 
events but could not arrest it. Certain victims of the stalinist leadership 
were "rehabilitated," some in their graves, as Laszlo Rajk and General 
Palffy. A rapprochement was effected with Tito's Yugoslavia, and 474 
political prisoners, mainly Communists and Social-Democrats, were 
released from Hungarian prisons.8 As it became known later, some 
3,000 others remained behind bars. Even though Gero and his former 
secretary and the new Premier of Hungary, Andras Hegediis, were 
reluctant to permit formally the re-burying of Rajk's remains, public 
pressure was so great that they had to yield. Funeral services for Rajk 
and three others who had been executed with him took place on 6 
October in Kerepes cemetery. Gabor Peter, the dreaded AVH chief 
during the terror, had to be brought out from prison to show where 
Rajk and his associates had been buried. Now the bones of four men, 
disinterred from a shallow grave in a winecellar on the outskirts of 
Budapest, were pronounced to be those of Rajk and company. The 
funeral turned out to be a gigantic, silent demonstration against the 
regime. Those who gathered in Kerepes cemetery (their number is 
estimated at 100,000), were not paying their respects to Rajk: by their 
presence they voiced, as yet silently, their disapproval of the existing 
government. 
During mid-October, associations of university students on the 
pattern of the Petofi Circle were formed in Budapest and elsewhere. On 
the 16th, the students of Szeged University established the Federation 
of Hungarian University and College Students, an organization inde-
pendent of the Communist youth movement and the Party. The very 
same day, in another part of the country, in the city of Gyor the demand 
for the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from Hungary was 
voiced publicly for the first time at a meeting of the local intelligentsia. 
After the 23rd demand, "Russians go home!" became a national slogan. 
Out of touch with realities, the country's leaders were losing the 
ground from under their feet. Early in October they had Mihaly Farkas, 
the ex-M inister of Defence, arrested, together with his son, the dreaded 
AVH colonel. The government figured that by sacrificing these men 
and a few other AVH agents they would satisfy the masses. On the 14th 
Gero, hoping that a treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia would take the 
wind from the sails of those demanding a new orientation in the coun-
try's politics, left for Belgrade at the head of a large delegation. A 
complete split now occurred within the Communist Party of Hungary— 
the Central Committee, the leaders, on the one hand, and the members-
at-large on the other. Most members identified with the demands of the 
people: to square accounts with the regime of terror, and to attain a 
socialist but independent and even neutral Hungary. The minority 
within the Party, the stalinists, viewed the ever faster pace of develop-
ments with consternation. 
By the middle of October a situation developed in Hungary which a 
professional revolutionary, V. I. Lenin, defined in 1905: 
For a revolution to happen it is not enough for the exploited masses 
to realize that they cannot live as they did before and demand a 
change. For the revolution it is also necessary that the exploiters 
should not be able to live and rule in the established fashion. Only 
when the oppressed reject the old order and the rulers cannot live and 
rule in the old way, only then can the revolution succeed. We can 
express this truism with other words thus: the revolution is not pos-
sible without a nationwide crisis affecting equally the exploited and 
the exploiters.9 
Today, even H ungarian Communist historians admit that in October 
1956 the country's leaders and the central Party organs were out of 
touch with the realities of the situation. Blind self-confidence, arro-
gance, and complacency characterized their behaviour, according to 
Dr. Berecz. In his book he points out that "certain security agencies" 
(i.e., the AVH) had twice reported that "opposition elements were up 
to something in Budapest." Moreover, in their second warning they 
predicted that 22 October would be the day when disturbances would 
start. The Party leaders replied: "Nightmares!" When, in the industrial 
centre of Csepel, one party functionary warned the stalinist Karoly Kis, 
a member of the Party's Political Bureau, about the excited mood of 
the workers, Kis responded: "Comrade: if some action is started against 
us we can deal with such outbreak in 30 minutes!"10 The leaders' direc-
tives to the Armed Forces also proved that they were unable to assess 
the situation correctly. On 20 October the Forces were put on internal 
security alert, but 24 hours later, in the evening of the 21st, the orders 
were cancelled. 
The students of the Budapest Polytechnical Institute held their 
general meeting on the 22nd. They announced that they supported the 
programme of the University of Szeged students, that they would quit 
the Communist youth movement, and that they would address their 
demands to the government point by point. It was at this meeting, 
lasting into the night, that the famous I6-point programme was born, 
rendering students' views on issues of national concern. The document 
mentioned not only the extension of democracy and reforms, but also 
free elections, participation of several democratic parties in the electoral 
process, and the removal of Soviet troops from Hungary. During this 
evening the students also decided to stage a peaceful demonstration 
the next day, i.e., on the 23rd, in order to lend emphasis to their 
demands. 
During the evening and night of the 22nd, the executive of the Petofi 
Circle also met. The participants decided to communicate with Imre 
Nagy at once, and inform him of the planned demonstration and its 
purpose. Although Nagy belonged to the group of Communists who 
returned to Hungary from Moscow in 1945, during the past eleven years 
he had managed to gain popularity with the masses. The peasants knew 
him as the minister who redistributed the land, intellectuals recalled 
his university lectures which were free of stalinist dogmatism; and 
during the change of government following Stalin's death, Nagy had 
tried to implement a new party line. In Imre Nagy, the masses saw a 
Communist who was both Hungarian and a democrat. 
The story of the student demonstration of the 23rd is known to all. 
The capital's populace accepted the students' programme as its own in 
a matter of hours. Within one day the whole country joined to support 
the people of Budapest. The tumultuous events at the statue of Jozef 
Bern (the Polish hero of the 1848-49 Hungarian Revolution), in Lajos 
Kossuth Square, at the Radio Centre on Sandor Brody Street, and the 
toppling of Stalin's statue in Varosliget, were the highlights of the day. 
The government's complete inability to deal with developments soon 
became apparent. Enraged, Gero demanded from the Minister of 
Defence that his troops open fire on the masses. By this time blood 
flowed in front of the Radio building in Sandor Brody Street. In the 
evening, the A VH men in charge of security there opened fire on the yet 
unarmed crowds. Seeing this, the Armed Forces Units arriving on the 
scene either surrendered their weapons to the demonstrators or joined 
them. Some commandeered cars and drove to the factories in Csepel 
and the other industrial suburbs to arouse the workers against the 
AVH—and they succeeded! 
During the night of October 23/24 the Party leaders made a decision 
which, from their point of view, was the only realistic one: to quell the 
revolt, they would solicit the aid of Soviet troops. Their request was 
granted. The first Soviet contingents reached the capital in the morning 
of the 24th. They were units comprised mainly of tank detachments 
and had orders not to fire. Their commanders believed that, as in Berlin 
in June 1953, the "insurrectionists" would be "brought to their senses" 
by the mere sight of Russian tanks patrolling the city's thoroughfares. 
But it was not to be so. The freedom fighters, at first sporadically, but 
later with great determination, opened fire with their primitive weapons 
on the Soviet tanks moving into the heart of the city. The revolution 
now entered a new stage: it became a freedom fight, a war of liberation 
against the interventionist forces of an alien power. 
* * * 
Viewed from a distance, it seems clear that the period between 23 and 
29 October constituted the first general phase of the revolution and the 
struggle for liberation. These days were characterized not only by the 
manning of the barricades and by street-fighting in Budapest. Insur-
gent political organizations were materializing everywhere. The various 
workers' councils, national and revolutionary committees wished to 
work for a free, independent, and socialist Hungary. The students were 
in the vanguard of these activities: they published newspapers, organized 
political rallies, conducted agitation in the countryside, and participated 
in the negotiations with members of the government. It should be 
pointed out that during these days three centers of authority evolved 
in Hungary: the insurgents; the government comprising the party elite 
(by now completely out of touch with developments); and the general 
staff of the Soviet occupation forces in H ungary, taking orders directly 
from Moscow. 
In vain did the existing government try to gain control over the 
situation by granting concessions to the people. In vain did they dismiss 
Hegediis as Premier and Gero as Party Chief, placing in their stead 
Imre Nagy and Janos Kadar. Neither of these men could influence the 
course of events or exercise a moderating influence on the demands 
pouring forth from every section of society. In Hungary, the type of 
compromise that had been implemented in Poland with the coming of 
Gomulka into office, was doomed to failure. After the 23rd, the Com-
munists' authority disintegrated within a few short days. The Party, 
with its 900,000 members, simply dissolved into thin air.11 The Units of 
the AVH had to fight for their lives, while the police and armed forces 
joined the insurgents. The Soviet occupation troops were completely 
isolated and had to quit Budapest on the 28th. This same day Gyorgy 
Lukacs addressed the country's insurgent youth on radio and expressed 
his sympathies with their demands. He was followed by Imre Nagy, 
who announced that in a reorganized government several non-Com-
munists had been included and that negotiations had been initiated 
with the Soviet military command for the withdrawal of Russian troops 
from Hungary. On the 30th, Nagy made still another announcement: 
the one-party system of government would end, and elections would 
be held with the participation of several democratic parties. This was 
the day when it seemed that the demands and aims of the Revolution 
had been achieved. 
By this time, Imre Nagy had resolved a certain conflict which mani-
fested itself during these days in the leadership of the Communist Party. 
The fact is that on the 28th the stalinists, led by Ferenc Miinnich (who 
later turned out to be Beria's follower and Hungary's top NK VD agent) 
attempted a coup d'etat aimed at the establishment of a military dic-
tatorship. It is noteworthy what Dr. Berecz writes about this hitherto 
obscure plan. 
During the night of October 27th/28th, the members of the M ilitary 
Committee of the central organs of the Party worked out a plan for 
the safe-guarding of the people's power (i.e., the rule of the Com-
munists ) through military means. For the time being the armed forces 
would assume power, with the political officers taking command 
within the individual divisions. After order had been restored in the 
country and the insurgents had been scattered, a new government was 
to be formed. But this plan was not to be carried out. . . ,12 
It could not be implemented because the Military Command could not 
find the men needed to execute the plan. By the end of October the 
Ministry of Defence, the Chiefs-of-Staff, and the commanders of the 
various branches of the Armed Forces had all endorsed the cause of the 
Revolution. The National Command of the Air Forceeven admonished 
Soviet troops through leaflets to leave the country by a certain date, 
otherwise the Hungarian Air Force would become actively involved in 
the fight against the Soviet Army. 
* * * 
The events in Hungary confronted Soviet government leaders and 
the CPSU with a grave situation. Two types of opinions crystallized in 
Moscow. One group (today we know that at first Khrushchev belonged 
to this one ) viewed Hungarian developments as a process of reckoning 
with the stalinist past, and would have accepted a neutral Hungary that 
would not join NATO nor restore capitalism. The other group, led by 
Molotov and Marshal Zhukov, demanded the immediate crushing of 
what they called a "capitalist and imperialist mutiny." During the 
second half of October Mikoyan and Suslov were dispatched twice to 
Budapest for discussions with Imre Nagy and to pass on instructions to 
him. But by the time the two Russian emissaries returned to the Kremlin 
on the 30th, the fate of the Hungarian Revolution had been sealed. The 
fact is that on the 29th Peking got into the act. Mao Tse-tung and his 
associates emphatically demanded that the"Hungarian counter-revolu-
tion" be crushed. It must be noted that in these historic days China 
itself was in crisis. It had just experienced its "hundred flowers" move-
ment, the mixing of a bit of liberalization with dogmatism, and the 
events in Hungary demonstrated that such experiments in freedom 
could endanger the whole system. This is why the "destalinization" 
process came to a premature end in China. Mao Tse-tung and associates 
realized that exposing the "mistakes of the past" could only hurt the 
Communist system.13 
But let us return to Hungary. In the early morning of 30 October 
preparations began in Moscow to crush the Hungarian Revolution. 
While Soviet troops poured into the country from the east, Khrushchev 
went on a whirlwind tour of the capitals of Hungary's Communist 
neighbours. Everywhere sympathy was expressed for the idea of quelling 
the revolt by military means. Czechoslovakia's Communist leaders had 
been viewing developments in Budapest with concern: they were worried 
lest the half-million Magyars living in Slovakia be spurred to action by 
events in Hungary. We now know that on the 27th the Czechoslovak 
Armed Forces were put on the alert, and sizable forces were dispatched 
to the Hungarian border. At the same time, Communist organs in 
Slovakia were instructed to help the stalinists in northern Hungary by 
all means. Accordingly, propaganda leaflets printed in three Slovak 
cities were smuggled into Hungary. Refuge was offered to high-ranking 
Hungarian party officials and AVH officers who fled to Slovakia to 
escape the vengeful wrath of the people. 
In Romania the situation was different. At first, the leaders in 
Bucharest looked upon developments in Hungary with a certain degree 
of sympathy. But when Transylvania's Hungarian population began 
stirring and, what is more important, enlisted the support of a good 
portion of the Romanian university youth, they got scared in Bucharest. 
Siguranca, the Romanian secret police, hit upon a brilliant counter-
move. With the idea of divide and rule in mind, it had leaflets printed 
in Magyar, reproducing the Hungarian youth's 16-point programme. 
The points were the same as the original ones issued in Budapest, except 
for the one dealing with university bursary system reform. Instead of 
this provision they substituted a demand never and nowhere voiced 
during the revolution: Transylvania's restitution to Hungary. This 
Machiavellian tactic isolated the Hungarians of Transylvania. During 
the next few weeks, Romania's leaders suppressed the budding Hun-
garian movement by so-called "executive methods" (unrestricted police 
action). More important, Khrushchev's proposed programme for Hun-
gary found complete support in Bucharest as well. Romanian officials 
favoured immediate Soviet intervention, but when the Russian leader 
asked for the co-operation of Romanian troops in Hungary's "pacifica-
tion," he received an evasive reply. Politically, the Romanian army was 
not strong enough to undertake action abroad without incurring 
internal damage. 
On 2 November Khrushchev met Tito in Belgrade.14 Soviet-Yugoslav 
relations were once more strained these days. The Russians knew very 
well that the idea of following the "Yugoslav example" had no small 
role in the evolution of events in Hungary. Emulating a socialist Yugo-
slavia, independent of the Soviet bloc and trusted by East and West 
alike, held a strong (though in the light of later developments, un-
realistic) attraction for Hungarian Communists with nationalist leanings. 
For several reasons Tito enjoyed a degree of popularity in Hungary, 
and those who wanted to pursue a policy of "away from Moscow," saw 
in him the potential leader of a new alignment centered on the Danube 
Basin. But socialist Yugoslavia, which had welcomed events in Hungary 
on the 23rd, 24th and 25th (after all, these were anti-stalinist manifes-
tations), viewed the unfolding of developments thereafter with increasing 
concern. It considered the recognition of the Kossuth insignia as a Hun-
garian national emblem a sign of reawakening Magyar imperialism. At 
the same time, the revival of the Social Democratic Party and the other 
progressive parties, and the increasing isolation of the Communists, 
aroused in Tito the fear that a general revolutionary movement might 
spread after its victory in Hungary. This would endanger the future of 
one-party dictatorship in the already conflict-ridden Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. That is why Tito, who had condemned Soviet 
intervention in Hungarian affairs on the 24th, changed his mind by 
early November. He assured Khrushchev that he sympathized with 
Soviet plans regarding Hungary, and even showed him a telegram just 
received from the State Department in Washington. The United States 
was not sympathetic toward governments of countries bordering the 
Soviet Union which adopted an unfriendly position against the USSR.15 
For Khrushchev, this telegram, couched in impeccable diplomatic 
language, was a stroke of fortune. It plainly showed that the United 
States had no interest in the establishment of anti-Soviet governments 
or systems within the Iron Curtain. Khrushchev could relax on his 
return flight to Moscow. Revolutionary Hungary's diplomatic isolation 
was complete, and all that remained was to initiate a military operation 
to restore order. 
Very little was known in Hungary about these developments at the 
time. The only alarming news came from the East. Following 31 October, 
more and more Soviet troops poured into the country. From centers in 
Eastern Hungary, such as Zahony and Nyiregyhaza came hourly re-
ports of the Soviet build-up. "It seems," began a message from the 
Hungarian railway officials in Zahony, "that the Soviet Army wants to 
bring the whole of Hungary under socialist protection." In vain did 
Imre Nagy call on the Soviet Minister in Budapest. The answer from 
the Russian Embassy was that no one there knew what was happening 
and that a clarification of the situation would be sought from Moscow. 
In the shadow of Soviet intervention, Imre Nagy—seeing no feasible 
alternatives—decided on taking a historic step. In the afternoon of 
1 November he announced to a crowd gathered in Lajos Kossuth 
Square that Hungary would quit the Warsaw Pact and become a neutral 
nation on the Austrian pattern. It must be emphasized that this 
announcement met with the approval of the vast majority of Hungary's 
population and in no way did it constitute an ad hoc decision. After 
all, ever since the outbreak of the revolution on the 23rd, this wish had 
been voiced most often and most emphatically by the masses. After two 
world wars and three revolutions, Hungary's people wished to build 
their future independent of East and West, free of military entangle-
ments, and in sincere cooperation with the other peoples of the Danube 
Basin. Naturally, such a solution did not suit the Kremlin's scheme of 
things. As far as the Western Great Powers were concerned, they—just 
as a century earlier during the 1848-49 Revolution—were not at all 
concerned with the affairs of the middle Danube Valley. 
There are those who fault Nagy for provoking Moscow to premature 
action, contending that he should have restrained not hastened the 
course of developments. Those who argue thus are unfamiliar with the 
sequence of events: the first steps toward a military showdown were 
taken by Moscow, Nagy only reacted defensively when he cancelled 
Hungary's membership in the Warsaw alliance; he hoped to deprive the 
Soviets of any legal pretext for sending troops into Hungary. By pledging 
the country's neutrality, he meant to convince Moscow that the Hun-
garian government had no desire to enter NATO or any alignment of 
capitalist powers. It must be said that Nagy's announcements had no 
influence whatever on the course of developments during the next few 
days. Moscow had decided on military intervention and the Hungarians, 
with their own resources, were powerless to alter the course of events. 
For the next few days the Soviet leaders played a two-faced game. 
They tried to convince Nagy that they still wished to negotiate with him. 
Indeed, on 3 November, a delegation of high-ranking Soviet generals 
came to the Parliament buildings to discuss the details of Soviet troop 
withdrawals from Hungary. Meanwhile, for three whole days, more 
and more Soviet units crossed the border into Hungary. Later it was 
learned that, by the time of the completion of the troop build-up on the 
3rd, fifteen Russian divisions, including eight tank divisions, with more 
than 200,000 Red soldiers were awaiting orders to attack. Moscow also 
adopted political measures to assure the satisfactory outcome of events. 
On the 2nd the Russians virtually abducted Janos Kadar from his Buda 
residence. They wanted to make him head of the Soviet-backed govern-
ment that was to replace Nagy's. Today we know that at first his role 
was meant for Mtinnich; but it was soon realized that Miinnich being 
unknown in the country, Kadar was more suited for the post: he had 
languished in Rakosi's prisons and been tortured by the Farkases. 
Moreover, he was of working-class origin and had not received his 
political training in Moscow. Thus it happened that, on 3 November, 
Nagy looked in vain for his comrade, the Party Chief and Secretary of 
State: Kadar was not to be found in the Hungarian capital. Only weeks 
later did it become known that, along with a few of his associates 
(Miinnich, Marosan, Dogei, Kossa and Kiss), he was in U/.horod 
(Ungvar), in Soviet Subcarpathia, negotiating with the Russians on the 
setting up of a post-revolutionary regime in Hungary. 
What happened thereafter is well known to all. On 4 November the 
Soviets unleashed their troops on Budapest once more. In the capital 
fighting endured for four days—elsewhere even longer. Significantly, 
Sztalinvaros (Stalin City), Hungary's foremost socialist centre, was the 
last to capitulate (November 15th). Nagy and his colleagues sought 
refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. When Tito announced his support of 
the newly formed puppet Kadar regime, Nagy left his place of refuge. 
His pride would not permit him to enjoy the hospitality and protection 
of a regime which had betrayed him. Nagy had trusted the Russians and 
Kadar as well; his disappointment in them must have been very deep: in 
the end, he paid for his trust with his life. Pal Maleter, his Minister of 
Defence, also became the victim of a trap. He was arrested in the early 
hours of the 4th by NKVD men at Soviet headquarters, where he had 
been invited for official discussions under the white flag of truce. 
Even though by 8 November Budapest was "pacified" and, under the 
protection of Russian tanks, Kadar and his government occupied the 
Parliament Buildings, the Hungarian Revolution could not be quelled 
so easily. Partisan warfare against the new regime continued well into 
January 1957, and the slogan MUK (Marciusban Ujra Ke/.djuk We 
will start again in March), current in Budapest during the winter, was 
not an unfounded rumour. The various workers' councils and other 
organizations, born at the time of the uprising, continued to struggle 
in the face of mounting persecution. All this must be kept in mind lest 
the impression be created that the Revolution was a transitory, passing 
event lasting only fourteen days. 
One more matter must be mentioned. No detailed figures have ever 
been released by the Budapest government about casualties and damages 
incurred during the revolution. But we do know that, on the Hungarian 
side, more than 3,000 persons lost their lives. The number of wounded 
was around 15,000. More than 200,000 people fled to the West. Some 
53,000 returned in the decade following 1956. Western observers esti-
mate Soviet Army losses to be about 100 tanks and armoured vehicles 
and approximately 2,000 casualties. The lives of an additional 12,000 
citizens were affected by the various post-revolutionary terror cam-
paigns and purges. Persons closely affiliated with the United Nations 
estimate that in the five-year period following 1956, the Kadar regime 
pronounced death sentences on, and executed 453 individuals, among 
them Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter, and a host of military and civilian leaders. 
In deeming the revolution a human tragedy, no distinction exists 
between Hungarians abroad or in Hungary. Albeit Hungary's present 
leaders persist in labelling the event a "counter-revolution," even Kadar, 
in a speech delivered on the occasion of his 60th birthday in 1971, 
looking back on 1956, called it a national tragedy.16 And it is not pure 
chance that in the two decades since the event, not one of the country's 
reputable writers, musicians, or poets has used the official terminology 
"counter-revolution" to describe 1956. Is this the judgement of Clio? 
The October Revolution failed to attain its intended goal. To this 
day, Hungary is under Soviet occupation. Instead of democracy and 
neutrality, there is Party rule and Warsaw Pact alignment. But we 
would do violence to reality if we failed to recognize the positive aspects 
of the present Hungarian situation, in contrast to what had prevailed 
before 1956. When we consider this carefully, it is not an inconsiderable 
achievement. And, as far as Hungary's national history is concerned, 
let me cite Kossuth's 1850 assessment of the significance of his genera-
tion's struggle for Hungarian freedom: 
We did not triumph, but we had fought. 
We did not end the rule of the Tyrant, but we had halted his 
march. 
We did not save the country, but we had defended it. 
If they will write about us in the history books, they will be 
able to say that we had resisted. 
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Twenty Years After: Kadar and 
His Rule Assessed, 1956-1976 
Ferenc A. Vali 
Twenty years ago a regime arose from the ruins of a Revolution 
suppressed by the Soviet army. Whoever wishes to discuss the nature, 
achievements, or failures of Janos Kadar and his group since November 
1956 cannot avoid looking back to this time. 
In a way, it was a genuine Leninist beginning: this regime was born 
by means of a conspiratorial act. A group headed by Kadar and the 
old Moscow-hand Ferenc Miinnich assembled on Soviet soil in the 
Carpatho-Ukrainian town of Uzhgorod. On November 4, 1956, at the 
moment when the Red Army opened its operation to wipe out the up-
rising and to oust the government of Imre Nagy, Kadar's team declared 
itself to be the "Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Govern-
ment." The orthodoxy of the action was assured by the presence of 
Nikita S. Khrushchev who also ruled that Kadar, already First Secre-
tary of the Communist Party since October 25, and not Miinnich, 
should head the new government.1 
Under the protection of Soviet tanks, the Kadar team entered Buda-
pest on November 7. Sporadic fighting still continued, production was 
at a standstill; the administration had collapsed and had been replaced 
by workers1 councils or local national councils. The Communist Party 
had, since the early days of the Revolution, disintegrated; only the Party 
Headquarters continued to operate. 
To rebuild the Party and to restore the order and authority of the 
government was a risky and arduous task. The Soviet military protected 
the new Hungarian central authority, but this certainly failed to en-
hance its prestige among the masses. 
It seems fairly well established that Kadar first attempted to restore 
what he considered order and to reestablish Party authority by per-
suasion. He may have prided himself on maintaining or implementing 
the revolutionary achievements of 1956 without abandoning socialism 
and Party control. He presumably flirted with the idea of a "purified 
socialism" and a "rejuvenated" Party.2 In November and December 
1956, however, the infamy of Soviet aggression was so much in the mind 
of everybody that the principal popular demand was directed at the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary. Even if Kadar had wanted 
to comply with this demand (which would have meant the eviction of 
his regime), it was beyond his powers to do so. As Major General 
Grebennik, the Soviet commander of Budapest, told the workers'coun-
cils: "Soviet troops will leave Hungary only when crayfish whistle and 
fishes sing."3 So they have not left since. 
By the end of 1956 the Kadar regime had made little progress either in 
consolidating its government or in resolving the confused situation of 
Party and state. Towards these ends the leaders of five Communist 
Parties (Soviet, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Rumanian, and Hungarian) 
assembled on January 1, 1957, in a rubble-strewn Budapest to instruct 
Kadar in these circumstances. 
Thereafter, on January 5, the Hungarian leader announced his pro-
gram, and this time he insisted that the dictatorship of the proletariat 
was to be secured. Political activity was again to be the monopoly of the 
Communist Party, all other political parties were forbidden, workers' 
councils were to be deprived of all power; the Revolution was declared 
to have been a "counter-revolution" and Imre Nagy, for the first time, 
was reproached for "treachery" and for having supported the "counter-
revolution." The period of repression was to begin. 
The Period of Repression 
The repressive measures were first aimed at the total liquidation of 
the remnants of the Revolution. The workers'councils were instructed 
to desist from all political activity; in November 1957 they were for-
mally dissolved. The Writers'Association which on December 28, 1956, 
was still able to vote a resolution condemning the Kadar regime, was 
suspended on January 17 and finally dissolved on April 21, 1957. 
Next came punitive measures against the "counter-revolutionaries." 
On January 15 an "accelerated criminal trial procedure" was decreed, 
under which special courts could summarily pass sentences ranging 
from five-year imprisonments to death. The death penalty could now be 
imposed also on juveniles (many of the freedom fighters were below 18 
years). Initial restraints on prosecuting participants in the Revolution 
were now abandoned.4 Also various other measures "to intensify the 
class struggle" were introduced: for example, reluctant judges were en-
joined to pass sentences in the spirit of class struggle, and institutions 
of learning were cleansed of class enemies. 
To implement all these coercive measures and to practice terror, the 
notorious Security Police (AVH), broken up during the Revolution, 
was reorganized under the name of "Political Investigation Division" 
of the Central Office of the Police. It showed itself to be as ruthless as 
its precursor in the Stalinist period. Totalitarian measures of torture 
and intimidation were practiced to extort confessions. Thousands sus-
pected or accused of "counter-revolutionary" acts were arrested, many 
thousands interned (internment camps dissolved during the Thaw were 
again set up). At least 2,000 persons were executed and more than 
20,000 imprisoned, among them prominent writers and other intellec-
tuals. Members of the Bar were purged; of 1,600 attorneys in Budapest, 
720 were disbarred. 
The most conspicuous judicial murder was that of the revolutionary 
Prime Minister, Imre Nagy, and his three associates. Nagy, an old-time 
Communist, had sought refuge at the Yugoslav Embassy after the entry 
of Soviet troops into Budapest. He was promised safe conduct by Kadar 
but was promptly kidnapped by a Soviet security unit upon leaving the 
Embassy, and interned in Rumania. Kadar had given assurances to 
Tito that he would not be tried. However, the renewed conflict between 
Moscow and Belgrade in early 1958 seemed to have sealed Nagy's fate. 
Brought back to Hungary he was secretly tried. On June 16, 1958, a 
governmental announcement revealed that the former Prime Minister, 
General Pal Maleter, and two of Nagy's advisers had been sentenced 
to death and that the sentences had already been carried out. 
There was no valid legal excuse for these condemnations: the adop-
tion of the multiparty system during the Revolution, the withdrawal 
from the Warsaw Pact—the chief points of accusation against Nagy— 
were no violations of Hungarian law and certainly not "high treason." 
Kadar himself as a member of the cabinet participated in and approved 
of these decisions. The Hungarian public and the non-Communist 
world considered these executions to be expressions of base revenge 
by Moscow; and Kadar was viewed as an accomplice. This event was 
correctly characterized by the United Nations Special Committee on 
Hungary as one "in which these men, symbols of the hope of a nation 
for freedom from foreign domination, were secretly sent to death in 
circumstances which call for full exposure, in violation of solemn 
undertakings that their persons would not be harmed." 5 
The last act of this period of terror was the forceful collectivization 
of Hungarian agriculture. During the Revolution more than half of the 
existing kolkhozes were disbanded. By late 1958 the regime decided to 
renew and fully implement the program of collectivization which even 
Rakosi's terrorism in the fifties had not achieved. 
The campaign to herd farmers into agricultural collectives began in 
February 1959. By January 1960 about 60 percent of the arable land was 
incorporated into the socialist sector. After a pause of several months, 
the drive was taken up again in the winter of 1960-61, and in February 
1961 the Communist Party announced the great victory: 90 percent 
of all cultivated land had been turned into collectives or had become 
state farmland. 
The methods to achieve this "victory" included various pressures, 
intimidation, and even physical coercion. Peasants eventually consented 
because they considered resistance to be hopeless. Now they also became 
a deeply frustrated and discontented segment of the population. 
By the middle of 1961 such a yawning gap existed between the people 
and their rulers, such as had not been seen since the imposition of Kadar 
on Hungary in 1956. But Party control had then been firmly reestab-
lished, the Party itself reorganized; and the last independent element, 
the land-owning peasantry, safely brought under control. This also 
must have been the view held in the Kremlin, where the fear of a recur-
rence of the 1956 events was never absent.6 
Goulash-Communism 
It can be safely accepted that, just as the period of repression was a 
carefully planned and methodically executed performance, so too the 
period of relaxation and liberalization—which extends to the present 
time—was also a systematically conceived and gradually introduced 
accomplishment. It must also be assumed that both policies were, if not 
initiated by Moscow, at least discussed with the leaders of the Kremlin 
and their approval obtained. While Khrushchev was in power, he per-
sonally supervised the various phases of these developments. 
Hungarian ideologues have subsequently revealed the main train of 
ideas which guided Kadar's repressive as well as liberal performances. 
In the past, Stalin and Rakosi had committed the same grave mistakes: 
they used excessive force when not required. In Hungary, grave distor-
tions in the political and economic system then ensued which, in turn, 
helped the counter-revolution to erupt. Thereafter, repression was neces-
sary, even if it meant a temporary absence of "democratic forms." But 
as soon as these methods were no longer needed, they had to be dis-
continued.7 
The change first became perceptible when in late 1961 Kadar pro-
nounced his since famous dictum before a meeting of the People's 
Patriotic Front: "Who is not against us is with us." This was an in-
tended reversal of what Matyas Rakosi had said in his time: "Who is 
not with us is against us." 
In March 1962 Kadar addressed workers of the Icarus truck plant 
and told them: 
We must bear in mind that different people, with different pasts and 
views live together with us in our people's system. . . . They don' t 
rise against us- and we only want to fight those who try to overthrow 
the people's power. . . . The people of this category—and they are the 
majori ty—are on our side. . . . But they are not Marxists. We must 
never forget that the trained Marxists are not in the majority.x 
And the directives for the Eighth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers' Party contained the following sentence: 
The Party invites those sectors of society which previously did 
not sympathize with it and even opposed its objectives to join in 
helping to build socialism. 
All these pronouncements heralded a new policy: an attempt at 
"peaceful coexistence" between the regime and "the silent majority" 
which it had to face. The terms were clear: the regime would desist from 
using undue coercion, indeed, it would use it only to defend its exist-
ence; in turn, the regime would expect its opponents to cooperate in 
helping to improve living conditions, to strengthen the economy of the 
country. Through these measures Kadar and his associates also hoped 
to popularize themselves, at least to the measure of the possible. 
Evidently these developments have taken place with the express con-
sent of the Soviet leadership. When Khrushchev visited Hungary for 
the last time before his ouster, he assured his worker audience it was 
erroneous to believe that revolution was the only matter of significance. 
Instead, "the important thing is that we should have more to eat— 
good goulash—schools, housing and ballet. . . ,"9 The de-emphasis of 
Marxism-Leninism, which is noticeable in these words, and the em-
phasis upon what has been nicknamed "goulash-communism" was 
turned into practice by Kadar's Hungarian regime. 
Implicitly it was now admitted that the class struggle had ended. As 
a sign of this, educational institutions were instructed not to discrimi-
nate against applicants on the basis of their class origin.10 This change 
was also recommended because academic standards had become di-
luted; many otherwise well-qualified students had been rejected due to 
their "defective" class origin or the stain of "counter-revolutionary" 
parentage. 
Kadar was also ready to make his peace with the intellectuals. In 
1959 the Writers' Association was allowed to function again, and slowly 
hitherto "silent" writers were induced to publish. Imprisoned writers 
were freed under a partial amnesty granted in March 1960. Censorship 
was also relaxed, the requirement for "party-mindedness" in literature, 
theatre, and art was reduced or often eliminated. 
With much fanfare and as a culmination of the trend toward appease-
ment, an amnesty decree of March 22, 1963, claimed to have freed all 
political prisoners. But the decree contained many reservations: those 
condemned for murder or arson—and many freedom fighters were 
condemned for such alleged crimes—and those sentenced for treason 
were exempted from the scope of the amnesty. Thus Cardinal Mind-
szenty could not just walk out of the American Embassy where he had 
been living since the entry of Soviet forces into Budapest in November 
1956. 
Relations between the Catholic Church and the Party remained 
strained until 1964, when an agreement between the Hungarian govern-
ment and the Vatican was reached concerning many vacant bishoprics. 
Vatican appointees to high church offices were recognized only when 
approved by the Hungarian state. Bishops were to take the oath of 
allegiance to the Constitution. In 1968, another agreement, besides 
settling further vacancies, granted greater liberty to the bishops in 
appointing parish priests. Thus, while the Church probably will always 
remain unhappy under this atheist regime, a limited modus vivendi 
may have been achieved. In September 1971, Cardinal Mindszenty, 
with Hungarian and papal consent, left Hungary, though still refusing 
to abdicate as Archbishop of Esztergom and Primate of Hungary.11 
Since the early 1960's the regime's concern has been directed toward 
the improvement of living conditions and the increase of production 
and stabilization of Hungary's international trade position. However, 
the planned economy, with its bureaucratic impediments, hemmed in 
any such development. It was of prime importance for the regime to 
create some modicum of material prosperity. Since no genuine freedom 
and free political expression could be provided, at least material bene-
fits might serve to satisfy the people. 
NEM and Democratization 
The New Economic Mechanism (NEM), introduced on January 1, 
1968, was to place the Hungarian economy on solid and rational 
footing. As experts have pointed out since the early 1960's, a planned 
economy, as applied to Hungary, compressed the productive forces 
into a rigid and bureaucratic Procrustean bed—instead of allowing 
them to pursue the life of living organisms. Economic targets were 
unrealistic, price levels artificial, and in no relation to the cost of pro-
duction, and productivity, for lack of incentives, was declining. 
Economic development was vital in order to comply with the promise 
of building socialism. The regime at last discovered that empty prom-
ises, self-praise, prospects of a remote prosperity, as well as ideological 
phraseology would never convince the masses. Frank exposure of 
problems and action in the right direction was expected. 
The NEM was to decentralize the economy by introducing the 
market-principle in relations between state enterprises and by encour-
aging "cost-consciousness." Enterprises were required to act autono-
mously, a method which should be pleasing to the individualistic 
Hungarians. 
It seems well substantiated that the reform was a success, but so far 
only a partial success. To become really operative the NEM needed a 
slow and gradual transition. The public had been warned that the full 
implementation of the program would require several five-year plans. 
And the NEM already has created some new problems of its own. 
However, no return to the command-economy was envisaged. 
The economic and social problems created by NEM were partly due 
to the deficient human element, unaccustomed to operating independ-
ently under the demand and supply method. The relative liberty caused 
managers to expand their investments excessively; the level of imports 
rose considerably, while exports stagnated. The incentive system—the 
differential in wages between various categories of workers—caused 
strained relations and discontent. Opponents of the reform—mostly 
old-time apparatchiki— accused it of fostering irresponsibility, adven-
turism, and a petit-bourgeois atmosphere.12 These accusations were 
also repeated across the Soviet press, giving rise to the suspicion that 
Moscow now looked upon this latest development of liberalization 
with a jaundiced eye.13 
It is true that many in Hungary hoped that the liberalization of the 
economy would be followed by a democratization in the area of politics. 
The few concessions the government was willing to offer (a limited 
choice of candidates at elections, insistence that democratization be 
restricted to the "local" level) were considered entirely insignificant. 
On the other hand, it is recognized that with the NEM certain interest 
groups have emerged (competition between enterprises is now con-
sidered legitimate) and thus a modicum of pluralism has been initiated. 
However, it is being realized that all these improvements are con-
cessions by the leadership and not irremovable elements of the social 
or economic structure. Moreover, the Kadar regime could not eliminate 
the malaise felt in respect to the lack of national independence, the 
tutelage exercised by the Soviet Union, which remains a noli me tangere 
of the government. The Hungarian public appeared to be little im-
pressed by the achievements of its government in the international 
field, the ending of the country's isolation after the Revolution. Since 
1956, with the help of some insignificant concessions, Kadar managed 
to restore Hungary's status in the United Nations and to reestablish 
full diplomatic relations with the United States. The international repu-
tation of the country has also gained because of the well-advertised 
liberalization as well as the apparent stability of the leadership. 
Kadar and His Fellow Leaders 
Since Ulbricht's departure from top leadership, Kadar has been the 
senior leader in the Soviet camp (Zhivkov, although First Secretary of 
the Bulgarian Party since 1954, became national leader only after 
Chervenkov's ouster in 1962). Not unlike other countries of the Soviet 
sphere, prior to November 1956, Hungary was led by Muscovites— 
leaders who had spent many years in the USSR before returning to 
their country of origin in the wake of the Red Army. In contrast, Kadar 
and his fellow top leaders, except Antal Apro, are "home" Communists 
who never spent any considerable time in the Soviet Union. 
Only two of the present Politburo members participated in the con-
spiratorial act of Uzhgorod: Kadar and Apro. Others who were there 
have either died or been discarded for reasons of incompatibility or 
incompetence. But six others joined the Kadar clique immediately after 
the suppression of the Revolution, when the situation was still highly 
critical: Biszku, Feher, Fock, Kallai, Nyers, and Nemes. The remainder 
of the twelve Politburo members were later co-opted. The majority of 
its members consist of the earliest acolytes of Kadar, a group held 
together by the memory of their bold decision to serve as a regime 
tainted with the stigma of being Soviet stooges. It is this past trial-and-
adventure period which has created a cohesiveness among the members 
of the leadership group, a spirit which helped to assimilate the later 
comers to comradeship. The cement of the original risk-taking also 
kept the group loyal to its erstwhile leader. This is the reason why the 
leadership in Hungary more closely approximates the ideal of collective 
leadership than in any other Communist country. Apprehension of yet 
another collapse, unsavory memories of past dissensions, the odious 
example of Rakosi's rule, and also a never-admitted bad conscience at 
obviously having been installed by a foreign military power—are all 
factors stimulating leadership coherence. 
Kadar determinedly has pursued a centrist policy, waging a two-front 
struggle both against dogmatists on the one hand and revisionists on 
the other. This has also served the purpose of persuading the public that 
there will be no return to Stalinism, but also to warn them that no 
repetition of 1956 will be tolerated. 
Kadar is not a tyrannic leader, neither is he really charismatic or a 
spellbinder. He is a strange mixture of mediocrity and astute realism. 
But first and foremost, he is an opportunist. Evidently he attempted to 
whitewash his sullied past, which includes the treachery he committed 
against his friend and collaborator, Laszlo Rajk, and the slaughter of 
Imre Nagy. The rehabilitation of his image before the masses and 
abroad has been systematically pursued. Many of the non-Party elite 
who were placed in secure and comfortable positions under his regime 
are among his best advertisers. Thus, it is emphasized that he was one 
of the victims of the "cult of personality," that he saved the country 
from Horthyist reactionaries in 1956, that he was absent when Imre 
Nagy was executed. It is also said that he was anxious to mediate 
between Dubcek and Moscow and suffered a nervous breakdown when 
Czechoslovakia was invaded in 1968. 
The surprising metamorphoses of his career developed his chameleon-
like qualities. He can speak in one fashion and act in another. He pre-
tends to oppose something while he is really in favor of it. He is, of 
course, prorSoviet, but lets it be hinted that he disfavors excessive 
Soviet control. He is a Marxist but he also supports the market principle. 
There is no need—he declares—for an opposition because he also 
represents the opposition. 
Kadar, unlike Rakosi, is no sadist; he is more a skillful operator than 
a supreme politician—shrewd in tactics but weak on principles. But he 
does pretend to know the limits of Soviet permissiveness. Since the 
departure of his mentor, Khrushchev, he has apparently become accept-
able to Brezhnev. Moscow considers him firmly established and reliable. 
The Hungarian leader has managed to surround himself with persons 
who were neither outstanding as politicians nor overly ambitious. No 
one who could have been his rival has survived in office. His fellow 
leaders are mostly good bureaucrats or specialists in their fields. But he 
is also assisted by a non-Party managerial-technocratic elite. The for-
mer and the latter are to a great measure apolitical in the sense that they 
could not care less about Marxist-Leninist ideology, while possibly 
paying some lip-service to its tenets. Among these non-Party experts 
are also publicists and journalists, whose job includes travel abroad 
and meeting foreign visitors. They also contribute to create a halo of 
high-mindedness and brilliant statesmanship around the head of Kadar. 
Prisoners of their opportunism, their career is inescapably linked with 
the success or failure of the regime. 
Balance Sheet and Prospects 
Those who have witnessed the few successful days of the Revolution 
of 1956 must have been amazed by the spirit of unity which swept over 
non-Communists and Communists alike, except for a tiny minority of 
compromised individuals. When Kadar took over, the prime obstacle 
was this very same national unity which confronted him. On June 29, 
1957, at the constituent Party Conference, he admitted that: 
. . . we had to make serious efforts to destroy the national un i ty . . . . 
Why did we have to destroy this national unity? Because it was born 
on a reactionary platform. . . . We do not want this kind of unity.14 
Evidently his goal was to create another kind of national unity, one that 
would support him, the Communist cause, and accept Soviet para-
mountcy. Has he succeeded? 
No doubt he has travelled a long way from 1956. Although he was 
not able to destroy the resistance he faced, he at least neutralized it, 
thereby fragmenting the national unity and creating different segments 
of attitudes toward his administration. 
Naturally, it is impossible reliably to assess present political attitudes 
in Hungary, based on opinion polls or voting patterns. Empirical evalu-
ation must rely on diverse and often highly imprecise symptoms: inter-
views with Hungarians abroad, impressions of visitors to Hungary, 
pronouncements in the Hungarian press or by public figures—often to 
be read between the lines. 
Thus, it would be hazardous to guess percentage-wise the number of 
those politically articulate adults who wholeheartedly support the re-
gime. Wholeheartedly would mean in this context that the persons in 
question would do so without qualification and would be ready to 
make meaningful sacrifices in its defense. Surely, only a fraction of 
Party njembers would be willing to do so. On the other hand, a great 
many people would be afraid of any change and therefore favor the 
status quo. Historic experience suggests that in autocratically-ruled 
countries most people would be willing to take sides against the regime 
only if they saw a reasonable opportunity for action of this sort. And 
then there is the great number of opportunists who would change color 
and join any bandwagon moving toward apparent success. Since there 
is now no prospect for any successful political change, such potential 
attitudes cannot be tested. Seemingly, those supporting the regime are 
more visible, appear more numerous than they really are. 
It is certainly due to the skillful operations of the Kadar regime and 
its doubtless achievements in many sectors that the average man-in-the-
street will conclude that this is the best Communist regime which can 
be expected. Many of these individuals would base their judgment on 
their experience with the odious Stalinist period under Rakosi. Resig-
nation to what cannot be altered, fatalism to the inevitable, and a 
striving "to be realistic" also play a role here. Many console themselves 
with the thought that the Revolution has not been in vain, that the 
improvements under Kadar are due to the developments of 1956. 
Others again would consider the uprising a tragic, hopeless mistake, a 
manifestation of a lack of realistic thinking which has to be avoided 
in the future. 
It is the view of this writer that the largest segment of the politically 
conscious public would be found in the above, neither white nor black, 
but gray majority. This segment neither favors the regime nor is it ready 
to oppose it. They cooperate where it is inevitable to cooperate and 
where it is in their personal interest to do so. But ideologically they are 
indifferent or rather opposed to Marxism-Leninism. They may yearn 
for some ideal form of Socialism and be cognizant of its absence in 
Hungary, and they may therefore even call themselves socialists. So 
they have an excuse for participating in the building of Socialism while 
it is not their Socialism. 
The number of determined and all-out opponents of the regime 
(speaking of sentiment only because open opposition is hardly per-
ceptible) is certainly reduced to relatively small numbers, but repre-
sented not only by the segment of older people. This is certainly an 
achievement of the regime. On the other hand, Kadar did not succeed 
in converting the overwhelming masses of Hungarians into a body 
committed to building Soviet Socialism. There are complaints—and 
not only in Moscow—that these masses display petit-bourgeois atti-
tudes, that a "considerable stratum" of the population is politically 
apathetic. 
The weakest point of Kadar's political structure is the evident lack 
of national independence. In vain does the regime try to explain that it 
just happens that "the country's policy corresponds to that of the 
USSR," and that it is therefore unjustifiable to call Hungary a satellite 
of the Soviet Union.15 No sensible person would pretend that it was 
Hungary's national interest to sever diplomatic ties with Israel in 1967, 
or that Hungary has an interest in condemning Communist China, or 
that Budapest had a stake in the victory of the Vietcong. The average 
Hungarian feels attracted to the West and therefore is disappointed 
and envious to observe that President Nixon visited Yugoslavia, Poland, 
and—of all countries—neighboring Rumania, while carefully avoiding 
Hungary, as did General de Gaulle. While Kadar is trying and succeeds 
in satisfying at least some of the material needs of the people, in the 
field of foreign policy he cannot but obey Moscow's commands. 
Thus, nationalist feeling—and in many respects the younger gener-
ation is more nationalist than their elders—cannot endorse Kadar's 
policies. While the legitimacy of his rule is thus questioned, so long as 
the regime pursues a reasonable domestic policy, no violent upsurge 
may be expected.16 And Kadar is very careful not to commit any major 
mistakes. As Hungarian officials have remarked, Budapest is unlikely 
to make the blunder of raising food prices before Christmas, as Gomulka 
did in 1970, in an act which led to his dismissal. 
Kadar is now 64 years old and may be in office for a long time. 
Rumors about his health are not substantiated; he may suffer the 
fatigue of office and may leave more and more matters to his business-
like, pragmatic associates, who will also do their best to avoid making 
mistakes. Should he for any reason depart from his leadership post, 
the most likely successor is Bela Biszku. In such event, the collective 
character of the leadership will become even more prominent. Biszku 
does not possess even the factitious charisma which Kadar contrived 
to assemble over the years. He is nine years younger than Kadar and 
may extend the years of the Kadar regime for another decade. 
Over the past twenty years Hungary, the enfant terrible of the Soviet 
bloc in 1956, has grown into an orderly member of the Soviet-led group 
of East European countries, especially from the point of view of the 
Kremlin. Both severe repression and, in turn, gradual relaxation and 
liberalization have worked to keep her "orderly." Save for major blun-
ders by her leaders, enticing precedents in other Communist countries 
of the area, a possible but still unlikely change in Mother Russia, or a 
radical upheaval in the global balance of power, the present type of 
regime, with or without Kadar, is likely to continue. But the above-
mentioned "ifs" are numerous and not merely hypothetical. As some 
precedents have shown, the "character of unexpectedness" is unques-
tionably not alien to that part of the world. 
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The Soviet intervention in the 1956 revolution led to a repressive 
political era under the Kadar regime. However, following the consoli-
dation of the country and the collectivization of agriculture, a political 
thaw began in the late sixties leading to far-reaching economic reforms 
in 1968.' In conjunction with the new economic policy, a series of gov-
ernmental measures lessened political tensions without introducing 
basic institutional changes. Despite the impressive achievements of the 
reforms, negative political and social consequences surfaced on a large 
scale in the early seventies. Decentralized planning and the increasingly 
profit-oriented economy resulted in intensified group conflicts and in 
a weakening of the Hungarian Socialist Worker Party's (MSZMP) 
power.2 
The erosion of the party's position was noted by Western observers,3 
and also became the concern of the party leadership. After long hesi-
tation, the party's Central Committee revised the reforms in March 
1974. Broad objectives became gradually specified and propagandized, 
culminating at the Eleventh Party Congress in 1975.4 This was followed 
by a series of party and government measures implementing the new 
policy. 
This study will assess the scope and meaning of the changing political 
trend and its impact upon Hungarian society. Particular emphasis will 
be given to the economic institutions which are in the focus of re-
centralization. The research is partly based upon personal observations 
and interviews conducted by the author in Budapest in 1975. 
The New Centralization and the Party 
The NEM had reduced the range of central planning and transferred 
power to the enterprise directors and administrators of local councils. 
Decentralization resulted in a loss of power for the higher political 
organs, which had not been anticipated at the inception of the reforms.5 
The party and government had growing difficulties in effectively trans-
ferring decisions to the lower administrative levels, and the party re-
sponded but slowly to the cross-pressures for economic modernization 
coupled with political liberalization and the need to preserve its political 
power. 
The manifest thrust of the new orientation centered around four 
major points: 1) strengthening the party's position throughout the 
entire society; 2) intensifying the ideological pressure against anti-
Marxist views; 3) reasserting the political status of the worker-class; 
and 4) preserving the essence of the NEM, coupled with adjustment 
to the changing economic climate.6 Both the strengthening of the party 
and economic policy revision were to be effected through the para-
doxical formula of "increased centralization combined with decentrali-
zation." However, the party proceeded cautiously: the theoretical 
framework of the revision would be "change within the continuum." 
First Secretary Janos Kadar offered assurances repeatedly that the 
main line of past policy had been successful and would be retained with 
some modification.7 
At the Eleventh Congress ideological questions were stressed with 
renewed fervor. The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat was 
upheld by the party, which planned to reinforce its own position and 
improve central decision-making in the government. It was acknowl-
edged that an erosion in the interest toward socialist principles existed 
and that considerable inroads had been made by "small bourgeoisie" 
and "bourgeois" ideas in society at large as well as in the party. Al-
though similar observations had been made repeatedly since 1968, it 
appeared now that the party intended to take this problem more 
seriously. The various regulatory measures undertaken since 1974 and 
the proceedings of the Congress indicate that the Political Bureau 
feared lest "anti-social' views become too deeply entrenched and the 
pursuit of private interests become a permanent behavior-pattern. 
Therefore, while denying foreign allegations regarding the hardening 
of its policy, the MSZMP vowed to combat these deficiencies and 
champion strict adherence to Marxism-Leninism.8 Through the bal-
anced policy of continuing the reforms with adjustments, the political 
leadership hoped that the negative effects of the NEM era would be 
subdued and socialist democracy improved. 
To carry out the new program the principle of democratic centralism 
was stressed anew and the party undertook some reorganization.9 The 
regrouping of the leading functionaries had begun in 1974 and con-
tinued throughout the Eleventh Congress, culminating in the replace-
ment of Jeno Fock with Gyorgy Lazar as premier.10 The removal of 
Rezso Nyers and Lajos Feher, chief architects of the NEM, from the 
Politbureau and the cabinet heralded serious changes in economic 
policy. They and other replaced functionaries were for the most part 
educated experts with a slightly cosmopolitan flavor, whereas the new 
leaders had stronger worker-class and party ties, and were more con-
servative but not hard-line politicians. Fock himself was committed to 
the NEM and thus had growing conflicts with the Soviet leaders over 
COMECON11 policies. His successor, Lazar, an economic expert, is a 
political moderate who is in good standing with the Russians.12 The 
appointment of Gyorgy Aczel as deputy premier secured the continu-
ation of cultural policy, but Valeria Benke, editor-in-chief of Tarsa-
dalmi Szemle, the party's theoretical journal, represents a more rigid 
line in the Politbureau.13 The post of first secretary remained firmly 
lodged with the central authority in the party, Kadar, who retains good 
relations with the Soviet Union and also enjoys moderate popularity in 
the country.14 These changes represented a shift from the right-of-center 
to the center and left-of-center in the Hungarian political spectrum and 
have strengthened the influence of the group which has been increas-
ingly critical of the party's direction in the early seventies. 
In the party apparatus, bureaucratic tendencies, sluggishness, and the 
passivity of the rank and file membership were hindering the party 
organizations' effectiveness. These phenomena were not new in party 
history but they became more serious under the NEM. In its report to 
the Eleventh Congress the Central Control Committee stressed that 
nepotism, lack of interest in defending party policy, violations of 
socialist property, and greediness occurred relatively frequently in the 
membership, including among the higher functionaries.15 To improve 
the situation, the Central Committee ordered a membership review in 
1976 to increase the activism of the organizations and "to carry out the 
new tasks of centralization." 
In preparation for the new political objectives the party's entire 
leadership was forced to stand for re-elections. Political dedication and 
worker-class origin became the two most important criteria of qualifi-
cation.16 About one-half of the leaders were newly elected and worker 
representation increased from 28 percent to 37.5 percent.17 It should be 
noted, however, that the political impact of these elections was not very 
significant. Though the party undertook a moderate reorganization, 
the success of its efforts is uncertain. There are indications that despite 
the party's more vigorous self-assertion there is still no enthusiastic 
rank and file participation and the atmosphere remains sullen. 
The Changing Role of Some Government Institutions 
Effective central direction and coordination between party and gov-
ernment agencies received high priority in Eleventh Congress delibera-
tions. These objectives were promoted by changing the Central Com-
mittee Secretariat infrastructure which now includes new departments 
for economic policy, and for industrial, agricultural, and transportation 
affairs.18 
In 1975, the National Assembly passed a constitutional amendment 
that synchronized some party and government functions. The gist of 
the reform was that the term of parliamentary and council representa-
tives would be five years (replacing the four-year cycles), and future 
elections would coincide with five-year plan and party congress sched-
ules. The new arrangement aimed at more convenient coordination of 
party policies, economic planning, and administrative functions. How-
ever, the change was more formal than substantial. 
The 1975 National Assembly elections did not depart significantly 
from the 1971 procedures. No change occurred in the election laws and 
all candidates represented the MSZMP platform. The social and politi-
cal composition of the representatives does show, however, that the 
relative weight of the party increased, because the percentage of higher 
party officials rose in comparison with 1971.19 Given the Assembly's 
limited role in the legislative process, the change was more symbolic 
than real. 
One of the disturbing bureaucratic symptoms in the government 
machinery under the NEM was "double distortion." Frequently, high-
level directives became distorted in the process of transmission to the 
middle and lower administration levels and additional mutations oc-
curred in their implementation. This is a chronic problem of most East 
European Bloc administrations, but the problem became even more 
unmanageable under the NEM in Hungary. To cope with this problem, 
the enlarged role of central authority was now being stressed, coupled 
with promises to preserve local autonomy. 
The leading role of the party was aggressively proclaimed at the 
Eleventh Congress, which resolved to exercise it more vigorously on the 
lower administration levels for better coordination between central and 
local organs. A projected increase of worker-cadre participation in 
higher administrative and managerial posts also would serve this pur-
pose. It is noteworthy that the concept of "worker-cadre" now incor-
porated the educated offspring of industrial and agricultural workers; 
since 1974 there has been a slow trend toward their more intensive 
employment in higher positions. The more demanding political require-
ments for such appointments are anticipated to tighten the party's grip 
upon the government agencies. This is a reversal of the dominant trend 
under the NEM, when expertise became a competitive requirement 
along with political reliability, but it should be noted that most techno-
crats today are also products of the party. 
Recently, the key function of the Council of Ministers has become 
the focus of political attention, together with the problems of the local 
councils,20 in which the party's supervisory authority has been re-
emphasized and local organs urged to correct erroneous administrative 
decisions. Much has been written and spoken about these questions and 
the constant preoccupation of the press with the same phenomena cor-
roborates the direct observation that these problems still persist. 
Centralization Tendencies in the Economy 
Concern with the harmful impact of the NEM upon society was not 
the party's sole reason for revising economic policy. The turbulent 
international economic climate also contributed to the pressures for 
change. The effects of the Arab oil embargo in 1972 and the repeated oil 
price increases by the OPEC countries imposed a severe strain upon the 
industrial democracies, and the Soviet Bloc could not completely avoid 
its consequences. Inflationary pressures affected foreign trade between 
the COMECON countries and the West adversely, and heavy govern-
ment import subsidies as well as the increased energy prices demanded 
by the Soviet Union21 created economic dislocations in Hungary which 
made a revision of the NEM mandatory. 
The revision of the NEM has affected primarily four areas: planning, 
premiums, prices, and productivity. These aspects of the economy had 
been significantly changed by the NEM and were also influenced by the 
recentralization trend. Party and govenment officials frequently claimed 
that the "main line of the NEM" would remain intact and only necessary 
adjustments were to be introduced; yet there was a noticeable lack of 
reinforcement of the NEM. The "dogmatic interpretations" of economic 
policy were criticized and it was suggested that Hungary should capitalize 
upon the experiences of other socialist countries whose economic or-
ganization was different but whose achievements equalled or surpassed 
Hungary's.22 
The need for centralization was stressed, but it seemed to be a Janus-
faced policy also favoring decentralized decision-making; however, the 
Eleventh Congress assumed an unequivocal position in favor of more 
controlled planning. This became necessary because in recent years 
domestic reasons, combined with foreign market conditions, had re-
sulted in an increasing budget deficit. The strengthened central planning 
also aimed at curbing consumer interests, which no longer could be 
satisfied on a scale known after 1968.23 The primacy of political over 
economic considerations and the priority of socialist property were 
focused upon, while private interests and profits were brought under 
tighter control, including the use of administrative methods. Numerous 
measures were introduced to secure these principles, e.g., a revision of 
the premium-distribution system, greater control of land-sales and 
property, and increasing taxation in the private sector. 
As the pendulum swings toward higher-level decision-making, the 
party tries to maintain a balance between advocates of extreme cen-
tralization of the Rakosi-model and revisionists favoring extensive 
decentralization. The new system of regulators distinguishes between 
economic sectors which need centralized (macro) planning and those 
which need autonomous decision-making (micro-planning).24 The im-
pact of the new control mechanism and the primacy of social over indi-
vidual and group interests reaches beyond the governmental adminis-
tration and reinforces the party's position in economic operations, 
including the enterprise-level. More stringent political requirements 
for managerial positions represent an important phase of this trend.25 
The creation of the State Planning Committee and the strengthened 
ministerial control of production units contribute to the expanded role 
of the government. Enlarged authority is wielded by the system of 
branch-direction which entails the coordination of different enterprises 
related to each other through production profiles. It is exercised on the 
ministerial level as a broad power to control enterprises at the expense 
of their own authority.26 New rules prescribe the preparation of opera-
tional plans which the enterprises must submit for approval to the 
supervisory ministry. This is a detailed blueprint regarding plan-imple-
mentation and it is one more bureaucratic control over enterprise 
autonomy. 
Some aspects of the new policy antedated 1974. A special status for 
forty-nine large industrial enterprises had been established by govern-
ment decrees in 1973. These exempted units operated under a more 
controlled regime and in many respects were not subject to the general 
economic regulators. Statistical data indicate the key position of these 
enterprises: they contributed 49.2 percent to Hungary's gross industrial 
production with only 38.9 percent of the labor force and represented 
47.4 percent of the nation's total industrial profit.27 Under the revised 
economic regulators their control was to be extended.28 
Centralizing measures were introduced recently in other areas also; 
e.g., in the coal mining and electrical energy industry, in construction, 
and in various other sectors where measures were introduced against 
excessive profits. The new policy pledged no return to the exclusive 
administrative direction of the economy, but there was to be a departure 
from the "pure" (i.e., automatic) economic regulators and enterprise 
autonomy without completely abandoning the latter. The success of the 
new blend remains to be seen; however, if past experiences with Soviet 
Bloc economies are any indication, increasing bureaucratization will 
yield only limited results in some sectors, and the overall performance 
of the economy will suffer.29 
The Revision of the Economic Regulators 
While the economic mechanism, the system of the direction of pro-
duction, has been retained formally, its content has been substantially 
altered for the New Five-Year Plan,30 which is based on a more retarded 
economic growth. In the past twenty-five years, the average national 
income growth rate had been 5.7 percent; between 1966-70, 6.8 percent; 
and in 1971-73, 6.1 percent, which is a relatively high yield. In the 1960-
73 period Hungarian growth exceeded the GDR's and Czechoslovakia's 
by one percent but fell by one percent below the USSR's and Poland's.31 
However, because of the contraction of Hungary's labor force and ex-
ternal economic conditions, this trend cannot be continued in the long 
run. Future improvement in national income must be achieved through 
better economic organization, more automation, increased productiv-
ity, and stable conditions in both the socialist and Western economies. 
For the new plan period the projected minimum growth rate is to be 5.5 
percent, which is considerably below the past trend, and the maximum 
is to be 6 percent, depending on the success of corrective measures in 
the economy. 
A. The Regulation of Enterprise Income 
Changing domestic and international circumstances have made it 
imperative that the allocation of national income between consumption 
and capital accumulation be altered more. Stricter conditions have 
been set for the enterprises by the central planning organs to increase 
the income ratio flowing directly into the national treasury. The accel-
erated income concentration was also made necessary because in com-
parison with the early seventies, the proportion of centralized income 
had declined (in 1971 it was 75 percent, in 1975 only 64 percent), while 
the ratio of decentralized (enterprise-level) income had grown. This 
trend could not be continued without endangering national long-term 
plans, and the modifications were expected to raise centralized income 
by 4-5 percent to about 70 percent again. The rechannelling of income 
was arranged through various new regulations: enterprises would have 
to pay 35 percent instead of 25 percent social insurance contributions 
and wage-taxes.32 This measure was to stimulate productivity through 
automation and to discourage the use of manpower in a labor-short 
economy. The new system, combined with new prices, was expected to 
reduce enterprise-income by 20 percent and an additional production-
tax would further lower it by 15 percent. Thus, the income-level reduc-
tion on the average would be around 35 percent, with certain fluctuations 
permitted in different sectors of the economy.33 Up to this point, the 
system of regulators has remained constant, but its changing content 
will have a significant influence on the price-structure and the cost-
factors as well as on the ratio of centralized income. 
B. The New System of Profit Taxation and Enterprise Funds 
Generally the new income regulators have favored the large enter-
prises which are under stronger control. The most important innovation 
for the new Five Year Plan commencing in 1976 was that the mandatory 
distribution of the profit prior to taxation, introduced under the NEM, 
was terminated. The enterprises, after fulfilling their fiscal obligations 
according to strict priorities, might autonomously decide the disposition 
of their profit between development and premium funds.34 It should be 
noted here that as the additional regulation clearly shows, high-level 
discretionary decisions have increased dramatically and party claims 
that enterprise autonomy is unchanged are unrealistic. 
After the payment of the unchanged 6 percent contribution to the 
administration of local councils, the remaining profit was to be sub-
jected to a 36 percent general profit tax, and 15 percent of the taxed 
profits would have to be deposited into the reservefund. The fund must 
be increased until it reached the combined sum of 8 percent of all wages 
plus 2 percent of the gross value of fixed assets, and the repayment of 
"borrowed" funds must be completed within five years. This was a more 
flexible principle than the past one.35 
After formulating the reserve fund, the next important step was to 
earmark the development fund for financing investment loans and 
debts obtained from banks and enterprises, and direct financing of new 
capital investments. The size of this fund would depend upon the needs 
and discretionary decisions of the enterprise; therefore it could be re-
garded as an unknown factor in the distribution of enterprise income.36 
There was bound to emerge a more diversified pattern depending on the 
competitiveness and efficiency of various enterprises, and the fund was 
expected to be a stimulant in raising productivity. 
The remaining enterprise profit might be used for creating the par-
ticipation fund, to be used for supplementing personal income and dis-
tributing premiums and bonuses. However, steep progressive tax was 
imposed on this allocation; therefore a close relationship would exist 
between the development and participation funds. No tax would be 
levied if the fund remained below 2 percent of the wages disbursed in 
the enterprise; between 2 and 4 percent of the wages the tax would be 
200 percent, and above that it would increase by 100 percent per each 2 
percent. If the participation fund exceeded 14 percent, the tax would 
jump to 800 percent, a severe punitive measure for supplementary wage 
increase.37 The majority of enterprises were expected to utilize a partici-
pation fund equal to a minimum of 4-6 percent of the total wages basis; 
only a few would employ 14 percent or more. Generally, the typical 
participation fund would fluctuate between 7-10 percent, lower than 
the 11 percent under the NEM.38 
Determining the correct proportion of the participation fund is of 
major importance and hence the director would have to rely upon the 
advice of the unions; yet he would be solely responsible for making the 
decisions. This arrangement underscored the extremely weak position 
of the unions in the Hungarian socialist economy. It is true that the new 
regulation expanded the autonomy of the enterprises in this area some-
what but the operation transpired in a tightly constricted financial 
frame. In general, profit distribution for premiums would be reduced 
and differences between enterprises cushioned. This contrasted sharply 
with the situation under the NEM and was bound to result in a socially 
more defensible, even income pattern, but it might also reduce incen-
tives for profits and productivity. 
The financing of larger capital investments became subject to special 
rules, which supplemented the regulation of development funds. Under 
the new system the individual investment projects and larger reinvest-
ments financed from government loans would have to be repaid by the 
enterprise, whereas previously repayment depended on its financial 
capacity.39 The volume of centrally determined investments would 
increase from 46 percent to 53 percent, and investment funds under 
enterprise autonomy would be reduced. Enterprises, on the average, 
would have to repay treasury loans within a maximum of ten years of 
the start of their new operations; the repayment with interest would 
have to be made from gross income prior to the payment of the general 
profit tax. These strict rules for loan repayment might stimulate heavier 
reliance on the development funds for at least the partial financing of 
these projects.40 
In order to permit limited flexibility in the more rigid income regu-
lation, the new measures allowed some deviation from the generally 
applied principles. It would be impossible to survey these detailed regu-
lations in this study, but due to their importance it should be noted that 
in the agricultural cooperatives individual income taxes were replaced 
by taxes based on the unit's gross income. Other aspects of the taxation 
and the system of investment-support in the agriculture have remained 
unchanged.41 
These special regimes reflected the principle that differentiation under 
the new system would occur on the branch and not the enterprise level, 
an important aspect of the new centralization. The directive organs 
would have more power to apply the regulators flexibly according to 
need. The party and government claimed that a better combination 
would exist between central direction and enterprise autonomy, but it 
appears that the former continues to dominate the latter, and informa-
tion from Hungary corroborates this viewpoint. 
C. The Regulation of the Wage System 
The MSZMP has always recognized that in this historical phase dif-
ferences in wages under socialism are necessary. However, the party 
has reversed its position in one important aspect: whereas under the 
NEM substantial personal income differences were defended against 
egalitarian aspirations, today it is admitted that income differences had 
reached an undesirable level, and Marxism-Leninism dictates that these 
inequalities should not be socially antagonistic. Therefore, the party 
now presses for the softening of differences in general, but in some 
sectors continuing wage differentiation is held to be desirable. The 
balance between wage levels in industry and agriculture remains un-
changed, but excessive incomes are being trimmed down among mem-
bers of the intelligentsia, managers, and the private sector. In these 
groups unacceptable incomes must be reduced even by administrative 
methods if need be, thus bringing about a socially more equitable in-
come distribution.42 
The ratio between the highest and lowest incomes under the NEM 
was nine to one, and the new policy aims at reducing this ratio in order 
to conform with Marxist-Leninist principles.43 The new regulation is 
also geared toward improved productivity but it is uncertain whether it 
will succeed. The former wage system was nearly uniform and it was 
primarily based on enterprise profits (in 90 percent of enterprises); how-
ever, it was applied under varied conditions and this created unaccept-
able distortions. The new modified rules have introduced four modes of 
wage regulation: the relative wage level and wage volume (depending 
on production), and the centrally determined wage level and wage 
volume (regardless of production). The classification of enterprises is 
determined by the Ministry of Labor in accord with the branch minis-
tries and the National Planning Office. 
The relative forms are applicable in those enterprises (in about two-
thirds) in which incentives may boost production; the centrally deter-
mined forms are found in enterprises where labor saving can be achieved 
through reduction of personnel (in about one-third). The wage volume 
categories (both relative and central) have been substantially broadened 
compared with the past. Generally, centralized decisions have replaced, 
to a large extent, the automatic wage regulation system. In 1976, a 
portion of the wage increases (1.5 percent) does not hinge upon effi-
ciency, but increases in wage funds above 6 percent are subject to pro-
gressive taxation and/or requirements for reserve-formulation. In the 
relative wage categories the tax rate is 150 percent if the wage fund 
exceeds 4 percent. These measures are designed to reduce "economically 
and socially unjust" differences between enterprises, and the steeply 
graduated taxation will restrain the use of participation funds for in-
creased wages. I n the centrally determined categories the wage increases 
(in wage levels and/or wage volumes) are decided by the Plan (in 1976 
it is 4.5 percent), and the enterprise management can utilize the funds 
irrespective of the productivity indicators. It has authority to introduce 
some increases if profits permit, but they are also subject to progressive 
taxes.44 These categories are expected to stimulate personnel reduction 
and to bolster productivity; both objectives are targets of the economic 
revision. 
For the new Five-Year Plan period, 14-16 percent real wage increases 
and 18 20 percent "real income" increases have been slated—a slower 
growth than under the NEM.45 With the 4.5 percent consumer price 
increase for 1976 and the combined nation-wide real wage (1.5 percent) 
real income (3 percent) increases of equally 4.5 percent, if the average 
wage increases on the enterprise level would be about 6 percent, the 
result will be a projected 1.5 percent rise in living standards. This is 
below the average 2-3.5 percent rise of the NEM years, a considerable 
decline of the recent growth rate.46 The smaller income increase also 
justifies the wage policy aimed at leveling off the income differences, 
thus departing from the NEM principles. 
D. Prices 
The NEM had introduced a three-pronged price mechanism; govern-
ment-regulated prices (45 percent of total); prices limited by guidelines 
(30 percent); and free prices (25 percent).47 This system has not been 
changed but it has been tightened recently. In 1974, the price index rose 
by 17 percent in the Western world, which set in motion a steep price 
increase in the COMECON countries as well. In Hungary, there was an 
average increase of 25 percent in heating materials (coal, wood, butane 
gas, etc.) and a 40-50 percent rise in oil and gasoline in September, 1974. 
A series of other price increases followed in 1974 and 1975, reaching 50 
percent in some categories, e.g., in certain construction materials and 
sugar.48 A minor wage adjustment averaging 50 forints accompanied 
these measures, which was far from upsetting the inflationary impact 
on real wages despite official claims to the contrary. 
The world inflation impelled the government to support export-
import prices. The raising of prices removed the need for price supports, 
and the projected increases for 1976 reflected this objective. The planned 
producer price increase was to be 6.4 percent and the consumer price 
increase 4.5 percent. Forestalling a possible chain reaction of regulated 
upon free prices, a temporary freeze has been imposed upon the latter, 
effective in the first part of 1976. 
E. Productivity and Enterprise Democracy 
The revision of economic regulators also aimed at increasing produc-
tivity. Although living standards and total output had improved under 
the NEM, productivity did not fare as well. Recent statistics indicate 
improvement, but their reliability is somewhat questionable. In the 
January-August 1975 period, employment in industry had decreased 
by 0.2 percent, while production has grown by 5.5 percent, "due exclu-
sively to the 5.7 percent increase in per capita production." However, 
the gain looks modest in a long-range perspective; the total number of 
workers employed in the socialist sector had grown by 10 percent 
between 1967 and 1972, while all other employee categories had ex-
panded by 26 percent.49 Since the population growth has been very low 
since 1956, leading to labor shortages, higher productivity could be 
achieved only through progress in technology and efficiency. This is not 
easily accomplished because 25 percent of the total industrial labor 
force consists of unskilled workers (segedmunkas), who are still moving 
material manually, an outstanding example of labor waste.50 The new 
system of regulators discourages reliance upon manpower and stimu-
lates efficiency through taxation and wage-fund restrictions instead. 
Additional aggressive measures were taken in 1976 by imposing a com-
plete freeze on the hiring of administrative personnel and by new 
restrictions on second jobs.51 
To cushion the anticipated unpopularity of the new measures, the 
party has propagated the concept of "enterprise democracy," purport-
edly to invite more worker input in management decisions. The Eleventh 
Congress observed that previous experience with enterprise democracy 
had not been satisfactory and improvements were necessary to mobilize 
the workers' participation. However, this would be permitted only 
through "the strengthening of the party organs" and by the workers' 
presence in the managerial committees and would remain—as it has 
always been—purely consultative. Hungary therefore is not considering 
participation by worker councils on the Yugoslav model.52 There is 
essentially nothing new in the recent proposals other than the involve-
ment of worker-representatives in extra meetings through union channels. 
F. Foreign Trade Relations 
A review of new trends would not be complete without a brief glance 
at the external aspects of the Hungarian economy. Direct and indirect 
links exist between re-centralization and foreign trade and, apparently, 
no major shifts are planned in this area at the present time. The 
COMECON is expanding its activities, including long-range plan co-
ordination and production specialization assigned to member states. 
In the 1976-1980 period of the various five-year plans, the COMECON 
integration will expand especially in the machine building and energy 
industry, including atomic energy production, and Hungary will fully 
participate in these efforts.53 The total trade volume among member 
states is projected to increase by 50 percent between 1976 and 1980; yet 
Hungary also plans to expand its economic ties with the West. Total 
Hungarian foreign trade is expected to grow by 45-50 percent during 
the plan period. COMECON trade will be increased by 40 percent, and 
trade with the non-socialist countries by about 50 percent (socialist 
foreign trade is 60 percent of the total at the present time), indicating 
that Hungary does not lean overwhelmingly toward the COMECON in 
long-range planning, although the importance of the latter is dispro-
portionately stressed in political statements.54 
Comparative COMECON statistics illustrate the need for some cen-
tralization in the Hungarian economy. While the Hungarian gross 
national product in 1974 (128 percent compared to the 1970 base) sur-
passed all bloc countries except Bulgaria, Poland, and Rumania, the 
volume of investments compared with 1970 noticeably declined to the 
lowest level (118 percent) with the exception of East Germany. These 
facts explain the MSZMP's concern with rechanneling the national 
income from the enterprises for overall national distribution. This is 
vital, considering that Hungary's industrial production volume in 1974, 
compared with 1970, was the lowest (130 percent), with the exception 
of East Germany and Czechoslovakia.55 Whereas the Hungarian re-
centralization scheme is more significant economically, some other 
COMECON countries also took efforts to improve their economic 
organization. The USSR introduced a two-to-three level industrial 
administration, and Poland took steps to centralize production through 
the formation of larger economic units.56 
Developments in Cultural Affairs 
Stronger central controls are also observable in cultural affairs, al-
though the changes are not as visible as in the economy. The party has 
always claimed primacy in this area but it has suffered some setbacks.57 
During the NEM's profit-oriented atmosphere opportunist and mate-
rialist behavior spread throughout the society, and the youth in particu-
lar exhibited cynicism and scepticism toward ideology.58 
The 1974 Central Committee resolutions stressed that Marxism-
Leninism was the exclusive foundation of cultural affairs and called for 
more consistent application of this principle. Kadar, following the 
Soviet position, made it clear at the Eleventh Congress that "there is no 
peaceful coexistence on the ideological front" and acknowledged the 
existence of simultaneous trends towards the growth of socialist prin-
ciples and "bourgeois values." He demanded the gradual elimination 
of the latter, but also rejected the impatient views of "dogmatists." 
Accordingly, the party adopted a more determined position in cultural 
problems by emphasizing the significance of fundamental socialist 
principles in the future.59 The need for ideological commitment by party 
members and organizations is being stressed anew in congressional 
resolutions but their efficacy is questionable, since the same problems 
have received attention at past years' party proceedings. 
The MSZMP has called repeatedly for a more vigorous ideological 
training in the educational process. The reorganization of the Ministry 
of Cultural Affairs into a separate Ministry of Education and Ministry 
of Culture was decided in this spirit. Political pressure through com-
munist indoctrination has increased in the primary and secondary 
school system and is expected to counter religious influences still 
present in significant proportions. Recognizing that the educators' 
ideological expertise had declined in the early seventies, the party has 
introduced intensified political courses in the institutions of higher 
learning in addition to the usual party programs.60 
The changing status of school principals reflects stronger central 
authority. The new government regulation makes them more depen-
dent; their appointment is limited to a five-year period and political 
considerations dominate their selection; but this regulation is counter-
acted somewhat by their expanded power in personnel questions and 
in the political control of their staff. The principals, together with the 
faculty, also hold direct responsibility for the privileged treatment of 
worker-class pupils.61 
In the area of academic disciplines, the social sciences are again the 
focus of attention.62 Kadar has criticized some recent theoretical ap-
proaches and the party has called for an unequivocal reliance on 
Marxism-Leninism. The dual role of social sciences is being stressed; 
they are to fulfill important scholarly tasks but they are also expected 
to support the socialist society and its political super-structure.63 
Departure from these principles was sharply criticized at the Eleventh 
Congress. Valeria Benke, member of the Politbureau, acknowledged 
that "both progressive and regressive" views influence the social scien-
tists who have frequently shown one-sidedness in research and have 
become influenced by ultra-leftist or revisionist tendencies by leaning 
toward the "most dangerous bourgeois deviation, nationalism." 64 These 
statements pertain to the Hegediis sociology group which was expelled 
from the party in 1973, and to the social scientists concerned with the 
suppression of Hungarians in Rumania.65 Official overreaction not-
withstanding, Hungarian observers agree that no significant new trends 
have appeared in these areas, and that the anti-nationalist cultural 
policy firmly remains under Aczel's leadership. 
In order to secure party-mindedness in scientific institutions, the 
party might correct "benevolent" errors, and project results are to be 
evaluated at the collective meeting of researchers and party members. 
To bolster working-class participation in the new intelligentsia, a new 
government program has been established, enabling students of worker-
peasant origin to enter universities after preliminary studies, without a 
formal high school diploma or admission tests, both of which are stand-
ard criteria for applicants of different social backgrounds.66 
The MSZMP rationalizes its apparently tightened control on the 
basis that detente has created a favorable climate for "anti-marxist 
views," which aim at the "erosion of the socialist system," and appear 
under the guise of "scientific objectivism." Consequently, there is pres-
sure to improve the ideological orientation of scientists and to maintain 
closer ties with research in the Soviet Union and the other COMECON 
countries.67 Whether this policy will lead to additional restrictions com-
pared with the early seventies is uncertain, but a trend toward a more 
liberalized research program is unlikely.68 
Kadar has also stressed that literary authors have disregarded ideo-
logical considerations in selecting the style and theme of their works.69 
The Eleventh Congress heeded Kadar's expose and declared that 
Marxist criticism must henceforth be applied more rigidly and must 
enjoy higher priority. The freedom of the arts was formally recognized, 
but the party would maintain the privilege to take decisions on extend-
ing support and on rejecting both dogmatism and negativism. In fact 
this principle means absolute control, for there is no other available 
source of support than the state. 
Gyorgy Aczel, who is in charge of cultural policy, reiterated recently 
that artistic contributions must serve the formulation of socialist con-
science and life-style. Even though such statements are not a novelty on 
the Hungarian cultural scene, it appears that the party is determined to 
press its view with more vigor. However, at present there are no indica-
tions of major shifts in implementation. Severe new restrictions are 
unlikely, but any further penetration of non-socialist trends might be 
prevented. This view seems to concur with the official expectation ex-
pressed in the interviews given by Aczel to Le Monde. "The right of 
expression which has no practical consequence is meaningless," and 
"we do not give publicity to inhuman views as exemplified by Solzhenitsyn, 
who urges a new war."70 It is noteworthy that Aczel quickly added that 
many non-communist Western works are being published in Hungary, 
including ones by Charles de Gaulle and Albert Camus. Though these 
publications are limited in quantity and are mostly critical of the 
Western world, especially the United States, Aczel's assurance should 
not be underestimated for it seems to foredoom a return to harsher 
censorship and cultural isolation. 
Conclusions 
The departure from the NEM began in 1974 and continued steadily 
through the Eleventh Congress, climaxing in the new economic regu-
lations and the guidelines for the fifth Five Year Plan to commence in 
1976. Essentially, the new policy is a partial retreat to a more centralized 
and/or controlled system politically, culturally, and economically. 
As the party is the sole source of political power, some internal re-
organization was necessary. However, the effects have remained limited 
and the screening of membership and party congress have served mostly 
propaganda purposes. The reshuffling of high-level leadership, and the 
modification of the infrastructure of the Central Committee have con-
stituted the apogee of the changes. The profile of the Political Bureau 
and the Secretariat indicates a shift in the direction of policy: the 
MSZMP has moved somewhat from right-of-center toward the center 
and left-of-center without restoring extreme conservatism. Kadar's firm 
position as first secretary assures the moderate stance of the Hungarian 
party, but strenuous efforts are being made to reassert the party's power 
and curb the erosion of its influence in society. 
In the governmental machinery, the trend is toward more centralized 
decision-making, implemented by the Council of Ministers, the State 
Planning Committee, and through the politicization of managerial 
positions. Other recent changes are merely formal, and the constitu-
tional amendment altering election terms has only limited meaning. 
Serious efforts are being undertaken in cultural policy to uphold the 
dominance of Marxist-Leninist theory. In this sphere, too, the party has 
reasserted its control on a limited scale without leaning back to earlier 
suppressive tactics. It is acknowledged that the "liberalized" aura of the 
NEM had contributed to the spread of bourgeois values, which has 
induced an intensive ideological training program both within and 
without the educational system. The social sciences had been sharply 
criticized in recent years, and special steps were taken to protect the 
prominence of Marxism and to prevent unacceptable research orienta-
tion. The party pledged, however, that resurgent concern with ideology 
would not result in a return to rigid dogmatism and direct censorship. 
Re-centralization has assumed more significant dimensions in the 
economy, and this may have a negative influence upon political insti-
tutions in the future. The revision of the NEM is essentially a retreat 
toward a more centralized economy. National planning has been ex-
panded at the expense of enterprise autonomy, and the modified system 
of regulators has depleted enterprise profits by returning a higher ratio 
of income to the treasury. The strengthened central planning and the 
system of branch direction have limited enterprise independence and 
decreased the directors' discretionary power. Therefore, it can be ex-
pected that managerial decisions would be influenced more frequently 
by political rather than economic considerations. The successful re-
channeling of enterprise income to the government will reduce enter-
prise profits and premiums during the fifth Five Year Plan, and the new 
steep taxes on participation funds will have the same effect. The stricter 
conditions imposed upon loans will result in heavier reliance on the 
development funds in financing investments, which in turn will reduce 
the financial capacity of the enterprises for income supplements. The 
new wage regulations have been based on a more uniform distribution 
system which will trim some of the extreme differences and bring about 
a "socially more just" wage pattern. These measures, combined with the 
weakened independence of the enterprises, may boost productivity 
through improved technology. However, they may have negative social 
effects, and could impair human incentives for productivity. 
The fifth Five Year Plan, based on a reduced growth rate, will taper 
off improvements in living standards. According to the government, 
this course is inevitable because of uncontrollable factors, especially in 
the area of energy imports.71 The Hungarian economy is tied to the 
COMECON countries and particularly to the Soviet Union. Re-cen-
tralization has moved the Hungarian system closer to the Soviet eco-
nomic model, which shies away from decentralization and will also 
operate on a scaled-down plan for the next five-year period.72 A levelling-
off and possible stagnation in Hungary, therefore, is anticipated, but 
grim prognoses by some Western observers forecasting a serious de-
cline, are unrealistic. It is also expected that controversial social phe-
nomena, especially group conflicts, will be tamed and socialist behavior 
patterns bolstered under the re-centralized economy. Although this 
expectation may be partly realistic, the present Hungarian milieu justi-
fies some scepticism. 
The Kadar era, embracing twenty years, has included a phase of sup-
pression and forced collectivization, merging into a milder policy of 
reconciliation; this trend has climaxed in a measured liberalization and 
in considerable economic and humanitarian accomplishments. The 
pendulum has not stopped there; it continues to move toward a mod-
erate centralization. Nevertheless, the new policy does not mean a 
return to the tight controls prior to the NEM. Speculations that re-
centralization will lead to a sharp reversal are unfounded; rather it aims 
at conservation and stabilization. Kadar's record in the long pull is 
moderate, and he has gained a modicum of popular support; as long as 
he remains in good standing with the Russians, a major political shift 
is unlikely. Though he has apparently accepted the principle of inde-
pendence of the communist parties at the Twenty-First Soviet Party 
Congress, this was counterbalanced by Kadar's affirmation of loyalty 
to proletarian internationalism and the Soviet Union.73 The preponder-
ance of Soviet economic and military power inHungary renders Kadar's 
claim for independence sterile, and it would be unrealistic to expect him 
to forfeit the Soviet protection. 
The twentieth anniversary of the tragic uprising of 1956 shows mate-
rial improvement, a partial return to more central power, a lack of overt 
terror, and a lighter atmosphere, but there is no evidence of basic politi-
cal freedom. Considering Hungarian trends, the latter cannot be ex-
pected without a major transformation in the European balance of 
power, which is highly unlikely under the present world political con-
ditions. 
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A P P E N D I X I 
The Composi t ion of the Nat ional Assembly 
After the 1975 Elections 
Absolute 
Total Number of Seats: 352 Numbers Percentages 
High party functionaries 69 19.6 
Higher ranking officials of the 
government, including economic 
administration and mass 
organizations 1 16 32.9 
Leading intellectuals and artists 6 1.7 
Workers 76 21.5 
Factory foremen and similar groups 33 9.3 
Professionals (physicians, artists, 
teachers, lawyers, etc.) 46 13.0 
Clerics 6 1.7 
Notes: a) The party functionaries represent 19.6 percent or about three 
times the ratio of party members in the total population. 
This is 22 or 6.6 percent more than the 1971 figure, which 
was 47 or 13 percent; see Nepszabadsdg, April 8, 1971, pp. 
7-10. 
b) The category of higher ranking officials includes many party 
members: the exact number is not known. 
c) The top three categories constitute the political elite and in-
clude 191 representatives, which is between 1/2 and 2/3 of 
the total. 
Source: The table was composed by the author on the basis of the 
official report in Nepszabadsdg, June 1, 1975, p. 3, and July 5, 
1975, pp. 1-4. 
A P P E N D I X II 
1974 N a t i o n a l I n c o m e in P e r c e n t a g e s of t he 1973 a n d 1970 
N a t i o n a l I n c o m e 
1973 = 100% 1970 = 100% 
Bulgaria 107.5 133.3 
Hungary 107 128 
GDR 100.3 124.4 
Cuba 108 140 
Mongolia 105.6 123.5 
Poland 110 145 
Rumania 112.5 155.3 
USSR 105 126 
Czechoslovakia 105.5 122.4 
1974 I n v e s t m e n t s in P e r c e n t a g e s of t he 1973 a n d 1970 
I n v e s t m e n t s 
1973 = 100% 1970 = 100% 
Bulgaria 109 131 
Hungary 108 118 
GDR 104.2 117.7 
Cuba — — 
Mongolia 108.1 125.8 
Poland 125 208 
Rumania 117.3 155 
USSR 107 129 
Czechoslovakia 108.7 135.3 
1974 I n d u s t r i a l P r o d u c t i o n in P e r c e n t a g e s of t he 
1973 a n d 1970 P r o d u c t i o n 
1973 = 100% 1970 = 100% 
Bulgaria 108.5 140.9 
Hungary 108.2 130.1 
GDR 107.4 128.5 
Cuba 108 139 
Mongolia 108.3 144.8 
Poland 112.2 149.2 
Rumania 115 164.5 
USSR 108 132.8 
Czechoslovakia 106.2 129.1 
Source: Based on the report by the Statistical Department of the 
Secretariat of the COMECON, published in Nepszabadsag, 
February 21, 1975, pp. 4-5, and Izvestia (Moscow), January 
25, 1975, p. 5. 
Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies, Vol. Ill, No. 2 (Fall 1976) 
A Bibliography of the Hungarian Revolution 
1956 
(Supplement II)* 
I. L. Halasz de Beky 
(compiler) 
ENGLISH 
1. Aczel, Tamas. Ten years after; a commemoration of the tenth 
anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution. London, Macgibbon, 
1966. 253 p. 
2 . The Hungarian Revolution in the perspective of history. 
[1st ed.] New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston [1967, c 1966] 
253 p. 
3. Anderson, Andy. Hungary 1956. London, Solidarity, 1964. 48 p. 
map. 
4. Barber, Noel. Seven days of freedom; the Hungarian uprising 
1956. London, Macmillan, 1973. 268 p. ill. 
5 . New York, Stein & Day, 1974. 266 p. ill. 
6. Brome, Vincent. The revolution. London, Cassel, 1969. 185 p. 
7. Cnossen, Taeke. Integration of refugees; some observations on 
the Hungarians in Canada. [The Hague, P.H. Klop, 1964] 
24 p. (R.E.M.P. bulletin, supplement, 7) 
8. Cooper, George William. Russianism or Christ; elegy for the 
revolutionists. A story of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 
in prose and verse by George Noel-Cooper. With introduction 
by H.C. Bezou. Postscriptum by Francis Hajtas and Joseph 
Ertavy. [1st ed.] New Orleans, Pelican [1964] xvi, 104 p. 
* The present supplement contains 117 entries of books and pamphlets, 
bringing to 730 the total of published works relating to the Hungarian Revolu-
tion. The list covers the period of October 1956 to July 1, 1976. The arrange-
ment of the entries follows that of the main Bibliography of the Hungarian 
Revolution 1956 (University of Toronto Press, 1963), i.e., the entries are divided 
by languages. For the first supplement see Francis S. Wagner (ed.), The Hun-
garian Revolution in Perspective (Washington, D.C.: F.F. Memorial Founda-
tion, 1967), pp. 255-336. 
9. 
10. 
1 1 . 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
Co-operative Party (Great Britain). Hungary, as we saw it. Lon-
don, 1961. 
Ertavy-Barath, Kata. Teaspoonful of freedom. [Astor Park, Fla., 
American-Hungarian Literary Guild, cl968] 222 p. 
Hay ward, Max. The ideological consequences of October 1956. 
Oxford, St. Anthony's College, 1957. 20 p. (St. Anthony's 
papers on Soviet affairs [32]) 
Helmreich, Ernst C. (ed.) Hungary. Westport, Conn., Green-
wood Press, 1973 [cl957] xiv, 466 p. maps. 
Hungarian News and Information Service. All about Hungary. 
London, 1956. 
Kovacs, Imre (ed.) Facts about Hungary; the fight for freedom. 
[Rev. ed.] New York, Hungarian Committee, 1966. 382 p. 
maps. 
Lasky, Melvin J. (ed.) The Hungarian revolution; a white book. 
Freeport, N.Y., Books for Libraries [1970, cl957] 318 p. ill., 
maps, ports. 
Mage, Shane. The Hungarian Revolution; documents. New York, 
Young Socialist Forum, 1960. iv, 35 p. (Educational bulletin, 
1) 
Marton, Endre. The forbidden sky. [1st ed.] Boston, Little, 
Brown [1971] xii, 306 p. 
Meray, Tibor. That day in Budapest, October 23, 1956. New 
York, Funk & Wagnall [1969] 503 p. map (on lining papers) 
Molnar, Miklos. Budapest 1956; a history of the Hungarian 
revolution; tr. [from the French] by Jennetta Ford. London, 
Allen and Unwin, 1971. 303 p. maps. 
Nagy Kazmer (ed.) Australia and the Hungarian question in the 
United Nations; a collection of selected documents. Canberra, 
FM Press, 1966. 55 p. 
Nemes, Dezso (ed.) Chapters from the revolutionary workers' 
movement in Hungary, 1956-1962. [Budapest, Party History 
Institute of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers' Party, 1971] 133 p. 
Pesti, Jozsef. On the edge of the volcano. Charlottesville, 1966. 
Pogany, Andras. A city in the darkness. [Gainesville, Fla., 
American-Hungarian Literary Guild, 1966] 262 p. 
Pryce-Jones, David. The Hungarian Revolution. London, Benn, 
1969. 128 p. ill., maps, ports. (Twentieth-century histories) 
New York, Horizon Press [1970, cl969] 127 p. 
ill., maps, ports. 
26. Radvanyi, Janos. Hungary and the superpowers; the 1956 Revol-
ution and realpolitik. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution 
Press, Stanford University [1972] xvii, 197 p. (Hoover Insti-
tution publications, 111) 
27. Ray, David. From the Hungarian Revolution; a collection of 
poems. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press [1966] xxiv, 
186 p. facsims. 
"Adapted from the Hungarian Fiiveskert, ed. by Tibor Tollas." 
28. Refusal of a compromise; documents concerning the Indian at-
tempts to mediate in Hungary, December 1956. [Berne, 1957?] 
12 p. 
29. Sartre, Jean Paul. The ghost of Stalin. Tr. from the French by 
M.H. Fletcher. New York, Braziller [1968] 150 p. 
30. . The spectre of Stalin. Tr. from the French by Irene 
Clephane. London, Hamilton, 1969. 131 p. 
31. Shawcross, William. Crime and compromise; Janos Kadar and 
the politics of Hungary since revolution. [1st ed.] New York, 
Dutton, 1974. 311 p. 
32. Revolution in Hungary and the crisis of Stalinism. [New York] 
Pioneer [1957] 33 leaves. 
33. Soviet News. Documents on Hungary. London, 1956. 
34. Stein, A.B. India's reaction to the Hungarian Revolution; an 
appraisal. [Kingston] University of Rhode Island, cl967. 13 p. 
(Occasional papers in political science, 1) 
35. Survey. Hungary today, by the Editors of Survey. New York, 
Praeger, 1962. (Praeger publications in Russian history and 
world Communism, 108) 
36. Szabo, Miklos. Homeless in the world. Budapest, Pannonia, 
1960. 243 p. ill., facsims. 
37. Szabo, Tamas [pseud.] Boy on the rooftop. Tr. from the French 
by David Hughes. Gloucester, Mass., P. Smith, 1968 [cl958] 
ix, 180 p. map. 
38. Szeplaki, Jozsef. Selected bibliography on Hungary with special 
reference to the Revolution 1956, available in the Ohio Uni-
versity Library. [Athens, Ohio, 1971] 12 p. Caption title. 
39. Wagner, Francis S. (ed.) The Hungarian Revolution in perspec-
tive. Washington, F.F. Memorial Foundation, 1967, 350 p. 
40. Weinstock, Sandor. Acculturation and occupation; a study of 
the 1956 Hungarian refugees in the United States. The Hague, 
Nijhoff, 1969 [1970] x, 127 p. (Publications of the R.G.E.M.P., 
15) 
41. World Council of Churches. Hungary — special report. Geneva, 
1957. 30 p. ill. 
42. Zinner, Paul E. Revolution in Hungary. Freeport, N.Y., Books 
for Libraries [1972, cl962] xi, 380 p. 
FRENCH 
43. Aranyossy, Georges. lis ont tue ma fois; un itineraire com-
muniste. Paris, Laffont [1971] 401 p. (Collection Vecu) 
44. Bernadac, Christian. L'execution de Budapest. Editions France 
Empire [1966?] 272 p. plates. 
45. Brugere-Trelat, Vincent. Budapest. [Paris] La Table Ronde 
[1966] 362 p. (L'histoire contemporaine revue et comparee) 
46. Etudes sur la Revolution hongroise. v. 1- Bruxelles, Institut 
Imre Nagy de sciences politiques, 1962-
47. Fejto, Francois. Budapest 1956, la revolution hongroise. [Paris] 
Julliard, 1966. 287 p. map, plates. (Collection Archives, 24) 
48. Gosztony, Peter. Histoire du soulevement hongrois 1956. Traduit 
du hongrois par Mme Berkit et M.M. Garaet Kaman. [Roanne] 
Horvath, 1966. 384 p. plates. 
49. Institut frangais d'opinion publique. L'opinion dupubliquefran-
gais sur les evenements de Hongrie, de Suez et d'Algerie. Paris 
[ETMAR] 1957. 38 leaves 
50. Kallai, Gyula. La contre-revolution de Hongrie a la lumiere du 
marxisme-leninisme. [Budapest, Zrinyi, 1957] 38 p. 
51. Khrushchev, Nikita. Moscou au tournant; du rapport Khrout-
chev a I'insurrection hongroise. Paris [n.d.] 
52. Marie, Jean Jacques. Pologne-Hongrie 1956 ou le Printemps en 
octobre; textes choisis et traduits sous la direction de Jean 
Jacques Marie et Balazs Nagy. Paris, Etudes et documentation 
internationales, 1966. iii, 368 p. 
53. Meray, Tibor. Budapest (23 octobre 1956). Precede de: Kadar a 
eu son jour de peur, discours prononce par Albert Camus, le 
15 mars 1957 a Paris. Paris, Laffont, 1966. 351 p. ill., plates 
(Ce jour la: 23 octobre 1956) 
54. Molnar, Miklos. Victoire d'une defaite, Budapest, 1956. Paris, 
Fayard, 1968. 365 p. ill. (Le Mond sans frontieres) 
55. Naegelen, Marcel E. La Revolution assasinee. Hongrie octobre-
novembre 1956. Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1966. 256 p. 
56. Nogradi, Sandor. Avant 56, chronique hongroise. Preface de 
Pierre Villon. Paris, Ed. du Pavilion, 1969. 295 p. 
57. Refus d'un compromis; document relative aux tentatives indi-
ennes de bons offices dans l'affaire de la revolution hongroise, 
decembre 1956. [Bern, 1957?] 12 p. 
GERMAN 
58. Farkas, Jozsef (ed.) Die ungarische Revolution 1956. Koln, 
Amerikanisch-Ungarischer Verlag, 1957. 2 v. ill. 
59. Feketekuty, Laszlo. Die Lehren der Ungarischen Revolution. 
Koln, Szechenyi-Kreis, 1961. 42 p. (Schriftenreihe des Sze-
chenyi-Kreises, 4) 
60. Frauendienst, Werner. Ungarn zehn Jahre danach, 1956-1966. 
Ein wissenschaftliches Sammelwerk. Mainz, Hase u. Koehler 
[1966] 357 p. 
61. Free Europe Committee. Die Volkserhebung in Ungarn. Miin-
chen, 1956. 
62. Gosztony, Peter (ed.) Der Ungarische Volksaufstand in Augen-
zeugen berichtet. Diisseldorf, Rauch, 1966. 461 p. ill., maps. 
63 . Fribourg, Office du Livre, 1966. 461 p. 8 plates. 
64. Hantos, Elemer. Ungarn 1848 und 1956. Zwei Revolutionen, 
zwei Konterrevolutionen, ein Ausgleich. Bern, Verlag SOI, 
1969. 120 p. (Tatsachen und Meinungen, 7) 
65. Imre Nagy; zur politischen und rechtlichen Bedeutung seiner 
Ermordung. [Bern] 1959. 69 p. (Schriftenreihe des Schweiz-
erisches Ost-Instituts. Reihe Materialen, 3) 
66. Moldova, Gyorgy. Der einsame Pavilion. MUnchen, Desch, 
1970. 161 p. 
67. Schneider-Henn, Dietrich. Griff nach der Freiheit. [Frankfurt/ 
Main] Europaische Verlaganstalt [1956] 83 p. 
68. Sebestyen, Gyorgy. Die Tiiren schliessen sich; Roman. Wien, 
Desch, 1957. 337 p. 
69. Szabo, Miklos. Heimatlos in der grossen Welt. Budapest, Pan-
nonia, 1960. 
70. Tollas, Istvan [pseud.] Wir kampften fur unsere Freiheit. [Liestal, 
Liidin, 1957] 93 p. 
71. Verbelen, Robert. Der Mond wird weinen. Blick und Bild Verl. 
[1969] 288 p. 
HUNGARIAN 
72. Berecz, Janos. Ellenforradalom tollalesfegyverrel, 1956. [Buda-
pest] Kossuth, 1969. 169 p. 
73. Berecz, Tibor. Eros Janos; koltoi elbeszeles. [Toronto, Ont., 
1966] 58 p. 
74. Berkesi, Andras. Oktoberi vihar. Vihar utan. [4. valtozatlan 
kiad.] Budapest, Magveto [1970] 678 p. 
75. Borbandi, Gyula. Tanulmanyok a magyar forradalomrdl. Szerk 
Borbandi Gyula es Molnar Jozsef. Miinchen, Aurora, 1966. 
680 p. 
76. Deri, Erno. Az ellenforradalom Miskolcon. [Irtak] Deri Erno 
[es] Pataki Laszlo. [Budapest] Kossuth, 1957. 69 p. 
77. Ellenforradalmi esemenyek a biharkeresztesi jarasban. [Bihar-
keresztesi Jarasi Partbizottsag] 1967. 32 p. ports. 
78. Ellenforradalom a siklosi jarasban. [Pecs, 1957] 39 p. ill. 
79. Ellenforradalom es tanulsagai a pecsi jarasban. [Pecs] MSzMP 
Pecsi Jarasi Vegrehajtobizottsaga [1957] 23 p. 
80. Az ellenforradalom tenyei Hajdu-Bihar ban. Debrecen [Szabad-
sag Lapnyomda] 1957. 91 p. ill. 
81. Erdos, Laszlo. Egy ejszaka tortenete. Budapest, Magveto, 1965. 
343 p. 
82. Ertavy-Barath, Kata. Tortenelem: kitund, regeny az 1956-os 
szabadsagharc idejebol. [Cleveland, Karpat, 1966] 180 p. ill. 
83. Feketekuty, Laszlo. 1956 oktober; a magyar forradalom torte-
nelmi kiertekelese. Briisszel, Magyar Haz, 1966. 123 p. 
84. Fiilop, Janos. Renduletleniil. Budapest, Zrinyi, 1966. 169 p. ill. 
(Faklya konyvek) 
85. Hollos, Ervin. Kik voltak, mit akartak? 2 jav. kiad. [Budapest] 
Kossuth, 1967. 306 p. ill., ports. 
86. Lauko, Zoltan. Aranyhalak. Budapest, Magveto, 1964.286 p. ill. 
87. Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart. Az ellenforradalom komarom-
megyei esemenyei. [n.p.] 1957. 
88. Manyoky-Nemeth, Karoly. 1956 oktober 23. [Toronto, 1972] 
108 p. 
89. Mezei, Andras. Vaskeriilet; Mezei Andras es Foldesi Jozsef 
riportjai. [Budapest] Mora [1958] 106 p. ill. 
90. Moldova, Gyorgy. Maganyospavilon. Budapest, Magveto, 1966. 
215 p. (Magveto kiskonyvtar) 
91. Molnar, Janos. Ellenforradalom Magyarorszagon 1956-ban; a 
polgari magyarazatok biralata. Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, 
1967. 266 p. 
92. . A Nagybudapesti Kdzponti Munkastanacs. Budapest, 
Akademiai Kiado, 1969. 149 p. 
93. Munkasorok; szemelvenyek a munkasorseg tizeves tortenetebol. 
[Valogatta es szerk. Vadasz Ferenc] Budapest [Munkasorseg 
Orszagos Parancsnoksaga] 1967. 198 p. ill. 
94. Nemeth, Erno. Oktoberi arnyak; versek. Toronto, Patria, 1966. 
64 p. 
95. Nogradi, Sandor. Tortenelmi lecke. [Budapest, Kossuth, 1970] 
466 p. 
96. Pinter, Istvan. Magyarok amerikai koszton. Budapest, Tancsics, 
1972. 335 p. ill. 
97. Sik, Endre. Bern rakpartievek. [Budapest] Kossuth, 1970. 286 p. 
98. Szeplaki, Jozsef. Valahonnan valahova; epizodok az 1956-os 
magyar forradalomrol. Boston, 1966. 58 p. 
99. Tamas, Aladar. Emberek a pusztaban. Budapest, Magveto, 
1967. 230 p. 
100. Tollas, Tibor. Gloria victis; az 1956-os magyar szabadsagharc 
koltoi visszhangja a nagyvilagban. Miinchen, Nemzetor, 1966. 
422 p. ill., facsims., music 
101. Zaszlos-Zsoka, Gyorgy. Vae victis. Buenos Aires, Magyar Egy-
seg, 1959. 
ITALIAN 
102. II Comunismo da Budapest a Praga, 1956-1968. Prefazione di 
Adolfo Battaglia. Roma, Ed. della Voce, 1969. 199 p. ill. 
(Saggi, 2) 
103. Meray, Tibor. La rivolta di Budapest (23 ottobre-4 novembre 
1956) Presentazione di Albert Camus. Milano, Mursia, 1969. 
391 p. plates. (Testimonianze fra cronaca e storia, 39) 
MODERN GREEK 
104. Basileiou, Basos. He deutere Oktobriane epanastase; dokimio 
gia to Oungrika (1945-1957) [Athena, 1957?] 195 p. facsims. 
SLAVIC 
105. Molnar, Janos. Kontrarevolucia v Mad'arsku roku 1956. Kritika 
burzoaznych interpretacii. 1. vyd. Bratislava, Pravda, 1972. 
366 p. (Clenska kniznica) 
106. Ovsiannikova, Maria D. Glazami starogo durga; vengerskie 
zapiski. Moskva, 1957. 92 p. 
107. Revesz, Istvan. Za chuzhezemnye den'gi — vengerskuiu krov. 
Budapest, Kossuth, 1957. 
SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE 
108. Alba, Victor. Las lecciones de un mes tragico; Hungria y el 
cercano oriente. Mexico, Centro de Estudios Sociales, 1956. 
32 p. 
109. Frutos, Eugenio. La vina destruida; a Hungria en su martirio. 
Zaragoza, 1957. 43 p. (La Tela de Penelope, 2) 
110. Gonzalez Alberdi, Paulino. Hungria, la batalla que perdio la 
reaccion; mi visita a Budapest, tras los sucesos de octubre de 
1956. Buenos Aires, Anteo, 1957. 108 p. ill., ports. 
111. Liras en las catacumbas; reflejo literario de la poesia y de la 
revolucion hungara. Buenos Aires [Associacion Cultural Ar-
gentina por Hungria] 1959. 190 p. ill. 
112. Persoa, Lenildo Tabara. A revolugao popular; operarios, estu-
dantes e intelectuais contra imperialismo. Caruaru, Liv. Estu-
dantil, 1966. 171 p. plates. 
113. Szots, Vilmos. Impresiones grdficas sobre la rebelion Hungara. 
Mexico, D. Bosco [1966] 1 v. (chiefly ill.) 
Includes poems in Hungarian. 
114. Union Civica Internacional. Nueva victima de la bestia roja; 
matanza de hungaros, vuelve la tenebrosa Edad Media en 
nuestros tiempos. Mexico, 1957. 126 p. ill. 
SWEDISH 
115. Kallberg, Sture. Uppror — Budapest 56. Dagboksblad. Stock-
holm, Raben & Sjogren, 1966. 149 p. (Tema) 
116. Littomericzky, Oscar. Atervunnet manniskovarde. Skisser. 3. 
utvidgade uppl. Lund, Gleerup, 1966. 54 p. ill. 
TURKISH 
117. Ergiin, Mehmet. Magar ihtilali. [Istanbul] Katap?ihk Ticaret, 
1967. 128 p. (Ak§am kitap kulubu, 34) 
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BOOK REVIEW* 
Remember Hungary 1956 
Francis Laping and Hans Knight, eds. Remember Hungary 1956. 
Center Square, Pa.: Alpha Publications, 1975. Pp. 381. $30.00. 
This superb compilation appears as a fitting memorial on the twentieth 
anniversary of the Hungarian revolution. Between October 23 and No-
vember 4, 1956, the Hungarian people, united as perhaps never before 
in their history, swept away the dictatorship of the Communist Party 
and challenged the Soviet Union's hegemonic rule. The consensual ob-
jectives of the revolution were national independence and neutrality, a 
pluralistic democratic system, a mixed economy and the termination of 
compulsory collectivization, and basic freedoms of speech, press, re-
ligion, and association. 
While the revolution easily demonstrated the devastating unpopu-
larity and weakness of the indigenous Communist Party, it could not 
withstand the naked might of Soviet imperialism. The restoration of 
Communist dictatorship was a painful process, and many years passed 
before the Kadar regime managed to forge a certain modus vivendi with 
the Hungarian people through an "alliance policy" reflected in the 
famous slogan "those who are not against us are with us." Kadar himself 
has described the revolution as a national tragedy, and on the occasion 
of the party's 11th congress in 1975 he claimed that eighteen years'ex-
perience had shown that the dictatorship of the proletariat "was not 
such a bad dictatorship. One can live under it, create freely, and gain 
honour." 
In fact, the Hungarians have achieved a notable degree of affluence 
and even a certain cultural freedom while foregoing the democratic 
political system and national independence anticipated by the revolu-
tion. Notwithstanding the false promises of peaceful coexistence and 
* Other book reviews slated for this issue will appear in Vol. IV, No. 1 (Spring 
1977) of CARHS. 
detente, this is perhaps all that they can hope to attain under Soviet 
tutelage. 
The contemporary documents, appraisals, and photographs in Re-
member Hungary 1956 provide a vivid reminder of those days of 
heroism, euphoria, and tragedy. The tree of liberty, wrote Thomas 
Jefferson, must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots 
and tyrants. The Hungarian people paid a heavy price for their chal-
lenge to totalitarianism and foreign oppression, and the memory of 
their historic gesture must be nurtured for the sake of future generations. 
A small correction that imposes itself is that in the bibliography two 
works by Professor Bela Kovrig are wrongly attributed to this reviewer. 
University of Toronto Bennett Kovrig 
BOOKS RECEIVED 
Borbandi, Gyula. Der Ungarische Populismus. Mainz: v. Hase & 
Koehler Verlag, 1976. 
Gabor, Aron. East of Man. Translated from Hungarian by Kathleen 
Szasz. Toronto: Weller Publishing Co., 1975. 
Gosztony, Peter. (Ed.) Zur Geschichte der europaischen Volksarmeen. 
Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Hohwacht, 1976. 
Komlos, John H. Louis Kossuth in America, 1851-1852. Foreword by 
C. A. Macartney. Buffalo: East European Institute, 1973. 
Konnyu, Leslie. Acacias: Hungarians in the Mississippi Valley. Ligo-
nier, Pa.: Bethlen Press Inc., 1976. 
Miska, John P. (Ed.) The Sound of Time. Lethbridge, Alberta: Canad-
ian-Hungarian Authors' Association, 1974. 
Nanay, Julia. Transylvania: The Hungarian Minority in Rumania. 
Astor, Florida: Danubian Press, 1976. 
Nowak, C. M. Czechoslovak-Polish Relations, 1918-1939. A Selected 
and Annotated Bibliography. Stanford, California: Hoover Insti-
tution Press, 1976. 
Nyerges, Anton N. Petofi. English and Introduction by Anton N. 
Nyerges. Edited by Joseph M. Ertavy-Barath. Buffalo, N.Y.: Hun-
garian Cultural Foundation, 1973. 
Nyerges, Anton N. (Editor and translator.) Poems of Endre Ady. 
Buffalo, N.Y.: Hungarian Cultural Foundation, 1969. 
Nyerges, Anton N. (Editor and translator.) Poems of Attila Jozsef. 
Buffalo, N.Y.: Hungarian Cultural Foundation, 1973. 
Vardy, Steven Bela. Hungarian Historiography and the Geistesge-
schichte School. Cleveland: Arpad Academy, 1974. 
Vardy, Steven Bela. Modern Hungarian Historiography. Boulder: East 
European Quarterly, 1976. 
Geza Csermak de Rohan 
1926-1976 
Geza Csermak de Rohan had a distinguished career as ethnologist, 
museologist and university teacher. He was born in 1926 in Budapest 
into a family of French origin. From 1945 to 1950 he attended the Insti-
tut Frangais and the University of Budapest. He received his first doc-
torate in 1950. After teaching in the University's Department of Eth-
nology, he became Curator in Hungary's National Museum of Eth-
nology, a post which he held until 1956. From 1957 to 1965 he was a 
Research Fellow at the Musee de 1'Homme in Paris. In 1966 he earned 
a doctorate in ethnology at the Sorbonne (University of Paris). From 
1966 to 1969 he was Professor of Cultural and Social Anthropology at 
the Catholic University of Paris. In 1969 he came to North America 
and, after being Visiting Professor of Sociology at Eastern Illinois 
University (1969-70) and Laval University (1970-73), he became Assis-
tant Chief of the Canadian Centre for Folk Culture Studies, National 
Museum of Man, in Ottawa. 
Professor de Rohan was fluent in French, English, Hungarian and 
German and had a reading knowledge of four other languages. He had 
conducted ethnological research and field work in Hungary, Spain, 
Scotland, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, the U.S.A. and Canada. 
During the last few years of his life he was co-ordinator of the Bekevar 
Team Project studying Hungarian pioneer settlers in the Canadian 
prairies. 
Professor de Rohan was the recipient of numerous research grants 
and fellowships granted by such institutions as the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences, the National Centre of Scientific Research in France and 
the Fulbright Foundation. He was a member and officer of numerous 
learned societies and academic associations. He was the founding edi-
tor of Ethnologia Europaea (Paris, now Gottingen), and participated 
in the editorial work of several other journals including: Folia Ethno-
graphica, the International Journal of Sociology and the Canadian-
American Review of Hungarian Studies. Professor de Rohan was the 
author of five books, close to fifty articles and some eighty other pub-
lications. At the time of his death, he was a member of the University 
of Western Ontario's Department of Sociology. He is survived by his 
wife Therese, and children: Zoltan, Henri, Stella and Paola. His un-
timely departure is a great loss to scholarship in general and Hungarian 
studies in particular. 
(NFD) 
CONTRIBUTORS (continued from page 70) 
Introduction to the Literature of Eastern Europe (an essay, anthology 
and bibliography, AAASS, 1977). He is also the author of the novel 
The Ice Age (Simon & Schuster, 1965) and of an autobiographical 
essay God's Vineyard (forthcoming). Currently Professor Aczel is 
working on a new novel, as yet untitled. 
BELA KIRALY has had a distinguished career both as a soldier and 
a scholar. He graduated from Hungary's best military academies, be-
came a member of the country's General Staff and was the Commandant 
of the War College in Budapest before his arrest in 1951 by the Com-
munists. He was freed from prison in 1956 and served as the Military 
Commander of Budapest and Commander-in-Chief of Hungary's 
National Guard during the Revolution. After his escape to the West 
Professor Kiraly obtained a Ph.D. in history at Columbia University 
and became Professor of Military History at Brooklyn College of the 
City University of New York. He is also an honorary faculty member 
of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. 
Professor Kiraly is the author of Hungary in the Late Eighteenth 
Century (Columbia University Press, 1969), Ferenc Dedk (Twayne 
Publishers, 1975) and the editor of several volumes of readings in-
cluding Tolerance and Movements of Religious Dissent in Eastern 
Europe (Columbia University Press, 1975), The Habsburg Empire in 
World War I (Columbia, 1976), East Central European Perceptions of 
Early America (Peter de Ridder Press, 1977). At the present Professor 
Kiraly is continuing his work on war and society in nineteenth and 
twentieth century Europe with the aid of a Guggenheim Fellowship. 
PAUL PILISI received his undergraduate training at the University of 
Budapest and his doctorate at the Catholic University of Louvain in 
Belgium. Since 1972 he has been teaching at the Univesity of Quebec 
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